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ABSTRACT 
 
One of the key aspects in the learning process, whether it is at an individual or 
organizational level, is the ability to recognize where errors occur. This is especially 
important in the field of public safety where small errors can present a serious threat to 
the safety of first responders and victims of disasters. Up to this point, there has been no 
systematic study to identify the most common errors that occur during emergency 
operations center (EOC) activations at the local level of government. Following the 
introduction, one chapter explores the history of emergency management and the 
difficulties local jurisdictions have encountered in their attempt to manage large-scale 
emergencies or disasters.  
 Another chapter is devoted to explaining the use of content analysis to review 
after action reports (AARs) from communities with a population between 300,000 and 
499,000. The statistical analysis of the AARs analyzed indicated that issues associated 
with communication, organization, situational awareness, resource deficiencies, as well 
as training, did have an impact in a majority of emergency operations centers (EOCs) 
during an activation. In addition, commonalities among challenges was also noted. Based 
upon the findings of this study, the outcomes can be used to help enhance current and 
future training programs so that preventable errors can be reduced or preferably 
eliminated.   
xiv, 234 pages 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Background 
 Emergency management is a field that is interdisciplinary by nature and 
incorporates multiple functions in order to be successful. Whether it is an interagency 
planning effort conducted to address the potential outcome of a regional influenza 
outbreak or the gathering of community organizations to discuss an annual family 
preparedness program, collaboration, coordination, and communication are critical. 
Whether man-made, technological, or natural, any large-scale incident or major crisis will 
involve numerous organizations. Emergency managers will be expected to serve as 
facilitators and convene those organizations so that an effective and efficient response 
can be initiated. Most likely, the response to, or recovery from, these types of scenarios 
will typically involve a network of multiple jurisdictions, as well as private and non-profit 
actors. In addition, multiple levels of government will become involved at some point 
(Moynihan, 2009).  
 During times of non-emergency, or what is often referred to as “blue sky” 
periods, emergency management entities, much like other organizations, utilize a 
framework or some type of organizational structure by which they can prioritize their 
tasks in order to help meet the needs of the community they serve. By using an 
organizational structure, they are able to meet their desire to build upon good business 
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practices and eliminate foreseeable errors, taking advantage of their own past experiences 
and using lessons learned along the way. Good preparation is based upon the realization 
that each crisis and disaster is unique and may take unknown (and unknowable) 
resources. At the same time, preparedness aims to build organizational capacities to deal 
with known risks that can be expected to occur (Boin & Hart , 2010). 
 This being the case, emergency management agencies benefit from having a 
template to follow during large-scale emergencies and/or disasters that require the 
activation of the local Emergency Operations Center (EOC). Unfortunately, at this point, 
established overarching standards, templates, or best practices that are utilized for 
activating EOCs are not in place. The result, according to one emergency management 
director from Virginia, is that “lessons learned, in many cases, are “lessons observed”, 
because modifications in policy, protocol, training, equipment, personnel, or mindset to 
actually promulgate change are not adopted (Brown, 2015).  
 One of the most common methods regarding how change is undertaken is to 
identify common obstacles and challenges, or situations or incidents that inhibit an EOC 
from reaching optimum efficiency and effectiveness. By taking the time to identify 
persistent obstacles, first responders can become aware of the challenges they face and 
place themselves in a better position to avoid future errors through better planning and 
training (Donahue & Tuohy, 2006). Additionally, through the process of understanding 
why some challenges remain unresolved, “responders may be able to adapt their lessons-
learned processes to better support behavioral change and improvement” (Donahue & 
Tuohy, 2006, p. 2). Accordingly, to improve current training programs, the foundation of 
the improvements must be based upon sound empirical evidence and be inclusive of best 
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practices where applicable. Taking deliberate steps to correct actions or create policies 
based upon empirical evidence is a good approach to solving issues hindering optimal 
performance.   
 Historically, emergency managers have taken the position that learning occurs 
from making mistakes. While to some extent this may be true, not all crises and disasters 
result in procedural or policy reform, or, for that matter, learning, even when mistakes 
and oversights have been clearly identified (Deverell & Hansen, 2009). Past and current 
research have been somewhat lacking in terms of identifying and comprehending 
organizational learning (Deverell, 2012), which has served as an unsurmountable 
hindrance to those professions that are trying to move forward. For example, many public 
safety and public health organizations implement and utilize formal knowledge 
management practices to help with the identification and sharing of experiences gained 
by individuals and groups over time (Savoia, Agboola, & Biddinger, 2012). One of the 
most common techniques used to enhance the learning process is through the 
aforementioned “lessons-learned” approach. A significant benefit of this type of approach 
is its application to both large and small enterprises, which is especially helpful in terms 
of addressing EOC operations because a “one-size-fits-all” approach is inappropriate for 
the variety of communities in which individual EOCs operate.  
 Within the public safety arena, learning from successes and failures, both within 
the organization itself and from others, has been a cornerstone for helping agencies 
become better prepared. Whether during blue-sky times or in the midst of a response to a 
disaster, the necessity and desire to improve policies, procedures, and processes is always 
present. Learning from historical practices, whether good or bad, helps individuals as 
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well as organizations improve their own performance (Savoia, Agboola, & Biddinger, 
2012). For emergency management professionals, drawing upon lessons learned from 
real-world events and training simulations not only influences their ability to assist with 
life-saving activities, but also improves their capacity to minimize avoidable economic 
and social consequences (Savoia, Agboola, & Biddinger, 2012). Through this technique, 
many organizations have created formal procedures for identifying, documenting, and 
sharing lessons learned from prior responses to emergencies as well as from simulations 
(Savoia, Agboola, & Biddinger, 2012).  
 Research has shown that noting past errors that occurred during emergency 
situations provides an excellent opportunity for learning (Loh, Andrews, Hesketh, & 
Griffin, 2013). As such, multiple programs have been developed to draw upon these 
lessons to help organizations improve their functions. One of the best known is the U.S. 
Army’s After Action Review program, which utilizes After Action Reports (AARs) and 
serves as a comprehensive, reflective-learning process (Donahue & Tuohy, 2006). 
 Throughout the country, numerous emergency responders follow the AAR 
template in some fashion, which is basically employing either a formal or informal 
process in which an agency or set of agencies documents the occurrences of a disaster or 
exercise. These reports usually include accounts of actions taken and the results of those 
actions. They often also identify potential remedies to problems encountered (Donahue & 
Tuohy, 2006). The AARs help individuals and organizations create a tool for the 
accumulation of experiences, which then can be utilized by individuals to implement 
useful cognitive skills even under stress (Donahue & Tuohy, 2006). Skills in this area 
consist of, but are not limited to, framing the problem, developing mental models, and 
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engaging in sense making (Moynihan, 2009). Thus, these ideas form the foundation of 
this study, which, specifically seeks to identify the most common challenges that occur 
during EOC activations so that future training can focus on known challenges.  
 At this point, no literature has been published regarding the examination and 
comparison of multiple jurisdictional EOCs regarding common errors and challenges 
they face during an activation. Therefore, the result of this study could enhance EOC 
effectiveness and efficiency by highlighting those areas that are most frequently 
encountered. Furthermore, errors in individual EOCs can be identified in a fashion that is 
acceptable to those who operate within the discipline, and recommendations can be 
developed that are applicable to all EOCs. 
Problem Statement 
 In order for organizations and individuals to improve their ability to perform 
tasks, they must be able to recognize where errors are occurring in their current level of 
performance. In public safety, this is critical because small errors can pose serious threats 
to the safety of first responders and victims (Jehn & Techakesari, 2014). According to 
Sinclair, Doyle, Johnston, and Paton (2012), “The quality of the response and recovery 
efforts is thus directly linked to the knowledge and skills possessed by staff working at 
disaster sites” (p. 2). This same premise holds true not only for first responders, but also 
for those who work within an EOC.  
 Mistakes made in the EOC can directly impact the ability of the EOC to provide 
support to those who are actively engaged in disaster operations. The goal of emergency 
management training is to develop the abilities of EOC personnel as they respond to the 
challenging and atypical demands of a disaster  (Uhr , 2009). In order to improve 
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performance levels, those who are charged with the responsibility of organizing and/or 
managing an EOC operation need to have access to information that readily identifies the 
errors made in EOCs, as well as their causes. This will then provide them with the 
information they require to correct deficiencies and improve their ability to support 
responders in the field.   
 In past studies, researchers have shown how the process of learning from past 
errors has yet to manifest itself (Donahue & Tuohy, 2006). While the use of AARs has 
shown to be beneficial, the recommendations that can be found within the documents are 
not always recognized and/or implemented. Additionally, while documenting errors is 
useful and necessary in identifying deficiencies, no efforts to systematically examine and 
compare EOCs have been made to identify the most common challenges. Additionally, 
documentation may identify mistakes but not the process in which to correct them. Thus, 
actions that have been taken to correct these problems have not been shared, limiting the 
benefits that could be derived holistically, to only a few EOCs.  
 During a White House press conference, Assistant to the President for Homeland 
Security and Counterterrorism Frances Townsend stated that the President requested that 
the mistakes made in response to Katrina be corrected (Donahue & Tuohy, 2006). 
Specifically, she identified areas such as planning, situational awareness, and 
communications. While these issues may have been news to some, this did not come as a 
surprise to the emergency management community (Donahue & Tuohy, 2006), because 
these are the same issues practitioners have been battling for many years (Donahue & 
Tuohy, 2006), which is further evidence that problems have been identified but not 
corrected.  
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 As stated by Thomas et al. (2004), “There is a growing realization that nearly all 
currently accepted disaster preparedness practices are based largely upon anecdote, and 
are lacking systematic study or objective validation (as cited in Sinclair et al., 2012, p. 
517). In addition, although studies have been conducted to identify errors, many have 
focused on incident response organizations. While very useful for responders, they are 
not much benefit to those who are working within an EOC environment. Without 
highlighting the areas that need the most attention, improving the efficiency and 
effectiveness of EOC operations will continue to be difficult.  
 While some research has focused on issues such as coordination and information 
flow in EOCs (Militello, Patterson, Bowman, & Wears, 2007), studies have not focused 
on exploring AARs in an attempt to identify the most common issues as noted by EOC 
personnel. This study serves to build upon current research in an attempt to explore the 
most common errors found during EOC operations to help improve their operational 
capabilities and training programs, as well as to begin the process of gathering data by 
which improvements can be measured. 
Purpose of the Study 
 The purpose of this study is to examine AARs created in examining the operation 
of an EOC in order to identify areas noted as needing improvement. Secondly, this study 
will help to identify the existence of trends in terms of areas for improvement 
documented in multiple EOC operations. Third, this study will offer possible solutions to 
the most commonly identified errors in EOC operations as noted in the AARs reviewed.  
 Not only will this examination serve as a foundation to help improve current EOC 
operations, exercises, and training courses, but it will also be beneficial as a template for 
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future evaluations of EOC operations. The study could be used as a guideline for future 
EOC assessments to measure progress in addressing errors specific to an EOC operation. 
Sinclair, Doyle, Johnston, & Paton, (2012), state that assessments are designed to 
incorporate two fundamental concepts: monitoring and evaluation. The monitoring 
component is a continual process that provides organizations with indications 
demonstrating compliance with responsibilities, and progress, or lack thereof, in the 
achievement of results. Evaluations are used to measure effectiveness by “comparing 
actual with intended goals, objectives, and targets” (Sinclair et al., 2012, p. 510), and 
provides a systematic context for interpreting these differences as well as providing a 
foundation for future training needs. 
Methodology 
 The methodology to be utilized for this study will be a content analysis. Content 
analysis can be applied to wide variety of written text such as speeches, letters, journals, 
and reports such as AARs. Furthermore, Rose, Spinks, & Canhoto state that content 
analysis can be used to examine both the manifest and latent content of a text (Rose, 
Spinks, & Canhoto, 2015). Regarding this study, manifest content refers to the visible 
and countable components of the document. For this study, the methodology incorporates 
the systematic dissection of text into units that can be further examined to identify 
specific areas that present themselves as challenges. The study will identify those areas in 
which jurisdictions have identified as strengths, as well as include recommendations that 
have been included into the individual AARs. According to Franzosi, (2008):  
Four major functions of content analysis may be distinguished to produce 
increases in the degree of confirmation of hypotheses already generally 
presumed to be valid, and definitive disconfirmation of hypotheses already 
generally presumed to be invalid. To correct “optical illusions” which may 
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be shared by most specialists. To settle disagreements among specialists as 
the truth value of certain propositions, and to permit the formulation and 
testing of hypotheses (Franzosi, 2008, p. xxiii) 
 
The research process will utilize individual coding as well as submitting each 
AAR into a software program for further analysis in terms of frequency. 
Additionally, it will assist with coding (United States GAO, 1989; Rose, Spinks, 
& Canhoto, 2015) to enhance both validity and reliability. 
Significance of the Study 
 The significance of this study is key in furthering the efficiency and effectiveness 
of EOC operations. While the study will focus on medium-sized communities, those 
with a population between 300,000 and 499,000 people, the results will be applicable to 
any EOC. This is due to the fact that the responsibilities of an EOC are to coordinate 
(Militello, Patterson, Bowman, & Wears, 2007) and support entities in the field, 
regardless of the population of the community impacted by a large-scale emergency or 
disaster. Whether the incident is natural, man-made, or technological in nature, large-
scale incidents that extend for multiple days or weeks demand more resources in terms 
of personnel, general and specialized equipment, supplies, and commodities than any 
governmental, private, non-profit, or faith-based organization has on hand  (Donahue & 
Tuohy, 2006). In order to address the response-driven as well as agency-driven demands 
that a disaster can have on a community, the EOC must be able to work as seamlessly as 
possible in order to get the right resources to the right people at the right time. 
 While this would be a challenge for the most seasoned emergency responders, it 
is even more so for those who have little if any experience working during a disaster  
(Militello, Patterson, Bowman, & Wears, 2007). One method of assistance to EOC 
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personnel is to establish an environment that is conducive to success. Through the 
identification of common errors, new or modified policies, procedures, training 
programs, and management structures can be developed to help reduce, or eliminate, the 
circumstances in which those errors occur. Within the EOC, managers “seek a lessons-
learned system that provides good answers, solutions, and best practices. They want to 
hear what to do, instead of what not to do (Donahue & Tuohy, 2006, p. 13). This study 
will help to further the knowledge of the most common errors in EOCs, the situations 
that contribute to those errors, and the possible solutions that can be developed to 
eliminate them so the EOC can function at the optimum level of performance and 
provide the highest quality of service to the community.  
 While the results of this study can be used by practitioners to improve functions 
within the EOC environment, the findings may be useful in other arenas as well. 
Academic institutions could use this study to help design future curricula in a manner 
that is useful for enhancing institutional knowledge about EOC operations, common 
errors, and possible solutions to those errors. This study also could be used by private 
entities to enhance and improve their current training courses. Additionally, the study 
can serve as a template for state agencies as well as local jurisdictions, large and small, 
to conduct evaluations of their own EOC operations. In essence, the study can help 
enhance the learning experience and improve the overall efficiency and capability of 
EOCs and their personnel 
Organization of the Study   
 This study will provide significant insight on the EOC environment, its 
operations, and common mistakes that occur during activations. The next chapter, 
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Chapter II, presents a review of the literature, which includes topical areas such as 
lessons learned, impacts of stress on decision-making, the significance of AARs, EOC 
management structure, EOC coordination, standards, and organizational learning. 
Following the literature review, Chapter III describes the methodology that will be used 
for this study, including the selection of AARs to be used in the study, the data 
collection process, and data analysis. It will also include the research questions that have 
been developed, along with the research hypotheses, and limitations of the study. 
Chapter IV will present the study’s findings. This will include the answers to the 
research questions presented in Chapter I. Finally, Chapter V will provide a summary of 
the entire study. This will include a discussion of the findings of the analysis conducted, 
recommendations for enhancing current and future EOC operations, and  
recommendations for further research that can be conducted based upon the findings of 
this project and the needs identified in the multiple AARs.   
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CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 The literature review for this study has been divided into four main sections. The 
first section is comprised of the introduction and history of emergency management. It 
highlights some of the federal laws that have had an impact on EOC operations. The 
second section describes the EOC of today and how this type of organization can be 
structured; some of the functions that are associated with an EOC include decision-
making, and how staffing is a key component as it relates to the successful EOC 
environment. The third section outlines the lessons that have yet to be learned, even 
though they have been previously identified as deficiencies. The effectiveness of using 
AARs as research materials will be introduced, and how these documents can serve as 
excellent tools within the framework of knowledge management will be discussed. 
Section I 
 While the response to large-scale emergencies and disasters is a challenge, 
especially for those at the local level of government (Wolensky & Wolensky, 1990), 
improvements can and have been realized when using a structured approach. Emergency 
management has a long history of implementing practices to address the challenges that 
come with disasters, which is important to understand as scholars and practitioners both 
try to advance the field. This section will outline the history surrounding emergency 
management, highlighting the fact that while errors in disaster response have occurred, 
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the underlying reason for them is often hard to detect. This section also will show that 
while local governments are still the main component of a community’s disaster response 
effort, the influence of the federal government has played a role in dictating how some of 
the response and recovery efforts are conducted. 
Introduction 
 In much the same manner as previous research (FEMA, 2008c; Faith, Jackson, & 
Willis, 2011; Savoia, Agboola, & Biddinger, 2012), this study is being done to examine 
specific AARs to identify areas that need improvement, and to look for any errors that are 
common to multiple EOCs across the country. By reviewing and analyzing AARs, 
emergency management leaders can develop a data-driven approach for identifying key 
areas of concern that, in turn, will assist them in prioritizing their planning efforts 
(Savoia, Agboola, & Biddinger, 2012). In addition, they will be in a better position to 
develop more effective training and exercise programs. While training and exercising are 
vital tools in all high-risk professions, the fact that disasters are infrequent makes training 
and exercising especially important in emergency management (Sinclair et al., 2012). The 
need to understand the impact training has on operational issues resulted in the formation 
of the first research question, which is:  
RQ1: How often is training, or the lack thereof, recognized as being a source for 
mistakes, errors, or challenges experienced during EOC operations? 
 For many years, efforts have been made to address the importance of improving 
our ability to deal with large-scale emergencies, disasters, and catastrophes. Those 
involved in public safety have learned over the years that while the actual performance of 
tasks is critical to the success of any operation, the management of those who are 
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performing those tasks is just as important (Pidot, 2013; Roberts, 2009; Cigler, 2008). 
Emergency response personnel have seen how the establishment of a structure by which 
individuals can perform their tasks can be beneficial (Drach-Zahavy & Freund, 2007). 
The Incident Command System (ICS) is currently used by first responders throughout the 
country to manage emergencies, and is a prime example of a structure that helps 
accomplish tasks in an emergency-related environment (Carwile, 2005). This, in turn, 
leads to a more efficient response (Lalonde, 2011), and helps responders become better 
acquainted with their roles and responsibilities, which results in the reduction of errors in 
the performance of tasks as they become more and more proficient in their role (Weitz, 
O'Shea, Zook, & Needham, 2011). While some criticize using ICS in large-scale disasters 
(Sylves, 2008; Waugh Jr. & Streib, 2006), the introduction of ICS into response practices 
was not an accident and has been in place for over three decades (Neamy & Nevill, 
2011).  
 The concept of ICS was developed more than thirty years ago, in the 
aftermath of a devastating wildfire in California. During thirteen days in 1970, 
sixteen lives were lost, seven hundred structures were destroyed and over one-half 
million acres burned. The overall cost and loss associated with these fires totaled 
$18 million per day. Although all of the responding agencies cooperated to the 
best of their ability, numerous problems with communication and coordination 
hampered their effectiveness. As a result, Congress mandated that the U.S. Forest 
Service design a system that would make a quantum jump in the capabilities of 
Southern California wild land fire protection agencies to effectively coordinate 
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interagency action and to allocate suppression resources in dynamic, multiple-fire 
situations. (FEMA, 2004, para.8)  
 To further the efforts being done to create a safer environment for those who 
serve as first responders and to improve the overall level of service to the public, this 
study is being conducted to take the idea of learning from past errors and apply it to those 
functions performed within the EOC environment. Much like the implementation of ICS 
into the public safety response domain, the basis for many errors is often difficult to 
determine since there can be multiple causes (Wilson, Dell, & Anderson, 1993). Errors 
fall into the realm of those items that are considered intangible. In essence, errors are 
caused by humans, and those actions, or inactions, are not abstract concepts (Hurst, 
Bellamy, Geyer, & Astley, 1991; Stewart, 1993; Busby, 2001). While the life safety 
threat to those who staff the EOC is in no way comparable to those who actually deal 
directly with the impacts of a disaster, their performance is just as important. These 
individuals are charged with the general coordination, communication, and collaboration 
needed to assist and support those who are in the field as well as the community in which 
they work (Perry, 1995; Comfort, 2007).  
 Managing the risk associated with a threat or disaster is often more important than 
managing the crisis (Cavanaugh, Gelles, Reyes, Civiello, & Zahner, 2008); this is often 
the role and function in which EOCs operate. While a national standard structure is in use 
in the field of emergency response to assist with managing efforts, no such singular 
standard framework for EOC operations is in place (Shouldis, 2010; Revere, 2000). In 
addition to having a standard by which to operate, past and current literature also has 
demonstrated that organizational performance can be enhanced with experience (Madsen, 
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2009; Biddinger, et al., 1974). Since the literature has indicated that an organization’s 
performance can be enhanced through the experience of the personnel who staff the 
positions, this served to be the impetus in the creation of the second research question, 
which asks:  
 RQ2: How often is lack of experience noted as playing a role in performance as 
  identified in after action reports? 
 In viewing historical responses, dealing with disasters has gone through a series 
of processes and management policy changes over many decades (Henstra & McBean, 
2005). Yet, one issue that has remained constant over the years is the seeming inability to 
learn from the mistakes of others (Wolensky & Wolensky, 1990; Donahue & Tuohy, 
2006; Militello, Patterson, Bowman, & Wears, 2007; Faith, Jackson, & Willis, 2011; von 
Lubitz, Beakley, & Patricelli, 2008). Thus, because the history of dealing with disasters 
has had one constant associated with it, the inability to learn from mistakes, and 
understanding that in order for EOCs to operate with any semblance of efficiency 
requires good situational awareness (Boin & Hart , 2010), the first hypothesis for this 
study was established: 
H1: When EOCs are activated for real world or simulated natural, man-made, or 
technological incidents, situational awareness will be identified as a 
challenge/deficiency in a majority of after action reports.  
Additionally, history has shown that depending on local government to be the flag bearer 
for disaster response and relief has been anything but successful (Wolensky & Wolensky, 
1990).  
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 However, the local government EOC has changed over time, and has faced some 
challenges in decision-making and staffing, as well as understanding how AARs can 
serve as a tool to help identify the most common errors. Since AARs serve as the primary 
source for this study, and the study is focusing on the most common errors noted in the 
AARs, the third research question was formulated:  
RQ3: In examining the operations of the EOC, what are the most common 
 deficiencies that are noted in the after action reports?  
Finally, training, exercises, and evaluation also are discussed to provide a perspective of 
their impact on improving performance and the considerations required to make them 
effective. 
History 
 Responding to natural, man-made, or technological disasters has been a part of the 
world for a very long time. Historically, the explosion of the Krakatoa volcano on August 
26, 1883, serves as the initial beginning of what is known today as the field of “disaster 
management.” When the explosion took place, the sound traveled for over 2,900 miles, 
and produced the largest ever recorded tsunami (30 meters), causing over 36,400 
fatalities. Overall, 165 villages were destroyed (von Lubitz, Beakley, & Patricelli, 2008). 
This particular event also marked the first time where the use of telecommunications was 
initiated as a method of spreading news of the disaster. It also was the catalyst for the first 
international relief effort (Winchester, 2003). For this incident, the response to meet the 
demands created by the explosion was guided by a Victorian sentiment, quite different 
from current scientific methodology (Hutchinson, 2000).  
 We have come a long way since the early style of emergency management first 
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appeared. While new knowledge has been created, and better systems implemented, they 
have gone through a cycle of being forgotten and then rediscovered, often at great 
expense (Hodgson, 2001; Thierauf & Hoctor, 2006). Despite the advances in many 
different areas of disaster management, the access to more response and relief 
organizations on both national and international levels remains much as it did in 1883 
(von Lubitz, Beakley, & Patricelli, 2008).  
 Disasters have the ability to impact communities in a variety of ways, and have 
some general characteristics associated with them. First, they generally occur in a 
compressed timeframe. Second, many disasters are unpredictable in terms of the type and 
extent of their impact. Finally, they also inflict “equally unpredictable political, 
economic, and social consequences” (von Lubitz, Beakley, & Patricelli, 2008, p. 565). 
How a community is able to respond and recover effectively is often based upon the 
actions they have taken prior to the disaster occurring, including the steps taken to 
eliminate or reduce their vulnerability to the disaster (Lagadec, 1993). While some 
disasters cannot be mitigated against totally, communities can take actions to better 
prepare for, respond to, and recover from incidents in a more effective manner. However, 
some researchers have held the position that, at least at the operational level, the 
effectiveness and efficiency of disaster response is dependent more on the abilities of 
emergency organizations responding than on the state of preparedness of the individuals 
(Dynes, 1975). 
 While the history of how EOCs came into being, or how they emerged, has no 
clearly defined starting point, there is some evidence regarding the background of how 
emergency management itself has been created and has evolved over time (Wolensky & 
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Wolensky, 1990). While a formal EOC facility may not have been part of the equation 
when disaster management was undertaken, the tasks and responsibilities of providing 
assistance to the community impacted were still present. Inasmuch, the process of 
decision-making, task assignment, communications, and coordination still took place. To 
examine this further, Wolensky and Wolensky (1990) asked two questions surrounding 
the local government’s role in managing disasters. First, how has local government 
managed the demands associated with natural disaster management, and secondly, what 
explanations have been offered for performance patterns observed? 
 In 1990, they conducted an examination of 100 articles dating between the mid-
1950s and 1989, they focused on four areas: preparedness, short-term recovery, long-term 
recovery, and response. They discovered that local government was one of the most 
understudied institutions in the disaster literature until the 1980’s “when researchers, 
particularly for public administration, political science, and political sociology, devoted 
more attention to the topic (Wolensky & Wolensky, 1990, p. 703). Thus, one of their first 
conclusions was that while some progress has been made in exploring the local 
government role in disaster management, further research was needed. It was their belief 
that one of the most important factors that influenced the government’s ability to manage 
the disaster existed within the structural underpinnings of the organization that reflected 
the social and cultural shape of the community (Wolensky & Wolensky, 1990).  
 While they did address some mitigation and preparedness issues of the disaster 
cycle, the focus for their study was on their perspective of the response and recovery 
segments. Within the response phase, they identified four areas that were highlighted as 
being contributing factors to a poor disaster response effort. These included character, 
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experience and “quality” of local leaders with an unwillingness and inability to plan, the 
excessive demands placed on the community by a disaster, and finally the 
decentralization of governmental decision-making (Wolensky & Wolensky, 1990). In the 
recovery phase, they highlighted that recovery did not occur in the fashion that was 
anticipated by the community. This was because local government failed to provide any 
direction in terms of how recovery should be conducted (Wolensky & Wolensky, 1990). 
 The article continues to explain that in the 60’s and 70’s, local governments 
continued to lose further control because of the funding limitations imposed by the 
federal government. While this trend was somewhat reversed in the 70’s and 80’s, it was 
still a contributing factor to the ineffectiveness of local government in disaster response 
and recovery (Wolensky & Wolensky, 1990). Their research discovered that during the 
past 200 years, local government has been, and continues to be, the weak link in the 
system. Along with other factors, local government also has suffered from the attitude of 
“it won’t happen here.” Instead, government has continued to focus only on what is 
happening today (Wolensky & Wolensky, 1990).  
 While the central theme of this current study is focused on the identification of 
common errors across multiple EOCs, research has supported the notion that government 
entities at all levels still have difficulty learning from the past (Donahue & Tuohy, 2006; 
Faith, Jackson, & Willis, 2011; Kettl, 2006). According to Wolensky & Wolensky, the 
community in the earlier stages of disaster management looked to government to be the 
answer to responding to, preventing, and recovering from local disasters. The focus was, 
much like it is today, on looking to the outside for assistance in lieu of drawing from the 
social capital that may be present in the community (Wolensky & Wolensky, 1990; Pynes 
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& Tracy, 2007). While this area is beyond the scope of the study, the article does 
highlight that issues previously identified are still present today.  
 Much like the issues identified in the AARs collected for this project, 
understanding that errors may have a catalyst element in that one mistake may lead to 
another, helped to design the fourth research question, which is:  
 RQ4: In examining the after action reports, which errors are identified as  being 
 coexistent? In other words, when one error is identified, what other error or errors 
 will most likely also be identified in other after action reports?  
As such, Brouillette and Quarantelli (1971) identified four internal factors that influence 
a local government’s ability to respond to a disaster, which include: the nature of the 
demands as perceived by the organization; the bureaucratic structure; the emergency 
capabilities of the organization; and the perceived need for effectiveness and efficiency. 
 Although all levels of government are generally involved in disaster management 
for large incidents at some point, the roles and activities undertaken by the local 
government are the ones that are most critical to the community (Wamsley & Schroeder, 
1996; Somers & Svara, 2009; Col, 2007). Of the many roles that local governments are 
expected to fulfill, the two most important ones, according to Drabek and Hoetmer 
(1991) are comprehensive emergency management and integrated emergency 
management. Additionally, O’Leary shares that regardless of the geographical size or 
location of a disaster, all disasters are experienced at the local level, where residents can 
expect to be on their own for at least the first 72 hours following the incident (O'Leary, 
2004). One of the ways that local governments have attempted to gather the resources 
necessary to address the issues created by a large-scale emergency or disaster has been 
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through the establishment of an EOC. 
 While numerous papers have discussed local government response to disasters 
(Harrald, 2006a; Kreps & Bosworth, 1993; Kapucu, Arslan, & Collins, 2010; Cave, 2008; 
Mann, 2009), the influence that states and federal agencies has had on local capacities 
also has been noted (Wolensky & Wolensky, 1990). Researchers have stated that it is 
important for agencies to function in a role that they already know how to perform (Kreps 
& Bosworth, 1993). Additionally, while having an organizational structure in which to 
operate is also beneficial, it is more important for personnel to understand their role. 
(Helsloot, 2009). 
Federal Laws Effecting EOCs 
 Laws and legislation have governed much of how local governments prepare, 
respond, and recover from disasters (FEMA, 2013a; Donahue & Joyce, 2001; Kweit & 
Kweit, 2006). While local jurisdictions may not be directly tasked from the federal of 
government to perform any function, they are influenced to perform in a certain manner. 
For example, many local level EOCs have adapted to using the federal Emergency 
Support Function (ESF) model for their operations (Shouldis, 2010) so that necessary 
interaction between the multiple levels of government could be conducted on a common 
platform. In addition, many government programs that offer reimbursement funds for 
disaster-related activities require that certain tasks be completed in a specific manner, and 
within a timeframe established by the federal agency overseeing the assistance funding 
(FEMA, 2015). 
 Throughout history, legislation has had an impact on EOC operations. For 
example, the National Response Framework (NRF) was created to provide a general 
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guideline as to how the federal government, along with the rest of the nation, is to 
respond to those incidents that involve the integration of multiple internal as well as 
external agencies, groups, and organizations (FEMA, 2008a). One of the main 
components of the NRF is the National Incident Management System (NIMS), (FEMA, 
2015). One of the subcomponents of NIMS is Command and Control, which is the home 
for the Incident Command System (ICS) management structure. ICS has been included 
into the NIMS document to serve as a common structure that can be used to manage all 
types and sizes of events (FEMA, 2013a). The idea behind ICS is that resources from one 
part of the country can be used to carry out the activities necessary during a disaster 
response in any other part of the country under a similar management structure, which is 
often accomplished through the operation of the EOC (FEMA, 2013a).  
 Another legislative document that has had a direct impact on EOCs is the Robert 
T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (FEMA, 2013b). This 
document provides the groundwork for presidential declarations and gives insight into 
how the federal government will work with the states and local entities during response 
and recovery efforts (FEMA, 2013b). As an example, the Stafford Act calls for specific 
actions be taken for obtaining a local declaration, before moving on sequentially towards 
a presidential declaration (FEMA, 2013a). It also requires EOCs to work closely with 
state officials in order to initiate preliminary damage assessments, which are reviewed 
and approved at the federal level (FEMA, 2013b).  
 All of these activities are associated with a timeline in order to be eligible for 
relief funding, either through the Public Assistance or Individual Assistance programs. 
The Act also addresses items such as training, which helps local governments “conduct or 
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arrange, by contract or otherwise, training programs for the instruction of emergency 
preparedness officials and other persons in the organization, operation, and techniques of 
emergency preparedness” (FEMA, 2013b, p. 63). Thus, many jurisdictions use this as the 
platform to build their training programs (Donahue & Joyce, 2001). 
 As noted, several influences from the federal government level have found their 
way into EOC operations. Regardless, today’s EOC needs to reflect the professionalism 
and calmness that is needed in the midst of chaos (Sager, 2005), and, at the same time, 
manage all the demands placed upon them to coordinate, communicate, and collaborate 
(Comfort, 2007). As a result, today’s EOC continues to evolve and adjust, to become the 
facility that can perform expected tasks from outside entities. 
     Section II 
The EOC of Today     
 According to FEMA (1981), the EOC is the central location for the coordination 
of emergency operations, and it can also serve as the central point for disseminating 
information to personnel who are performing emergency operations (FEMA, 1981). An 
EOC gains its distinctive characteristics by the activities conducted within its walls. 
However, often the EOC is confused with the organizational structure that is actually 
managing the event itself (Kreps & Bosworth, 1993), thus, this section will clarify that 
the EOC of today is the central point for the coordination of disaster operations. While 
the roles of those who operate within an EOC are significantly different from the first 
responder entities, the lines between their areas of responsibilities are sometimes 
confused.  
 This section also will identify that while having a common operating picture is 
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crucial for EOC personnel, and the usage of modern technology can assist with this 
endeavor, the fact remains that not all EOCs are created equally. Also, research has 
shown that communications play a significant role in EOC operations, and provide 
further assistance to those staffing the EOC. The review also will highlight that a while a 
standardized organizational structure is helpful in accomplishing tasks, no such standard 
structure for EOCs currently exists. Additionally, EOC functions and staffing are 
discussed, as well as how decision-making is expected not only of the leadership in the 
EOC, but of all personnel called in to fill positions. 
 The EOC by its very nature does not manage the incident. Clark, Hooper and 
Gibbs (2011) distinguish the difference between a Command Post (CP) and the EOC. A 
command post delivers specific assignments from the site to units in the field without 
direct correlation between assignments and resource movement. In an EOC, management 
decisions are made to support operations in the field (Clark, Hooper, & Gibbs, 2011). The 
authors add that while a distinction between a field command post and an EOC may be 
evident, circumstances may result in the command post being located in the EOC (Clark, 
Hooper, & Gibbs, 2011), which may serve as the basis for some of the confusion 
surrounding the actual operational differences between the two. 
 Operationally, the EOC is the most suited facility in which to coordinate response 
and recovery activities, as well as keep vital records associated with the incident (Bryan, 
2011, p. 69). Many times, the flow of information that is entering and leaving the EOC 
can be too much for any one person to manage. Bryan (2011) explains how the use of 
modern technology can enhance real-time information gathering and sharing, which is a 
critical component of any EOC. Portable radios, cell phones, pagers, emails, and all other 
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types of communication media can be used to contact those who may work in the EOC 
but who are not at their desk (Bryan, 2011). In addition, the EOC is not only responsible 
for sharing information with internal partners, but they also have a responsibility to keep 
the public informed as well (Spence, Lachlan, & Griffin, 2007; Perry, 1995). 
 In addition to technological aspects, in order for an EOC to operate effectively, 
personnel must be able to have a common operating picture (Comfort, 2007), and must 
have an environment that is conducive to seamless action and timely decision-making. 
Decision-making behavior is considerably affected by the dynamics of environment 
(Kowalski-Trakofler & Vaught, 2002). Sager (2005) states that the EOC should reflect 
the required “professionalism and calmness that is needed in the midst of chaos and 
uncertainty” (p. 119). As such, the operations within an EOC need to be deliberate, and 
carried out with skill and sensitivity. Perry (2003) argues that the EOC is also where 
technical experts and political figures convene to formulate the foundation of a decision-
making body that helps direct and coordinate the resources necessary in response to an 
incident. Yet, as he explains, the usage of the EOC is sometimes sporadic and poorly 
understood.  
 To be effective in their role, participants in the EOC must have situational 
awareness (Boin & Hart , 2010). This means that each person who is staffing a position in 
the EOC must  have the capacity to understand what has happened, what is trying to be 
accomplished in terms of goals and objectives, and what actions have been taken to meet 
them (Militello, Patterson, Bowman, & Wears, 2007). Although the function itself 
appears simplistic in nature, the actual activities can be overwhelming to those who are 
not exposed to disaster-related functions on a regular basis (Huang, Wang, & Lin, 2011). 
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 Additionally, there may be times when understanding the basis for errors is not 
apparent, although recognizing erroneous actions such as omissions or miscalculations 
can be quite evident (Wantanakorn, Mawdesley, & Askew, 1999). Understanding that 
while the location of the EOC may not be ideal, and the circumstances under which it is 
activated may be less than optimal, personnel are still expected to carry out the functions 
for which they are called upon to perform. For instance, when the EOC in downtown 
Grand Forks flooded, it had to be relocated to the campus of the University of North 
Dakota (Kweit & Kweit, 2006). Also, Fischer and Harr (1994) describe how an EOC in 
Pennsylvania had to be established in a storefront (Fischer & Harr, 1994). Yet, 
expectations of performance remained the same. Quarantelli (1978) has argued that EOCs 
should be designed to accomplish six crucial functions; coordination, policymaking, 
operations, information gathering, public information, and the capability to host visitors 
(Quarantelli, 1978; Perry, 1995). Thus, whether the EOC is physically located within a 
10,000 sq. ft., specially-designed-and-equipped facility, or operating from back of a 
warehouse, the tasks still need to be conducted and completed in a manner that meets 
already established expectations.  
 As identified, communications are key components to EOC operational 
effectiveness. Looking specifically at the public information function as recognized by 
Quarantelli (1978), one of the overarching themes of EOC operations is that if all else is 
fails, the EOC still needs to be able to serve as the hub for communications with public 
officials, governmental agencies, and the public (Perry, 1995). The communication goals 
are to initiate action, inform crisis decision-makers, and set the tone for handling the 
crisis (Spence, Lachlan, & Griffin, 2007; Garnett & Kouzmin, 2007; Covello, Peters, 
28 
 
Wojtecki, & Hyde, 2001). Essentially, the EOC manages the information being 
disseminated to reduce confusion and frustration (Donner, Rodriguez, & Diaz, n.d.). A 
well-defined process for sharing information can reduce the challenges the EOC faces 
(Perry, 1995). Personnel in the EOC also will need to ensure that communications, both 
internally and externally, are ongoing and accurate (Quarantelli, 1986).  
 Internally, during normal non-crisis situations, communications between 
organizations is conducted in a non-formal fashion, and occurs between individuals who 
generally are familiar with each other. During a crisis, this may not be the case. Often, 
new contacts must be established and maintained with individuals who occupy positions 
of authority within organizations that had not established contact prior to the incident 
(Quarantelli, 1986). Even in the best of circumstances, this can prove to be difficult, 
which leads to the study’s second hypothesis:  
H2: When EOCs are activated for actual, real-world or simulated natural, man-
made, or technological incidents, communications will be identified as a 
challenge/deficiency in a majority of after action reports. 
Within the EOC environment, the perspective must be one whereby individuals maintain 
a “global view”. This enables the EOC staff members to maintain a vision of how the 
disaster incident, or incidents, has affected the many components that make up the 
community. The goal is not to address the specifics of any one activity that may be 
garnering much of the attention during a disaster response, but to view that particular 
event, or events, as potentially having other cascading effects outside of the immediate 
incident scene. Lettieri, Masella, and Radaelli (2009) shared a concept espoused by 
Quarantelli, (1997), who stated “good disaster management does not involve the 
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mobilization per se of personnel and resources – that will happen anyway. Effective, 
means that a desired and intended result has been produced” (p. 129). EOC staff may 
sometimes need to step back to maintain a community-wide vision so that the whole 
community can still have their needs met. 
 In understanding the concept of a global perspective, research also has focused on 
how EOCs operate (Carwile, 2005; Faith, Jackson, & Willis, 2011; Huang, Wang, & Lin, 
2011; Savoia, Agboola, & Biddinger, 2012), and how these operations are viewed by 
others. Many times, those who are not members of the emergency management 
organization do not understand the premise for how operations take place or are 
structured in the EOC (Perry, 1995). Often, a large-scale incident presents policy-makers 
as well as EOC staff with challenges and operational dilemmas that could be considered 
impossible-choice dimensions. Boin and Hart (2010) share that in regards to EOCs, 
“Everybody looks at them to ‘do something’, but it is far from clear what that 
‘something’ is or whether it is even possible without causing additional harm” (p. 358). 
In the grand scheme, the EOC really serves as the conductor and coordinator during a 
large-scale incident or disaster response and recovery (Perry, 1995; Engelmann & 
Fiedrich, 2009; Revere, 2000).  
 While the staff in an EOC do not direct the activities that take place out in the 
field, they are often responsible for providing the logistical support necessary for those 
activities to be done safely and successfully. However, the skillset necessary for those 
who staff an EOC may not be reflective of their daily roles in an organization (Revere, 
2000). Thus, the challenge for the emergency manager is to accentuate the skills that each 
EOC staff member brings to the operation, and provide an environment in which they 
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have a good chance of performing at a very high level in a new environment (Shouldis, 
2010). Without a standard platform, and in order to carry out all of the demands placed 
upon them from a variety of entities, EOCs often attempt to find the best organizational 
structure in which to operate (Boin & Hart , 2010; Dynes, 1970). 
EOC Organizational Structure 
 Emergency conditions place extraordinary demands upon public service personnel 
for accurate and timely information to make the best use of limited resources under 
urgent constraints (Comfort, 1985). As such, many internal as well as external agencies 
look to the EOC to be their base for support. In order to fulfill this expectation, personnel 
in the EOC must be able to organize vertically, and to work horizontally (Kettl, 2006). 
Today, as in the past, there are no jurisdictions that have all the materials, equipment, 
personnel, and supplies they desire when it comes to dealing with a disaster. Even on a 
good day, agencies and organizations are in a constant battle for resources just to carry 
out the tasks they normally perform. However, during a disaster, these resources become 
even more scarce (Donahue & Tuohy, 2006). Add to this the level of stress that will 
accompany any EOC operation, and the ingredients necessary for multiple errors to occur 
are in place (Wheeler & Riding, 1994). 
 Undoubtedly, there is a difference between those who coordinate the activities of 
a variety of disaster response and support agencies, and those whose role is to direct the 
disaster response (Waugh, 1991). Yet, unlike first responder agencies who typically work 
and conduct their tasks under the Incident Command System (ICS), one standard 
organizational structure that EOCs are expected to implement to help them with their role 
has not been created (Shouldis, 2010; Perry, 1995; Drabek, 1985). The question then 
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becomes, what type of organizational structure is best to implement in order to ensure 
that tasks in the EOC arena are successfully completed? With this environment as a 
backdrop, the third hypothesis was formed.  
 H3: The lack of EOC organization will be identified in multiple EOC after action 
 reports as being the source of errors committed during an EOC activation. 
One study conducted to examine governmental organization suggested that the best 
strategy is to base the organizational structure on the actual function to be performed 
(Dean, 1981). Then: 
 fit the agency’s current structure to its desired purpose 
 group the related programs 
 acknowledge that even good personnel cannot overcome a bad structure 
 provide the administrative head with broad authority 
 permit span of control 
 decentralize the operational decision-making 
 delegate authority for service delivery coordination, and  
 avoid attempting coordination through a collective interagency committee. 
In an attempt to accomplish this goal, EOCs have adopted several organizational 
frameworks that are essentially based upon the preference of the jurisdiction (Shouldis, 
2010; Drabek, 1985). 
 In looking at organizational structures, Drabek (1987) has suggested five 
principles that local jurisdictions should adopt to help guide their emergency 
management structure selection. These include making sure that the mission of the 
agency is consistent with the public’s perception in term or priorities; find the supportive 
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niche within the local government; demonstrate organizational ability; increase 
interorganizational linkages; and become involved with constituent relationship building 
activities (Drabek, 1997). The issue in essence comes down to balancing authority with 
flexibility. As such, the conditions of urgency that EOCs face require adaptability and 
coordination of effort. While the tendency would be to centralize authority and control 
during a disaster, theory would suggest a more organic approach to building the 
organizational structure under which these types of activities would be managed may be 
more appropriate (Waugh, 1991).  
 One type of structure utilized by local governments is built upon the configuration 
used by the federal government in their role as a support agency in times of disaster. This 
structure is labeled, the Emergency Support Function (ESF) (Kamoie, 2005). ESFs 
provide the organizational assignment structure that a jurisdiction can use for 
coordinating interagency support for response to an incident. Similar to the manner in 
which the federal government is organized, they serve as mechanisms for grouping 
functions most frequently used to provide support (FEMA, 2008b). Each ESF has a 
primary agency and several supporting agencies. The role of the primary agency is to 
ensure that resources associated with their specific ESF are integrated to provide the 
optimum level of support to those disciplines on the incident scene(s). ESFs are 
composed of functions such as transportation, public works, firefighting, law 
enforcement, public health, search and rescue and multiple other function based upon the 
determination of the jurisdiction (Shouldis, 2010). 
 Another structure that may be found within an EOC is the Multiagency 
Coordination Group Structure. Often referred to as a MAC Group (Shouldis, 2010), 
33 
 
which is made up of organizational, agency, or jurisdictional representatives who are sent 
to the EOC to serve as representatives for that entity. Each representative is provided 
with the authority to speak on behalf of the body that he/she represents. They have the 
ability to commit resources (material, personnel, and funds) as they deem appropriate 
(Shouldis, 2010). The success of the MAC Group is dependent upon the representatives 
who are present at the EOC. While some organizations that need to be at the EOC are 
obvious (such as law enforcement, fire rescue, emergency management, etc.), other 
important groups that should be represented, may not be present. These include personnel 
from volunteer agencies, faith-based charities, non-profit organizations, and the business 
community. While they may not have the large number of resources to commit, “their 
contacts, political influence, and technical expertise are the foundation for a collaborative 
effort” (Shouldis, 2010, pp. 74-75).  
 The establishment of the Major Management Activities Structure is another one 
of the organizational frameworks that can be found within an EOC (Shouldis, 2010). The 
components of this organization consist of a Policy Group, which is made up of upper-
echelon individuals such as elected officials and department heads, whose role is to 
address the overarching objectives and priorities of the community (Shouldis, 2010). The 
decisions that come from the Policy Group help to set the direction for the objectives to 
be operationalized. This segment is carried out by the Coordination, Resource, and 
Operations Groups (Shouldis, 2010).  
 The Coordination Group is comprised of individuals whose role is to be 
responsible for collecting and analyzing the incident information such as the extent of 
damage, resource status, and expenditures data. They also are charged with conducting 
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planning for future activities that may need to be accomplished (Shouldis, 2010). The 
Resource Group is charged with supplying resources necessary to the incident scene, 
while the Operations Group is responsible for all portions of the response or recovery 
function. While the overall structure is simple, there is no one-to-one match between the 
organization of the on-scene incident command structure, and the EOC organization. This 
could hamper the coordination of efforts (Shouldis, 2010). 
 Finally, much discussion over the years has centered on the use of the Incident 
Command System (ICS) in the EOC (Waugh, 1991; Shouldis, 2010; Donahue & Tuohy, 
2006; Bigley & Roberts, 2001). ICS is structured to provide for operational effectiveness 
through fourteen different elements. These include: 
 common terminology 
 modular organization 
 management by objectives 
 reliance on an Incident Action Plan 
 chain of command and unity of command 
 unified command 
 manageable span of control 
 pre-designated incident locations and facilities 
 resource management 
 information and intelligence management 
 integrated communications 
 transfer of command 
 accountability and  
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 deployment (FEMA, 2005).  
While the use of ICS in field operations has been fairly well accepted as a standard of 
practice, it has not been well received in the academic community as being a good 
management platform for large-scale disasters (Lutz & Lindell, 2008).   
 Some researchers have suggested that the ICS cannot be used in formats other 
than military or paramilitary organizations such as fire rescue or law enforcement 
(Wenger, Quarantelli, & Dynes, 1990). Additionally, some researchers also contend that 
organizations with normal civilian structures, such as public works and social services, 
cannot operate as effectively under such a structure (Lutz & Lindell, 2008). Others 
maintain a position that the system neglects volunteers and emergency groups (Drabek, 
1985; Drabek, 2005; Neal & Phillips, 1995; Schneider, 1992; Trainor, 2004). 
 However, in an article by Waugh and Streib, (2006), they state that the 
appropriateness of ICS for the EOC is an issue to be examined further (Waugh & Streib, 
2006). They share that it may not be the structure that is at the center of the issue, but 
more of a misunderstanding of emergency management (Waugh & Streib, 2006). 
Another perspective is that it may not be the system itself but rather the ineffective 
implementation of ICS that is the real issue (Hansen, 2007). In the study conducted by 
Lutz and Lindell (2008), their findings did not necessarily confirm or contradict the 
position that ICS is better than some previous management structures used. However, 
they did expand upon this more by stating that the way that ICS is currently structured 
and trained upon is not effective. Accordingly, the issue of not using ICS correctly 
appears to be more of a training issue, and not so much a structural one (Lutz & Lindell, 
2008).  
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 Since training was identified as a significant issue when it comes to utilizing the 
ICS format correctly, the fourth hypothesis was advanced. It states;  
H4: When EOCs are activated for actual real world or simulated natural, man-
 made, or technological incidents, training will be identified as a 
 challenge/deficiency in a majority of after action reports. 
 This is a logical conclusion since many of the people who staff EOCs are not public 
safety or traditional first responders. Their comfort level with the ICS structure, or any of 
the other organizational structures that have been identified, may be tenuous at best. 
Thereby, it makes sense that their ability to work within the system is not as efficient as it 
could be if they were to utilize the structure on a regular basis. 
 Regardless of the type of organizational structure in place, each person who 
comes to the EOC has a function to carry out (Boin & Hart, 2010). Supporting the 
functions that are conducted out in the field requires just as much activity be conducted 
within the EOC. For responders in the field to be successful, operational objectives must 
be accomplished. This is done with the support provided by personnel in the EOC (Boin 
& Hart, 2010). The positions filled in the EOC are critical to the success of any disaster 
field function (Drabek, 1985; Perry, 1995). The next section will examine some of the 
most important roles that EOC staff fill during an activation. 
EOC Functions 
 Regardless of the types of organizational structure used to manage the activities 
conducted within an EOC, specific activities must be undertaken in order for the EOC to 
be effective. In remarks made at a conference on industrial emergency management, 
Quarantelli  (1986) stated that the primary problems that occur during a disaster are not 
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associated with the victims of the disaster themselves, but can be traced back to the 
organizations who are charged with the responsibility of responding to the disaster. 
Therefore, it is imperative that the actions performed in an EOC result in a positive 
outcome. Prior studies have shown that success in disaster management is the result of 
organizations coping well with problem areas (Quarantelli, 1986). 
 To start, one of the most important functions within the EOC is collaboration. 
Beginning in the 1990’s, local community emergency managers became more defined as 
individuals who could interact effectively with outside governmental and non-
governmental entities (Drabek, 1987; Sagun, Bouchlaghem, & Anumba, 2009; von 
Lubitz, Beakley, & Patricelli, 2008). At the local level, collaboration is a required skill 
during disasters because of the necessary community involvement (Waugh & Streib, 
2006). Successful EOC operations are dependent upon the integrated and interdependent 
collaboration of both public and private organizations. By doing so, they are able to 
create a solution to a problem larger than any one organization can handle on their own 
(Kapucu, Arslan, & Collins, 2010). This requires a level of trust that many organizations 
may not be familiar with because during their day-to-day functions, interacting with 
outside entities may not be part of their typical operation (Uhr, 2009). 
 Often the other component that goes along with collaboration is coordination. 
Unfortunately, the larger the disaster, and the larger number of organizations involved in 
the response, the less likelihood of achieving success in overall organizational 
coordination (Quarantelli, 1986). This is mainly due to the different levels of the social 
structure and the dissimilar mix of public and private organizations involved (Quarantelli, 
1986). Nonetheless, the EOC staff must do all they can in order to achieve the highest 
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level of coordination possible given the circumstances in which it is to be obtained. A 
coordinated response requires the subtle weaving together of forces from a variety of 
functional areas and from differing levels of government (Kettl, 2006). Accomplishing 
such a task can be a daunting challenge.  
 Since the concept of team members working together for a common outcome is 
the goal of the EOC. EOC staff must be able to “cooperate throughout all stages of the 
task” (Kapucu, Augustin, & Garayev, 2009, p. 299). During an activation, several 
important objectives may need to be accomplished. Prioritizing those objectives may 
prove difficult, especially if competing objectives seem to be present. Often these are 
difficult because of the perceived difference of their importance, or because of individual 
management philosophies (Bryan, 2011). However, these difficulties need to be resolved 
in order for effective coordination to occur.  
 Additionally, while many agencies may have the internal capabilities and 
resources to deal with the myriad of issues they face on a daily basis, in terms of disaster 
response, these same resources are most often not enough to address all of the unique 
hurdles presented (Kweit & Kweit, 2006). Addressing the needs of first responders as 
well as the unmet needs of the community requires the combination of multiple groups, 
organizations, and agencies (McEntire D. A., 2002). It takes the combination of a variety 
of resources, garnered from multiple organizations, all coordinated in a structured system 
to realize a successful outcome.  
 Donahue and Tuohy (2006) provide some insight as to the challenges of 
coordination in their review of the federal-level response that occurred in the aftermath of 
Katrina. They shared how the multiple command operations centers that were activated 
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(not only in DHS but in other federal agencies as well) exposed serious organizational 
flaws. In their findings, they argue that clear operational or organizational roles and 
responsibilities were not established. This inaction led to further confusion and the 
overlapping of functions (Donahue & Tuohy, 2006). Furthermore, they share that without 
a strong coordination environment, assignments will be missed, tasks will be duplicated, 
and resources wasted (Donahue & Tuohy, 2006), all of which will result in a decreased 
level of service to not only the first responders who are depending upon the support of the 
EOC, but to the community as a whole.  
 The importance of coordination espoused by Donahue and Tuohy is also 
highlighted by Lettieri, Masella and Radaelli (2009). They stress that coordination is not 
only important during the response phase of a disaster, but during recovery as well. 
Inadequate coordination can lead to conflicts, in addition to the wasting of resources and 
time. In the end, the outcome has the potential of unnecessary loss of human life and 
property (Lettieri, Masella, & Radaelli, 2009). Drabek (1997) highlighted that much like 
communications, repeated mistakes in coordination occur, many of which were found 
during the review of the response to 9/11 and are not unique. In fact, the same issues that 
agencies identified in the terrorist attack were the same problems that had been 
recognized and documented in other localities following a disaster (Drabek, 1997). 
 As demonstrated, communication, collaboration, and coordination all have a 
significant function in the EOC. Yet, another function that must occur within the EOC is 
that of planning. Much like the planning process that is conducted prior to a disaster 
occurring, planning during a disaster must anticipate the need for resources. Like any 
other human activity, planning depends on the resources, skills, and motivation of those 
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that engage in that activity (Perry & Lindell, 2003). Within the EOC, the development of 
a plan of action is often difficult given the fact that the disasters are dynamic in their 
nature. The planning process seeks the most efficient way to use essential resources in 
order to satisfy urgent or chronic needs under conditions of extreme duress (Alexander, 
2003). At the end of the planning process, the document created should adequately 
specify the roles and activities of each and every participant in the risk management and 
emergency operations activities being discussed (Alexander, 2003).  
 The planning process has many components. Yet, it is essential that each one be 
properly included. The outcome being that lives and property could be saved 
(McLoughlin, 1985). While every emergency is unique, there is enough common ground 
to make forecasting, warning, and planning, feasible tasks (Alexander, 2003). The 
personnel in the EOC must make sure that the planning function is carried out in a 
manner that creates an environment for a successful outcome.  
 When it comes to EOC functions, regardless of how complex or simplistic, 
performing unfamiliar tasks with agencies that are not part of one’s normal method of 
conducting business can lead to errors and reduce the efficiency of the entire operation. 
However, these can be used as learning opportunities, much like within high-performance 
organizations (Boin & Hart , 2010). Looking at the overall functionality of an EOC, 
Huang et al. (2011) identify several important characteristics that could be troublesome, 
such as discrepancies between concepts and objectives, competition between agencies to 
demonstrate superior performance, and sectionalism, all of which are driven by each 
agency’s differing specialties (Huang, Wang, & Lin, 2011). These characteristics are not 
isolated to any one segment of agencies or geographical location. While they may seem 
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to be significant obstacles, they can be corrected. By doing so, errors that may be 
perceived as unforeseen, can be remedied. As such, the selection of personnel who will 
be selected to staff the EOC could be one possible remedy. 
EOC Staffing 
 At the local level, EOCs are not activated on a regular basis. Inasmuch, they are 
staffed with personnel who will be asked to perform tasks that they are most likely not 
familiar with. In fact, when a large-scale emergency or disaster affects a community, the 
majority of the people who will report to the EOC do not have any relevant experience in 
disaster management (Canton, 2007; Militello, Patterson, Bowman, & Wears, 2007). 
Local emergency management officials hold the EOC as the nucleus of response 
operations where representatives of public safety, fire and rescue, law enforcement, local 
public health, and water districts meet to ensure that necessary information is 
communicated in a timely fashion (Kapucu, Augustin, & Garayev, 2009). For the most 
part, the staff in a local governmental EOC is typically at the forefront of response 
management in disasters (Sinclair, Doyle, Johnston, & Paton, 2012). Selecting personnel 
to fill these roles can be almost as challenging as addressing the demands of the disaster 
itself (Mann, 2011). 
 Whenever a large-scale emergency or disaster occurs, emergency managers and 
those who staff an EOC must be able to think quickly and critically in order to identify 
and anticipate situations. They must be problem solvers, be willing to assume as well as 
manage risk, and protect their community from potential harm (Peerbolte & Collins, 
2013). The EOC environment can present difficult and complex situations, while at the 
same time, incorporate substantial restrictions. These include but are not limited to issues 
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such as time constraints, and working with highly uncertain information (Palomares & 
Martınez, 2014). Conducting these types of operations with staff who come from diverse 
professional backgrounds brings additional challenges. Also, managing individuals with 
strong personal preferences “makes it more difficult to reach consensus in the group 
within a reasonable time period” (Palomares & Martınez, 2014, p. 2091). While each 
individual may bring a level of expertise, individual talent does not guarantee success in a 
team-oriented environment.  
 The type of individuals who staff the EOC positions during a disaster must be 
able to look at the entirety of the situation. They must be able to take a global perspective 
on how the disaster may not be only impacting an immediate area, but how it may be 
impacting service delivery to other segments of the community that were not directly 
impacted by the event. These are referred to as agent and response-generated demands 
(Perry, 1995). Agent-generated demands are problems resulting from the disaster itself  
and appear as the disaster unfolds. Some examples include the placement of sandbags to 
prevent flooding, the opening of shelters for those who may be displaced, and restoring 
vital services such as electricity as soon as it is safe to do so (Perry, 1995).  
 Response-generated demands are those needs that become apparent as individuals 
and groups attempt to meet the needs produced by the agent generated demands (Perry, 
1995). They become more recognizable as people try to deal with the impact of flooding, 
earthquakes, or other hazards. Acquiring sandbags, finding locations for shelters, or 
obtaining needed equipment are examples of response-generated demands. In essence, 
response-generated demands deal with the logistical issues pertaining to the response of 
people and organizations to agent-generated demands (Perry, 1995).  
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 Another set of factors that staff within the EOC must be able to deal with are 
normalcy-generated demands and mitigation-generated demands (McEntire, 2007). 
Normalcy demands are associated with the pressure on personnel to restore the 
community back to the conditions that existed prior to the disaster occurring. This 
includes getting residents back into the homes, restarting businesses that may have shut 
down and getting the economic vitality back into the community (McEntire, 2007). 
Mitigation demands, on the other hand, arise from the desires and expectations of both 
community members and jurisdictional leadership to prevent the disaster from happening 
again. This may include, but not be limited to, enhancing current building codes, revising 
land development plans, or relocating homes and businesses (McEntire, 2007). 
 Unfortunately, these last two sets of demands may run in opposition of 
themselves (McEntire, 2007). While residents may want to be placed back into the 
original home, the mitigation demand may call for them to be relocated, which can create 
a very intense environment. While many of these issues will have the final outcome 
determined well past the closing of the EOC, the initial reaction by the community may 
be an issue that the EOC staff will need to address.  
  The staffing of the EOC is usually done by individuals who drop their normal 
day-to-day duties to come and serve next to those who may work in emergency situations 
regularly (Sager, 2005). Often these individuals are not selected based upon their daily 
roles, but on the functions that the EOC needs to perform (Perry, 2003). Many times the 
policy decision-making body is made up of various departments and jurisdictional leaders 
who work with the EOC manager. This can include technical experts based upon the type 
of situation being addressed, such a nuclear incident, a weather-related event, or a 
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terrorist type of scenario (Perry, 2003). Subject matter experts can be very useful to 
provide guidance and direction that may not normally be part of the EOC staffing 
makeup. 
 What cannot be lost is that while EOC staff are trying to solve problems on one 
hand, they may be trying to push aside fears of what may have happened to their own 
home at the same time. Additionally, they are reporting to perform a role that they may 
have never performed before, in a place in which they have never worked. Selecting the 
right person is a task that the EOC manager needs to approach with a very keen sense of 
the type of individual that can work both independently, and as part of a team - traits that 
are sometimes hard to find.  
 While challenging, the expectations remain that the EOC will find a way to get 
the help that is necessary to provide the level of support required for those in the field. 
Unfortunately, according to Donahue and Tuohy (2006), many first responders view the 
EOC as ineffective. They see those who have been sent over to the EOC to function as 
their support structure, as individuals who lack any capacity to make decisions or take 
appropriate or effective action. Often they are viewed as individuals (or organizations) 
who cannot get along with others, and have trouble garnering enough effort to even focus 
on the singular goal of how to make a decision as a group (Donahue & Tuohy, 2006). 
Many outside of the first-response community also find that the government can be slow, 
ineffective, and misguided (Schneider, 1992). This then translates into the perception of 
inadequacy within the EOC environment. 
 As a general rule, organizations typically do not communicate and/or coordinate 
with each other on a daily basis to the same level that is required with the EOC 
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environment. Therefore, when they are summoned to come together to work as a highly 
efficient and skillful group during a disaster, which is expected by first responders and 
the community, they are not usually successful (Huang, Wang, & Lin, 2011). 
Additionally, EOCs are usually overcrowded, which can result in the EOC function 
becoming less efficient (Quarantelli, 1978). While there is much that is taking place in 
terms of identifying and prioritizing issues and decision-making, many of the people who 
staff the EOC are second and third-level types of employees who come to the EOC with 
limited decision-making capabilities (Quarantelli, 1978). While department official heads 
will occasionally drop by to see what is going on, they usually don’t stay (Quarantelli, 
1978). If higher-echelon officials cannot be reached, personnel at the middle and/or lower 
echelons often make decisions they do not normally make (Drabek, 1997). 
 While some of the personnel that report to the EOC may have little experience in 
the decision-making process, it is a task that most will be asked to perform as part of their 
function. Unfortunately, when it comes to local jurisdictions, prompt decision-making is 
not a common occurrence normally found within the confines of these types of public 
institutions. This is especially true for democratic systems that are particularly not well 
designed for this purpose (Rosenthal, 1990). Rather, these governmental structures are 
noted for their emphasis on the formal consultation, deliberation, and more often than 
not, complex process and accountability procedures (Rosenthal, 1990). This adds an 
additional layer of unfamiliarity that the staff of the EOC will be expected to overcome. 
 Additionally, aside from the fact that the staff of the EOC is mostly comprised of 
internal jurisdictional personnel, key private-sector partners should have a direct link to 
emergency managers. They should also be part of, and at times thoroughly integrated 
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into, the decision-making process. Strong integration into response efforts can offer many 
benefits to both the public and private sectors (FEMA, 2013a). Staffing of the EOC must 
include those from the private sector so that all members of the community who have a 
stake in the outcome, have a place in which they can voice concerns, offer support, or 
provide resources. All elements of the community must be brought in and integrated into 
the response and recovery phases of the disaster (FEMA, 2013a). 
 While doing something may be seen as a good indicator of progress, it is 
important that the right “something” be done. EOC staff are often expected to accomplish 
something as soon as they get to the EOC. However sometimes it is best that instead 
taking the approach of hurry-up- and-do-something, EOCs take the time to stop and do 
nothing (Canton, 2007). It is important that any decisions made, be done not only on 
purpose, but with a purpose. 
Decision-Making 
 The increasing occurrence and severity of disasters require a more efficient and 
effective disaster management system in order to reduce the costs of disaster to society 
(Cutter, Emrich, Mitchell, Boruff, Gall, Schmidtleine, & Melton, 2006). Additionally, 
with the increased prevalence of technological, manmade, and natural disasters, “the 
public increasingly expects better public sector leadership before, during, and after 
catastrophic disasters than has been seen in the past” (Kapucu and Van Wart, 2003, p. 
279). Despite the associated challenges, emergency managers and the staff in the EOC 
must think critically. Each member of the team must be able to identify, anticipate, and 
evaluate risks as the incident unfolds so that they are in a position to solve problems, 
make decisions, and assess information in the proper manner (Peerbolte & Collins, 2013). 
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As noted by Sagun, Bouchlaghem and Anumba (2009), the disaster management process 
entails critical thinking, sound decision-making, and continuous effort. 
 Decision-making during times of crisis is influenced by ever-changing conditions, 
uncertain and/or missing data, constant time pressure, and the need for real-time reaction. 
Comfort, (1985), stated that “the critical importance of information for optimal decision-
making increases geometrically with the scale of the disaster, the scope of the geographic 
impact, and the number of people involved” (p. 155). Without good information, 
situations can arise which can lead to ill-defined tasks and goals, as well as significant 
consequences for mistakes (Engelmann & Fiedrich, 2009). Therefore, personnel who 
staff the EOC should have a good foundation from which decisions can be made. If not, 
they can start to question their own abilities. Furthermore, they will begin to question the 
effectiveness of the plan (Grant & Hoover, 2003). If they are not comfortable with what 
they perceive as progress, such as getting necessary supplies to those who are in need 
during the recovery process of a disaster, people will start the process of trying to find 
alternative solutions to make the situation work (Grant & Hoover, 2003). Critical 
components of the decision-making process include effective communication and 
understanding the roles of the multitude of agencies and organizations involved in a 
disaster response. These play a role as it pertains to establishing and building upon 
interorganizational relationships (Mann, 2009). These relationships can help to improve 
decision-making.  
 The decision-making process for staff within an EOC is not a simple task, and it 
takes knowledge, skills and abilities, along with strong relationships to ensure an 
effective process is put into place (Sagun, Bouchlaghem, & Anumba, 2009; von Lubitz, 
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Beakley, & Patricelli, 2008; Sinclair et al., 2012; Lester & Krejci, 2007). Decision-
makers must be able to constantly distinguish between important and unimportant pieces 
of information so that unimportant segments are discarded from the decision-making 
process (Kiisel & Vihalemm, 2014). The strategic orientations of decision-makers about 
what to consider meaningful also helps them to form the basis for their construction of 
situations of risk. However, working with other team members in an EOC environment 
offers other challenges. One being that the subject matter experts and lay people may 
have different perceptions of what is or is not relevant and/or important (Kiisel & 
Vihalemm, 2014). 
 One of the ways that staff within an EOC can use information to help with the 
decision-making process is through the gathering of what is termed situational awareness 
(Caymaza, Akyonb, & Ereneic, 2013). As shared by Römer et al. (2014), a critical 
requirement for an effective response by public entities with the task of management of 
the response and relief effort during disasters, is the availability of current situational 
information (Waugh, 2007). However, there is currently a lack of a comprehensive 
operational system that allows for real time collection, visualization, and/or provision of 
situational information (Römer, et al., 2014). This lack of resources does not, however, 
negate the need for having accurate information to help staff take the needed steps to 
manage risk and protect the citizenry from harm, and to reduce property damage 
(Peerbolte & Collins, 2013). 
 While no comprehensive system is currently in place, independent systems are 
being employed to help with decision-making. For instance, former Honolulu Mayor 
Jeremy Harris recognized the importance of Hawaii's Global Information System (GIS), 
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and shared that they had lacked some of the fundamental tools necessary for good 
decision-making. With the integration of GIS, that situation changed (Prizzia, 2009). He 
stated that they currently have the system deployed in an enterprise-wide operation of the 
city to help decision-makers.  
 Harris explained how just about everything they do takes advantage of GIS. He 
emphasized that every decision that they make really effects every other decision. GÍS 
now provides them with the opportunity to see all of the community, understand what is 
going on, and how it works (Frencica, 2004). All of which are important elements to 
decision-making in the EOC. Decision-making also extends to how communications with 
those in the community will be handled. In today’s culture, what guides an individual in 
their responses to warning messages is often predicated by their previous experience 
(Kiisel & Vihalemm, 2014). According to Luhmann (1995), individuals cannot determine 
meaning in point-to-point correspondence from one person to another. Individuals 
operate by processing meaning.  
 In explaining his position further, he distinguishes between two types of 
individual observations, direct and indirect (Luhmann, 1995). As a direct observer, the 
individual treats the world as a set of facts (reality and objects), and assumes that 
situations can be treated as taken-for-granted. Demands by the public for better 
information, more information, or information that is being withheld exemplify the belief 
of the direct observer that the information about the state of things is a “given”, already 
correctly interpreted for efficient use (Kiisel & Vihalemm, 2014). The indirect observer is 
an individual who relies on other’s accounts of an event. This individual has to consider 
the aims of different messages and the facts that the communicator may not feel relevant 
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and may not transmit. Thus, the second-order observer needs to use knowledge and 
understandings of direct observers and their experience and skills to interpret the message 
(Kiisel & Vihalemm, 2014).  
 Understanding how messages are being received requires that the EOC decide the 
best methodology to implement to gain the desired result, which often calls upon the 
usage of differing types of media in order to be effective with the largest number of 
community members as possible. Additionally, the EOC must anticipate the response of 
the community to the message. Realizing that even when they trusted the warning and its 
source, individuals are still willing to ignore some of the advice if it conflicts with their 
practical concerns (Kiisel & Vihalemm, 2014). 
 Another one of the largest challenges to decision-making is the fear of making the 
wrong decision. Many decisions are made without an abundance of information. Yet, 
action can be taken to help reduce some of the uncertainty that may come with differing 
disaster scenarios. For example, in China’s Qinglong County, the county leader, upon 
becoming aware in 1974 that his community was susceptible to a possible earthquake in 
the near future, obtained academic publications and studied about the theories of 
earthquakes and their natural signals (Col, 2007).  
 Armed with this new knowledge, he was able to interpret data that he was 
presented with in 1976 to assist the county committee in their decision-making process to 
initiate mitigation and preparation programs in the jurisdiction. The result, when the 
Tangshan earthquake struck in Qinglong County, there were no fatalities in the county, 
even though more than 240,000 people died in the earthquake zone, of which Qinglong 
belonged (Col, 2007). 
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 While the preferred outcome of the decision-making process is the realization of a 
desired goal, this cannot be guaranteed. However, this does not mean that when faced 
with a similar situation later that individuals are limited to making the same decision and 
experiencing the same outcome. Unfortunately, history in disaster management and 
decision-making does not shed a positive light on the willingness to move beyond doing 
just that (Wolensky & Wolensky, 1990). In regards to decision-making, one truth that has 
remained consistent over the years is that the quality of the immediate local response is 
one of the most important factors in determining if the outcome of the response to the 
disaster will be deemed a success in terms of saving lives and protecting property 
(Lennquist, 2004).  
 Time and speed in disasters also present issues. However, the real challenge that 
individuals face during a disaster is the pace of both the information flow, and the speed 
with which decisions need to be made (Cavanaugh, Gelles, Reyes, Civiello, & Zahner, 
2008). Nowhere is this more evident that within an EOC, where information is being 
gathered and verified to assist in the decision-making process. The road to providing 
better service to the communities being served is long. While the importance of 
collaboration, communication, coordination, and decision-making is evident, the mistakes 
made during each event are not being corrected.  
Section III 
 While the desire to learn from the past has always been a goal to help improve 
future operations, this section will show that some of the same mistakes are still being 
repeated. The literature will provide examples of where and when these instances are 
occurring. Arguments will be proposed that past and current solutions are not working, 
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and how the solution may be found through the use of AARs. 
 Multiple articles will highlight the value of AARs, and how they have been used 
effectively in the past by multiple organizations. The review also will show how they can 
be instrumental in improving the overall learning process. Knowledge management is an 
arena that is discussed as part of the learning endeavor, and several authors share how the 
gathering of information contained in the AARs can be helpful in furthering efforts in this 
area. This section brings forth the value of conducting this study utilizing the 
methodology outlined with regards to including AARs as the primary source for 
gathering data. 
Lessons Learned and Repeating Mistakes 
 In 2010, over 80 disasters were declared in the United States. Although for the 
most part, the response system employed worked as configured, actions did not always 
go according to plan (Faith, Jackson, & Willis, 2011). Faith, Jackson, and Willis noted 
that mistakes made during small-scale incidents often could be compensated for because 
the jurisdiction, or discipline, had the resource capacity to overcome the errors, making 
them appear relatively minor in nature. However, the same mistakes that may occur 
during a large-scale response or recovery effort could result in significant property 
damage and/or loss of life (Faith, Jackson, & Willis, 2011).  
 Individuals working in crisis-affected systems operate in an interdependent 
operational environment and therefore experience a collective uptick in organizational 
stress because the already onerous demands on their performance have been magnified by 
the critical situation (Cavanaugh, Gelles, Reyes, Civiello, & Zahner, 2008). Since the 
implementation of the Disaster Recovery Act of 1950, several attempts have been made 
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to correct repeated errors, yet, the same problems repeatedly arise (Faith, Jackson, & 
Willis, 2011). While the value of lessons learned should be recognized, learning from 
past mistakes is an action that calls for a deliberate and honest appraisal, which is not 
always an easy undertaking. In a study conducted by Donahue and Tuohy, (2006), first 
responders observed that: 
Many problems encountered repeatedly are solved anew each time, 
suggesting that it should be possible to inculcate improvements 
across time and agencies. It should be possible to solve at least some 
of these problems once and for all, rather than time and again (p.10).  
 
 The pattern of repeating the same mistakes needs to be corrected if there is any 
desire to improve upon current field and EOC operations. To change old patterns of 
action, or to initiate new action, requires a conscious re-examination of the meanings 
involved in the action. Without this conscious process of learning, individual behavior is 
likely to remain routine (Comfort, 1985). Militello, Patterson, Bowman & Wears, (2007), 
explain how the areas of concern that were found during Katrina can be found not only in 
real-world events but in training/exercises as well. For example, in a tornado exercise, 
observers noted how the flow of information throughout the EOC was fragmented, 
resulting in poor situational awareness, much like the situation that developed during the 
response to Katrina.  
 During the response to the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center on 
September 11, 2001, the issues experienced with communications and coordination 
efforts may have resulted in the deaths of both first responders and civilians (Faith, 
Jackson, & Willis, 2011). Yet, some four years later, in response to Hurricane Katrina, 
these same issues caused the delay of rescue efforts for the victims of the storm in New 
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Orleans. Furthermore, these same sets of issues were identified as problem areas during 
the response to Hurricane Andrew, which occurred in 1992 (Faith, Jackson, & Willis, 
2011).  
 Donahue and Tuohy uncovered that of the 14 major incidents that occurred 
between 1995 and 2005, all of the response components were hindered by a lack of 
leadership, lack of planning, poor public relations, and mismanagement of resources 
(Faith, Jackson, & Willis, 2011). Problems in the areas of communications, logistics, and 
training also were evident. Empirical results have shown, and are consistent with the 
perspective that, organizational learning from prior large-scale emergencies and disasters 
is often a complicated process that is multifaceted and involves learning at the individual, 
organizational, and institutional levels (Madsen, 2009). 
 It would seem that drawing from experiences to make improvements in current 
and future operational activities would be a simple process. Yet, Davidoff (2002) shares 
that often shame is a significant hindrance to improvement, and that some individuals 
will view improvements as personal criticism of one’s ability to perform. Further, some 
may believe that no matter how good their efforts may be, they may feel they are not 
good enough (Davidoff, 2002). However, while some may feel offended or ashamed, the 
cost of not taking action to correct deficiencies that are routinely repeated is formidable.  
 As we have witnessed thus far, attempting to overcome and correct issues in an 
unstructured manner has proven to be inadequate (Deverell & Hansen, 2009; Donahue & 
Tuohy, 2006; Savoia, Agboola, & Biddinger, 2012). While much of the focus has been 
on the inability to learn from large disasters, it is not limited to just those large disaster-
type scenarios. In an article about mine safety, Madsen (2009) reports that the U.S Senate 
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declared that as a country, learning from the experiences of past mining tragedies must 
occur in order to find better ways to respond to mining accidents (Madsen, 2009). 
However, earlier literature espoused that similar accident investigations invariably follow 
the same pattern with similar pronouncements made about the need to learn to avoid 
future disasters (Carroll, 1998). 
 While learning from the past is necessary, recognizing that learning is an ongoing 
process is important. The tsunami disaster that occurred only a few years ago has shown 
that while some old lessons may have been forgotten or never completely learned, new 
lessons have to be learned (Lennquist, 2004). However, the concept of incorporating 
lessons learned can be a positive experience (Madsen, 2009; Birkland, 2009; Deverell & 
Hansen, 2009; Donahue & Tuohy, 2006). One of the most important goals is to reduce 
the instances of repeating those same errors (Donahue & Tuohy, 2006). For this study, 
the goal is the same, looking for the challenges that the EOCs face and specifically 
identify the errors committed. 
 To improve upon efficiency in EOC operations, as with any evaluation conducted 
to enhance performance, areas identified for improvement must be acknowledged. This is 
true for not only real-world events but in training and exercise scenarios as well. As 
stated by Paton  (1999), “It is therefore important that local government organizations 
and personnel operating within the EOC understand the assessment methodologies 
available for evaluating and monitoring exercises and which can serve to provide input 
into future training needs analyses” (as stated in Sinclair et al., 2012, p. 508).  
 Much like the actions that led to the introduction of the ICS structure, the point at 
which errors are occurring must be recognized before they can be addressed (Donahue & 
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Tuohy, 2006). For those in emergency management, one of the best ways to accomplish 
this critical component is to review current operations, and critically evaluate how they 
execute their functions during a real-world or simulated disaster response (Birkland, 
2009). Evaluations of local incidents, as well as lessons drawn from exercises that are 
based on comparative analysis of experiences in other jurisdictions, encourage those who 
are in the role of disaster management to explain why the system they utilize performs in 
the manner it does. It also provides them with the information they need to identify 
shortcomings and improve how they conduct business (Boin & Hart , 2010).  
 What can be stated with confidence is that learning from past experiences is 
valuable. According to Madsen (2009), “one of the most robust findings from the 
organizational learning literature is that organizations tend to improve their performance 
in a domain as they gain experience in that domain” (p. 862). Thus, improvements in the 
efficiency and effectiveness in EOC operations can be achieved. While not always an 
easy task, gathering information from previous disaster operations, from sources such as 
AARs, is a worthwhile approach (Savoia, Agboola, & Biddinger, 2012). As stated by 
Kettl, (2006), “If the nation does not learn the lessons that both Katrina and September 11 
teach, we will suffer the same consequences, over and over. In that case, the worst is yet 
to come” (p. 274).  
Use of After Action Reports (AARs) 
 Historically, AARs have played a significant role in the learning process for 
organizations (Donahue & Tuohy, 2006; Bergeron & Cooren, 2012; Savoia, Agboola, & 
Biddinger, 2012). For example, the United States Fire Administration (USFA) develops 
annual reports on selected major fires throughout the country. The reports are created for 
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incidents that usually involve multiple deaths, or a large loss of property (FEMA, 2008c). 
While the selection of specific incidents is based upon established parameters such as the 
number of fatalities, and/or loss of property, the primary criterion for deciding to 
construct such a report is whether the report itself will result in significant “lessons 
learned.” The premise being that in some cases, these lessons bring to light a new 
understanding, or discipline knowledge, associated with fires, such as the impacts of 
building construction and/or their contents or human behavior. At other times, “the 
lessons are not new, but are serious enough to highlight once again because of another 
fire tragedy” (FEMA, 2008c, p. 3). 
 This body of work is then distributed and utilized throughout the fire service 
community to provide decision-makers, and those who develop policies, an instrument 
with which they can examine how they can improve their department’s performance in 
emergencies. By implementing actions to correct errors, the decisions made can affect 
several areas such as the allocation of resources, inclusive of both material and personnel 
(FEMA, 2008c). They also can cause a reexamination of current training practices and 
operational concepts that may need to be modified based upon newly-discovered 
empirical findings. Alternatively, they may be used to build upon current public 
education and outreach programs to help the community become better prepared in terms 
of fire safety (FEMA, 2008c).  
 Regardless of the manner in which they are used, the importance of AARs cannot 
be overstated. They provide the basis for positive change in any discipline for which they 
are designed, and support the foundation to build upon for improving future actions and 
policy decisions (Cave, 2008; Biddinger, et al., 1974). Furthermore, one of the tools most 
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commonly used by organizations, including the military, who have participated in 
numerous disaster situations to correct noted deficiencies is through the creation of AARs 
(Birkland, 2009; Donahue & Tuohy, 2006; FEMA, 2008c; Faith, Jackson, & Willis, 
2011; Savoia, Agboola, & Biddinger, 2012). These AARs have served as a key 
component in addressing both the strengths and weaknesses of activities undertaken, and 
decisions made, during actual and simulated events. In the United States, formal AARs 
are now required by several agencies and organizations that fund, oversee, or regulate 
aspects of public health and healthcare emergency preparedness and response such as the 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (Savoia, Agboola, & Biddinger, 2012).  
 In addition to serving the needs of jurisdictions to improve performance, AARs 
have also been used in prior research (Faith, Jackson, & Willis, 2011; Savoia, Agboola, 
& Biddinger, 2012; Waugh, 2007). In a study by Savoia et al. (2012), “descriptive 
statistics were performed to determine the recurrence of the themes by each capability 
from all AARs. Frequencies of subthemes were calculated using the total number of 
subthemes identified within the pool of statements derived from each theme” (p. 2952). 
 Organizations often learn through the experience and actions of individuals 
(Stern, 1997). Savoia et al., (2012), posit that by taking the time to review AARs, 
individual leaders as well as organizations can improve their own internal capacity and 
perform at higher levels. They conclude that AARs can serve as potential tools that can, 
and should be used, to learn from past mistakes, regardless of whether they occur during 
simulations or real-life events. As such, to gain the most value from these documents, a 
systematic method of synthesizing the information must be developed so that a lessons-
learned type of knowledge management structure can be identified (Savoia, Agboola, & 
59 
 
Biddinger, 2012).  
 AARs can be useful on many fronts when it comes to the EOC. Whether it comes 
in the form of how the EOC is activated, determining if the level of staffing is appropriate 
for a specific type of incident, how the coordination between entities will be 
accomplished, or which staff management structure is put into place, AARs can highlight 
many areas to be studied. The implementation of sound decisions based upon lessons 
learned from past experiences, either real world or simulated, can lead to sound action 
being taken (Hosseini & Izadkhah, 2010). “The quality of the response and recovery 
efforts is thus directly linked to the knowledge and skills possessed by staff working at 
disaster sites and their ability to put them into practice in a range of hazard events” 
(Sinclair, Doyle, Johnston, & Paton, 2012, p. 508).  
 To be effective, emergency management organizations must engage in critical 
self-examination to provide those agencies directly involved with on scene activities the 
support necessary to be successful. They need to base their future direction on evidence-
based and reflective lessons (Boin & Hart, 2010). Moynihan (2009) looks at the crisis 
learning process and explains that an after-action report created after an incident can 
systematically collect and examine relevant information. Based upon these findings, the 
report can then offer recommendations for the future and suggestions for better 
performance or appropriate policy decisions (Moynihan, 2009). Lagadec (1997) furthers 
this concept by sharing that learning from a difficult situation should come from a 
constructive perspective so that the experience itself is treated as a learning opportunity, 
and not so much as a situation by which blame is placed. How errors are framed affects 
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how effectively people will learn a complex, dynamic task (Loh, Andrews, Hesketh, & 
Griffin, 2013). Based on this premise, the fifth research question was developed.  
 RQ5: What are the most common recommendations and strengths identified in 
 after action reports? 
 Individuals charged with the responsibility of training need to develop a process 
by which exact training needs can be addressed (Wilson, 2000). Part of this analysis 
should include a review of past practices as well as a review of areas that are identified as 
needing improvement. Utilizing AARs for this purpose is an effective way in which these 
areas can be recognized. The goal is to be able to provide relevant and useful training. To 
accomplish this “effective training requires that the training be pertinent” (Wilson, 2000, 
p. 8). AARs serve as an excellent source for providing the data and observations needed 
for this to occur (Biddinger et al., 1974).  
 AARs draw their findings from events (real world and simulation) that virtually 
any EOC, regardless of size, geographical location, or resource capacity has the potential 
to face at some point in the future. Thus, building curriculums from these resources can 
make future EOC training sessions meaningful. The usage of AARs to help improve EOC 
operations is an exercise in implementing knowledge management. EOCs strive to depart 
from being reactive to become more proactive. In order to do so, they will rely on their 
knowledge, skills, and abilities to help move the organization forward.  
 As part of the overall learning process, once these expanses have been addressed, 
further action is then needed to place corrective steps into observable action to ensure that 
these areas for improvement have truly been corrected (Savoia, Agboola, & Biddinger, 
2012). To take action to improve performance and learn from experience, enhancements 
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must be tested through the iterative cycle of planning, testing, measuring, and improving. 
In the same manner, in order for EOCs to improve their level of capability, they must 
utilize assessments that identify those areas in which improvements can, and should be 
made. Borodzicz and van Harperen (2002), state that assessment processes function to 
enhance organizational learning in relation to the expected improvements in capacity and 
capability. They also support accountability in ways that contribute to overall emergency 
management effectiveness and contribute to the process of informed decision-making 
(Sinclair et al., 2012). 
Knowledge Management and the Importance of After Action Reports 
 Once assessments have been made, and the data has been derived from documents 
such as AARs, effective and data-based training programs can be developed. Although, 
within the emergency management discipline, this is a significant challenge. While many 
public safety entities perform their response roles in a fairly regular fashion, this is not 
the case for those involved in EOC operations.  Paton et al. (1999) share that just by their 
very nature, the infrequent nature of hazard or disaster incidents creates problems for the 
training needs analyses that would normally underpin this process. As such, Sinclair et al. 
(2012) found that “each individual organization’s training and assessment program was 
unique to that organization, suggesting that processes are developed in ad hoc ways and 
are not making effective use of the relevant literature and ideas” (p. 517).  
 Studies, such as the one currently being undertaken, could help to bridge that gap 
by identifying a process by which common errors are identified in a systematic fashion. 
While beyond the scope of this study, this could then lead to the creation of a common 
framework to conduct evaluations by using AARs that are constructed in a consistent 
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manner. As stated by Stern (1997), “by emulating the successes and avoiding the failures 
of others, one should be able to garner the benefits of experience without paying the costs 
entailed by the more negative experience” (p. 70). AARs, such as those being used for 
this study, can accomplish this goal by further indicating their value as training, exercise, 
and real-world evaluation tools, and as a source in which formal studies can be 
conducted. 
 Knowledge is a powerful tool that can be shared and improved upon. Knowledge 
can also help to minimize the amount or repeatable errors that EOCs are presently 
experiencing (Kettl, 2006), which is best accomplished by looking at performance both 
holistically and critically. While witnessing success is enjoyable, identifying 
shortcomings and learning from errors creates efficiency and effectiveness. Taking the 
broad overview approach of using multiple AARs from differing communities across the 
United States eliminates the stigma of focusing on any one group. 
Section IV 
Learning as a Process 
 This final section will discuss how the learning process takes place, how 
important it is to learn the right lesson, and how up to this point, that process has not been 
successful. The literature recognizes the value of the current procedures used to teach 
concepts and ideas, as well as implementing a practical application of those lessons. 
Thus, the articles expand upon the influences that training programs have (both positive 
and negative) on those who are expected to perform specific tasks. As a part of the 
discussion, the infrequency of disasters, as mentioned in the previous section, is 
highlighted as being one of the challenges that are faced by those who are charged with 
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developing effective training programs for disaster operations. 
 This section further develops the concepts of bringing multiple organizations 
together for both training and exercise scenarios, much like they are brought together to 
work within the EOC. Finally, the value of exercises as part of the overall training 
program is presented. This section brings home the concept of how using AARs to 
identify the most common errors committed in EOCs can be the basis for evidence based 
future training programs. The result of this process may be providing a better program to 
train those who will be working in the EOC to perform their roles more effectively, 
efficiently, and with fewer mistakes. Helping to reduce the trend of repeating errors that 
has been such a large part of disaster response history.  
 Learning is an activity that should be a continual process, which is especially true 
in the maturing discipline of emergency management. “Learning in all situations can 
usefully be understood as complex and relational, with no simple lines of cause and 
effect, and no factors or influences that are self-evidently more significant or 
foundational than others” (Hodkinson, 2005, p. 116). From an overarching perspective, 
individuals seem to inadequately prepare for and/or respond to disasters (Canton, 2007). 
Canton, a former emergency manager, argues that while multiple studies over the decades 
relating to disaster management have been conducted, the process of learning must 
continue (Canton, 2007). Stern (1997) argued that “over the long-term, differences in the 
rate of learning or forgetting are influential in determining whether competence-building 
or competence-decline is taking place” (p. 70).  
  Previous studies focusing on past concepts of organizational learning from a 
crisis have been developed in a piecemeal fashion (Elliot, 2009). Much of academic 
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literature has dealt with factors that inhibit, or impede, organizational learning, or issues 
regarding why individuals should not expect a learning process to emerge from responses 
to disasters. This narrowly-defined format has led to a gap between scholarly studies on 
organizational learning, and the high consequence issues that practitioners struggle with 
routinely (Deverell & Hansen, 2009). Elliot (2009) explains that the normal pattern of 
correcting errors has been to create new rules and regulations by which actions are to be 
undertaken. However, while the intent of these new guidelines has been to improve some 
specific aspect of an operation, they are not always well received, with the misconception 
being that the newly-created documents will seamlessly flow into operation (Elliot, 
2009). As history has shown, this is not the case. Deverell (2009) agreed with this 
concept and stated that: 
Distinguishing between the processes of observing lessons 
and implementing lessons is related to the distinction 
between cognition and behavior. Most definitions of 
organizational learning agree that learning entails both 
cognition (change in states of knowledge) and behavior 
(change in organizational outcome) (p. 182). 
 
 Research findings have shown that if the separation is made from cognition and 
behavior, it may cause concern when real-world events and processes are to be examined 
(Deverell, 2012). As shared by Elliot (2009), the false sentiment is that individuals are 
learning the right lessons. Yet, this apparent learned-lesson effect has yet to manifest 
itself in terms of an actual measurable improvement in performance.  
 Up to this point, a clear understanding of organizational learning has been elusive. 
Many scholars have found defining and measuring organizational learning to be very 
difficult (Deverell, 2009). In addition, others have drawn attention to the lack of team-
performance measuring tools that could be used to evaluate performance and 
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subsequently assess training effectiveness (Sinclair et al., 2012), which further identifies 
the need for a study such as this to be conducted. Research findings could help better 
define areas that need attention so that training programs can be developed and 
implemented to improve team performance.  
 Unfortunately, learning must often be initiated during some sort of crisis 
(Deverell, 2009; Moynihan D. P., 2008). Crisis learning primarily sets its parameters 
around activities associated with prevention and response. Much like the Deverell (2012) 
explanation, preventative actions are designed to understand the cause of the crisis in 
order to ensure that it does not happen again. The desired result is to avoid being placed 
into a similar situation in the future. The response component strives to address actions 
undertaken to minimize the consequences of a disaster by improving the crisis 
management capacities of the structures in place that are charged with managing the 
resources required to combat the impacts of the event (Deverell, 2012). Thus, since 
providing resources is a major component of the activities associated with an EOC 
function, the fifth hypothesis was created.  
H5: When EOCs are activated for real-world or simulated natural, man-made, or 
technological incidents, resources will be identified as a challenge/deficiency in a 
majority of after action reports. 
 Wildavsky (1988) argued that a strategy of resilience, which is, learning from 
previous errors on how to bounce back after accidents and crises, is a more efficient use 
of time and resources than expending efforts searching for preemptive measures to 
implement. The primary purpose would be to prevent these types of incidents from 
occurring in the first place (as stated in Deverell, 2012). However, the line between 
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minimizing risk and minimizing consequences is thin at times (Deverell, 2012). 
Understanding the correlation between the two aspects is important so that the right 
attention is given to those issues that specifically address one area or the other. Such a 
perspective recognizes the importance of context (Elliot, 2009).  
 One of the best methods for individuals and organizations to gain knowledge is 
through effective training (Wilson, 2000; Revere, 2000; Lagadec, 1997), which can 
provide both the basis upon which learning can occur, and also the opportunity for 
personnel to put their newly-acquired knowledge to use. However, training is not just a 
matter of putting people in seats or having them perform tasks. Good training must be 
designed as a program and not just a singular event. It must have a purpose and be 
applicable to those who receive it. There is more to learning and training that just the 
activity (Lagadec, 1997).  
Training 
 Since the infrequent occurrence of disasters that require EOC operations prevents 
the evaluation of direct EOC role performance in the traditional manner, differing 
approaches are required to identify training needs (Sinclair et al., 2012). To fill this gap, 
exercises are conducted to simulate disaster incidents so that those who staff an EOC 
have an opportunity to practice their role. These simulated incidents allow individuals to 
work within the EOC facility and perform their roles in a much more non-threatening 
environment, and still experience the challenges that will be found during real world 
activations. As indicated by Williams, (2011), emergency training is most effective when 
frequent exercises allow employees to use their skills. 
 According to McEntire and Myers (2004), “emergency management training is 
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intended to develop people’s capacity to respond to the new and atypical demands 
presented by a disaster, as well as developing norms of carrying out a job or exercising a 
specific skill” (as cited in Sinclair et al., 2012, p. 509). However, there is currently no 
standardized process by which training programs are designed, developed, and 
implemented (Revere, 2000). Additionally, there is also no standard by which all 
organizations must evaluate their programs. Yet, as indicated earlier, these activities are 
useful and provide beneficial learning opportunities. When determining the level of 
preparedness within a organization, exercises and simulations can provide some 
indication that learning has taken place since the last crisis occurred (Stern, 1997). 
Although the value that exercises and simulations serve has been demonstrated, the 
approach to incorporating the data gathered into useful future training has been less than 
optimal.  
 Burstein (2006) argued that, “in our haste to train everyone, a lot of the wrong 
people are getting the wrong training in the wrong way” (as cited in Rutty & Rutty, 2012. 
P. 92). Hodkinson (2005) also stated that curriculum content and design are critical 
components of the learning process (Hodkinson, 2005). When planning an exercise, 
organizations must consider whether the primary purpose of the simulation is the 
identification of gaps or education. Once determined, a defined pathway for planning, 
delivery, and evaluation can be established (Rutty & Rutty, 2012). Thus, a prime target 
for those in the emergency management profession is to identify the most common errors 
attributed to EOC operations so that a strategic approach can be taken to improve overall 
EOC effectiveness. By drawing upon the experiences of others, even vicariously, it is 
likely to facilitate the retrieval of schemata, allowing a pathway to be developed that 
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leads to adaptive expertise (Joung, Hesketh, & Neal, 2006). 
 Much like climbers who are tethered together, they face risks in which any given 
action, or any mistake that may be viewed as minor, can take on major symbolic 
importance and result in a general collapse (Lagadec, 1997). To eliminate these errors, 
training and exercises are used to help personnel be able to recognize the environment in 
which errors may occur. By understanding the most common errors, improvements to the 
overall management of resources can result in safer operations.  
 Training EOC staff takes on renewed importance when it is understood how 
critical decisions directly influence the safety of others. A lack of knowledge, skills, and 
abilities both in the emergency arena and in the EOC can lead to personal and 
organizational failure (Revere, 2000). Developing mental models that can be shared 
among those in the EOC about what a disaster response will entail, while at the same 
time understanding the limitations and capabilities of each team member, are just a 
couple of the benefits that can be obtained through a comprehensive training program 
(Sinclair et al., 2012). In contrast, developing training programs on an ad hoc basis is not 
an approach that can elicit confidence that improvement in skills and capabilities will 
occur (Sinclair et al., 2012).  
 At some point in time, a feature needs to be in place to reduce the number of 
times that errors are repeated. Learning is a process that “entails an inseparable amalgam 
of rational thought, affective or emotional dispositions, and actual embodied practice” 
(Hodkinson, 2005, p. 111). As mentioned earlier, one of challenges that this presents for 
the EOC is the fact that they are not activated very often, and those who staff the EOC 
are not involved in this type of environment on a regular basis. However, this is a known 
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condition that can, and should be, addressed through effective training programs, which 
offer personnel an opportunity to work together during a crisis. Thus, training results in 
individuals becoming familiar with one another in a more relaxed atmosphere (Williams, 
2011). In this manner, learning can occur on both an individual as well as an 
organizational level, which is necessary in reducing the number of repeated errors 
(Deverell, 2012; Elliot, 2009; Moynihan, 2009; Deverell & Hansen, 2009). 
 While still considered a part of the training program, exercising provides the 
opportunity for individuals and organizations to demonstrate their skills. If done in the 
proper context, exercises themselves can be useful training adjuncts that just add more 
value to the overall training program. Allowing personnel to actually perform a task 
provides them the confidence to know that they can perform successfully and carry that 
confidence into actual disaster scenarios (Sinclair et al., 2012).  
Exercising and Evaluations 
 Often, professional experience is typically gained on the job through incidents or 
simulations. However, those who are brought in to staff the EOC, while they may be well 
experienced in their own disciplines, will probably have little, if any, knowledge of the 
administrative and/or command skills required during and activation. This includes issues 
such as planning, prioritizing, logistics, and incident command (Revere, 2000). Mistakes 
also are more prone to occur in those situations where tasks are cognitively more 
demanding (Loh, Andrews, Hesketh, & Griffin, 2013). Emphasizing the need to have a 
fundamentally-sound training and exercise program in place to assist those who may be 
new to the EOC. 
 Another challenge is that individuals who may participate in the same experience, 
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such as an emergency management exercise, may not relate to the real-world situation in 
similar fashions because of their respective backgrounds and their day-to-day functions 
(Bergeron & Cooren, 2012). Yet, experience has value regardless of whether it is 
obtained through real-world events, or simulated scenarios. As noted by Sagan (1993), 
“virtual experience, such as that generated through training drills, simulations, role play, 
scenario and case exercises, may stimulate learning at relatively low cost compared to 
trial and error” (as cited in Stern, 1997, p. 71). The challenge for emergency management 
is that too often, those who possess a considerable amount of EOC experience are 
routinely lost through staff turnover. The result is that, as much as organizations learn, 
they also forget (Stern, 1997).  
 Often, it is politically dangerous for an agency, or a leader, to actually accept and 
take responsibility for mistakes. Therefore, any lessons to be learned from such errors are 
often documented in a manner that is seen as being less than actionable, resulting in 
reports that are much less meaningful (Donahue & Tuohy, 2006). However, learning 
from mistakes needs to be a process that is undertaken after every incident, exercise, drill, 
or training session. As shared by McEntire and Myers (2004) “exercising provides 
opportunities to test the knowledge, skills, and the abilities of first responders and 
government officials, assess participant perceptions of teamwork, training adequacy, 
response network effectiveness, job risk, and equipment adequacy” (as cited in Sinclair et 
al., 2012, p. 512).  
 While training and exercising are factors in virtually any high-risk occupation, the 
fact that most localities do not experience incidents that require an EOC activation on a 
regular basis emphasizes the reality that training and exercising are especially important 
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in the emergency management discipline (Sinclair et al., 2012). As noted in the Fort 
Worth tornado response, while errors were made in some aspects, those organizations 
associated with the response phase of the incident were well aware of the tasks that 
needed to be undertaken as well as the value of working with others in a cooperative and 
collaborative manner during disaster types of incidents (McEntire, 2002). This is 
associated with the interaction these organizations had previously experienced through 
working together on other similar scenarios.  
 While the value of sound training in these situations is evident, the assessment of 
training, and for that matter exercises, should not be confused with an overall assessment 
of how well an organization can respond to a significant event. In order to make such an 
observation, the training and exercises themselves should be part of the evaluation 
process (Sinclair et al., 2012). “Ensuring that training provides a return on investment for 
communities, responders, and organizations makes including an evaluation component in 
the planning process essential (Wilson, 2000; as cited in Sinclair et al., 2012, p. 508). 
This same process should be incorporated in the deliberate examination of the tools 
utilized to provide such training, thereby ensuring that individuals are gaining both a 
valuable experience as well as increasing their level of EOC knowledge.  Using AARs to 
identify common EOC errors can serve as the context by which training programs, 
including the component of exercises, can be improved, and EOC performance enhanced. 
     Summary 
 The EOC is tasked with performing a variety of functions. Lettieri, Masella, and 
Radaelli (2009) explained how the vision of those who work within the EOC is different 
from that of the traditional first responder. Mainly, they are concerned with how the 
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incident, or incidents, is influencing the remainder of the community. One of the biggest 
challenges with this is that while first responders are, for the most part, very familiar with 
the activities they undertake to address the incident, the staff in the EOC do not generally 
have this same level of comfort or experience in the roles they are cast into at a moment’s 
notice.  
 Those who staff the EOC are directed to work together during an activation to not 
only obtain and deliver resources for those on the incident scene, but support the needs of 
the community as well (Militello, Patterson, Bowman, & Wears, 2007). This can be a 
difficult role for seasoned professionals, let alone those who may have never before been 
asked to do this function. The opportunity to commit errors is understandably higher in 
these types of situations. One of the goals of this study is to attempt to identify the most 
common, specific errors, and seek solutions to help those in the EOC perform their roles 
in the safest and most efficient manner possible. Additionally, to examine if 
commonalties exist between challenges/errors, which led to the final hypothesis that 
states; 
 H6: When EOCs are activated for actual real world or simulated natural, man-
 made, or technological incidents, several challenges will be identified as being co-
 existent. 
 Huang, Wang, and Lin, (2011) state that in terms of managing human resources, 
they must be provided the training and equipment necessary to perform well in their 
assigned roles. In addition, the leadership of senior managers, the continuing learning of 
the group members, and the good use of technology can all be used to help improve the 
operations during a disaster response (Huang, Wang, & Lin, 2011). Those who staff an 
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EOC during an activation face a multitude of challenges. Boin and Hart (2010) list these 
challenges as;  
 sense making (understanding what is going on) 
 meaning making (interpreting what is happening) 
 decision-making (choosing a course of action) 
 coordinating (organizing activities) 
 circumscribing (constricting the range of activity) 
 consolidating (combining many actions or resources into smaller units) 
 account giving (being responsible for actions taken and/or decisions made) 
 learning (gaining knowledge) and  
 remembering.  
To provide these individuals with the best opportunity to execute their roles with minimal 
errors requires that training, exercising, and learning all be a significant component of 
preparedness.  
 Although much has been written, and many scholars have contributed to the 
scientific community regarding multi-organizational emergency response, only parts of 
the complexity associated with the topic have been revealed (Uhr, 2009). There is much 
more that needs to be done at both the academic and practitioner levels. In addition, the 
usage of resources also must be considered when gathering data from specific disciplines 
in order to gain an accurate picture. The United States Fire Administration state that in 
regards to critiques, which are also termed AARs, “The process should be considered an 
important tool for improving firefighter safety and health, as well as a means for ensuring 
that the public is receiving quality services” (FEMA, 2008c, p. 1). This same perspective 
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is applicable to the emergency management discipline as well. The goal is the same — 
promote safety in all that is done, while at the same time, providing the best service to the 
public. The use of AARs is an excellent way to help identify areas where improvements 
can be made in performance. 
 Designing, developing, and instituting such a program in a cost-effective manner 
requires that detailed attention to the contents of a program (Sinclair et al., 2012). People 
are empowered when they have a secure sense of knowing of what is happening and 
where things are going (Cavanaugh, Gelles, Reyes, Civiello, & Zahner, 2008). When a 
disaster strikes, things can spin out of control, and people will be looking to their leaders 
for direction. Thus, the EOC leader, with the EOC staff, must focus on predictability and 
help each other to see the direction they are going, and feel confident that the desired 
outcome will be achieved (Cavanaugh et al., 2008).  
 While numerous articles have been written about learning from previous errors 
(Lester & Krejci, 2007; Donahue & Tuohy, 2006; McEntire D. A., 2002; Birkland, 2009; 
Deverell & Hansen, 2009), no studies have taken the initiative to gather data from 
multiple locations to identify some of the most common errors that are occurring in EOCs 
during activations. A large number of scholars and researchers argue, “Learning from 
man-made and natural disasters is an inseparable part of the disaster life cycle” (Sawaiha, 
2014, p. 319). Previous articles also have shown that while an attempt to learn from past 
mistakes has been made, the history of correcting errors has enjoyed limited success at 
best (Henstra & McBean, 2005; Wolensky & Wolensky, 1990). Research also has shown 
that it would be naıve to assume that disaster events act as a common enemy that induce 
seamless and harmonious linkages between all the organizations (Boin & Hart , 2010). 
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Therefore, identifying common errors will only help to enhance EOC operations.  
 This study is intended to be a part of that process by completing the research 
outlined through the use of AARs, and developing possible recommendations to help 
reduce and/or eliminate commonly-repeated errors that occur within the EOC 
environment. As shared in an article by Middaugh (2012), the military is known for 
conducting post-action reports so that their leaders and troops reflect on what they 
learned. Sharing these lessons saves lives. Sharing and learning from our lessons can as 
well (Middaugh, 2012). 
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CHAPTER III 
METHODOLOGY 
 This study illuminates the various challenges that confront EOCs during an 
activation. The terminology challenges, mistakes, and errors will be used interchangeably 
throughout this study. This analysis will identify specific challenges, trends among the 
challenges, and the relationships between the challenges. More specifically, the study will 
examine numerous AARs from multiple jurisdictions to highlight the most common 
challenges faced. After conducting an extensive review of the literature, an examination 
regarding the operational characteristics of EOCs, and the most common challenges they 
face, has been conducted.  
 EOCs face various challenges during an activation, regardless of the nature of the 
incident itself. One of the main purposes of this study is to discover the most common 
challenges so that future training programs can be developed that are constructed on 
evidence-based data, and not perception. While there are training programs in place at 
this time, the literature reviewed has indicated that mistakes are often repeated (Donahue 
& Tuohy, 2006; Wolensky & Wolensky, 1990; Militello, Patterson, Bowman, & Wears, 
2007). Through evidenced-based training programs, the desired outcome is to reduce the 
frequency of mistakes, or preferably, eliminate them by developing new skills through 
improved training curriculums. The other benefit of this study will be to identify these 
challenges so that future training programs can be built upon documented findings in lieu 
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of designing programs on an ad hoc basis (Sinclair, Doyle, Johnston, & Paton, 2012), and 
not upon what curriculum designers may perceive will assist EOCs improve efficiency in 
operations.  
 Many tools are used to evaluate organizational operations (Paton, Flin, & 
Violanti, 1999), and the changes made to correct deficiencies. As such, they serve as the 
foundation of evidence-based practice. It can be measured as easily as analyzing what 
went right, what could have been done better, and lessons that were learned by 
individuals (Middaugh, 2012). Using AARs to serve as the principal tool for identifying 
errors is a good approach that has been successful utilized in previous studies (Savoia, 
Agboola, & Biddinger, 2012).  
 Historically, AARs have been used by organizations in their effort to identify 
components within their environment where improvements can be made, as well as 
serving as an important tool in the overall learning process (Donahue & Tuohy, 2006; 
Bergeron & Cooren, 2012; Savoia, Agboola, & Biddinger, 2012). While AARs do have 
limitations, they have proven to be valuable documents in examining actions taken during 
disaster operations as evidenced by their use in both public safety and military 
organizations. Both of which have extensive disaster experience (Birkland, 2009; 
Donahue & Tuohy, 2006; FEMA, 2008c; Faith, Jackson, & Willis, 2011; Savoia, 
Agboola, & Biddinger, 2012). Their importance in identifying areas of improvements 
have been recognized to the extent where they are now required by several agencies and 
organizations that fund, oversee, or regulate aspects of public health and healthcare 
emergency preparedness and response such as the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention (Savoia, Agboola, & Biddinger, 2012). AARs provide the foundation from 
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which positive changes can be incorporated in activities undertaken as well as policy 
development (Cave, 2008; Biddinger, et al., 1974). Thus, they are also appropriate for use 
in this study of EOC operations to provide direction in the identification of areas where 
improvements should be focused in current and future training programs.  
Content Analysis  
 Quantitative research uses statistical analysis to provide a numerical evaluation of 
a given situation. The use of statistics allows researchers to define the concept of 
“unusual” while also looking for the evidence of probability, which is used to express the 
likelihood of the observed event outcomes in relation to the researcher’s expectations 
(Giventer, 2008). The statistical data is used to represent observations for the purpose of 
describing and explaining the phenomena that those observations reflect (Babbie, 2004; 
Camp, 2007). Quantitative methodologies are used in multiple disciplines such as a 
psychology, sociology, and physics (Camp, 2007). Woodrum (1984) also contended that 
the content analysis methodology “provides methods for measuring the characteristics of 
both manifest and latent communications” (Cheng, Fleischmann, Wang, & Oard, 2008, p. 
3). Thus, this is an appropriate approach to use in analyzing the AARs collected for this 
study. 
 Among other methods, one of the most common means of summarizing data in a 
quantitative fashion is by looking at frequencies among them (United States GAO, 1989) 
in terms of content. The methodology of content analysis relies on both the categories 
created, and the interpretative process of fitting text into these categories (Franzosi, 
2008). Thus, it is vulnerable to the subjective view of the researcher creating the 
categories. To overcome this, many content analysis studies employ the use of intercoder 
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reliability testing to ensure that the content being analyzed is done so in a consistent 
manner, and interpreted in a similar fashion. However, for this study, the use of single 
coder required the use of a test-retest validity process, explained later in this chapter.  
 Content analysis can be viewed as a method of data collection. More specifically, 
it is a technique of measurement that is applied to text whereby the coder serves as an 
instrument of measurement (Franzosi, 2008). Thus, with a purpose of using statistical 
analysis to provide numerical value to the textual content, such as associated with 
frequencies of occurrences, content analysis is simply a data collection method, which is 
no different from survey research (Franzosi, 2008). Historically, counting frequencies 
was the main activity of content analysts in the 1930s and 1940s. For many people, that is 
how content analysis was defined (Franzosi, 2008). 
 In regards to frequency analysis, absolute frequency may represent the actual 
number of times words, statements, or issues are found in the data collected as compared 
to relative frequency, which could represent frequency by a percentage of the sample 
size. Similar to the process used for this study, researchers are able to use this 
information to compare one category’s frequency to the average frequency for all 
categories (United States GAO, 1989). This method helps to provide a more 
comprehensive review of the statistical data found in the documentation collected for 
examination.  
 For the purposes of this study, the quantitative analysis utilized will be 
constructed to demonstrate a basic frequency distribution (Holcomb, 2011). The 
frequency distribution statistical table will demonstrate the number of times a statement 
or sentence is found in the analysis of the AARs reviewed. Additional comparison also 
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can be done with multiple AARs to show the number of times these types of statements 
or sentences appeared among all the documents collected. The process will be inclusive 
of conducting a content analysis and the use of descriptive research to determine the 
trends identified within each AAR. The study will utilize a content analysis to identify 
the most common errors/challenges associated in EOC operations in both real-world 
activations as well as simulated incidents, which are mentioned in multiple AARs.  
 The foundation of this type of study is based upon the premise that using a 
quantitative approach can provide statistical evidence to confirm the areas within EOC 
operations that should be addressed in terms of current and future training. Areas that are 
performing well also will be highlighted. Identifying strengths as well as weaknesses is 
important in the overall analysis of actions carried out in the performance of a task. The 
basis for this examination of strengths is described later in this chapter to demonstrate its 
value in addressing challenges. 
 Generally, a content analysis is introduced and applied to written text, and also 
often is used to examine the manifest content of a text. Manifest in this sense will refer to 
the visible and countable components of the message (Rose, Spinks, & Canhoto, 2015). 
While developing a frequency table is beneficial, analyzing text also involves discovering 
both themes and subthemes (Ryan & Bernard, 2003). This process has also been used in 
other similar studies (Savoia, Agboola, & Biddinger, 2012) 
 Berelson (1952) defines content analysis as “a research technique for the 
objective, systematic and quantitative description of the manifest content of 
communication” (p. 18). However, others provide no such restrictions on the quantitative 
description. They prefer to define content analysis as “any technique for making 
81 
 
inferences by objectively and systematically identifying specified characteristics of 
messages” (p.2, as stated in Cheng, Fleischmann, Wang, & Oard, 2008). 
 These communications can be analyzed at various levels, thus creating a variety 
of research opportunities (Kolbe & Burnett, 1991). The use of content analysis as a 
research methodology is an example of the use of language to study human cognition and 
communication, and is based on the assumption that the analysis of text is a way for 
researchers to understand how people make sense of the world around them (McKee, 
2003). Content analyses allow for unobtrusive appraisals of communications 
(Krippendorff, 1980), which can be particularly valuable in situations when direct 
methods of inquiry might yield biased responses. Content analyses also can provide an 
empirical starting point for generating new research evidence about the nature and effect 
of specific communications (Kolbe & Burnett, 1991).  
 Popping (2000) identified three approaches to text analysis. The first is the 
thematic text analysis. Texts are quantified as counts of words and phrases that were 
classified according to a set of content categories, which offer the researcher an 
opportunity to determine the concepts as well as their frequency within texts (Popping, 
2000). The second method is a semantic text analysis, which involves not only the 
identification of concepts, but also the relationships among them. In this analysis, a 
coding process is needed to acquire a semantic grammar that specifies the relationship 
among themes. Then the texts’ themes are coded according to the relationship specified 
in the semantic grammar (Roberts, 1997; Popping, 2000). After the coding process, the 
semantically-coded data can be used to make inferences from the texts (Popping, 2000).  
 The third approach is the network text analysis that is developed from the 
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semantic linkages among various concepts. As Popping (2000) explains, after a 
researcher has coded semantic links among concepts, networks of semantically-linked 
concepts can be built. When the concepts are depicted as networks, the researcher now 
has more than just the frequency at which specific concepts are linked; the researcher also 
is able to characterize concepts and linkages relative to their position within the network 
(Popping, 2000). To provide a more comprehensive view of the data within the AARs, 
both the second and third methodologies have been applied to this study in the analysis of 
the AARs. 
Conceptual Framework 
 A conceptual framework should serve as a platform from which a guide can be 
developed to connect the identification of the problem being researched, and the possible 
solutions to that problem (Kumar & Antonenko, 2014). In essence, the conceptual 
framework for this study has been designed to help organize the pathway to be used for 
the exploration of the problem at hand (Shields & Tajalli, 2006). Since this study will 
employ quantitative research, it is a good practice to institute a framework that not only 
identifies the research that will be conducted, but how the quantitative component will be 
employed and utilized. The conceptual framework will provide the how and why to the 
statistical analysis of the project. This will then provide the substance to the study to help 
deliver a more comprehensive look at not only the problems identified by the 
circumstances in which they occur, but include recommendations for future research to 
be conducted that can be employed to reduce or eliminate them in the future. 
 The conceptual framework for this study is based upon the idea that unless errors 
are corrected within EOC operations, which has been highlighted in earlier research 
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(Paton, Flin, & Violanti, 1999; Donahue & Tuohy, 2006; Militello, Patterson, Bowman, 
& Wears, 2007), the performance of the EOC, as an organization, cannot improve. In 
addition, the performance of individuals also will be limited if the most common errors 
committed are not identified and either minimized, in terms of possible occurrence, or 
eliminated from the learning environment. Sawaiha (2014) concludes that major 
accidents are generally “the result of more than one mistake, and if the chain of mistakes 
is not resolved rapidly, damage and loss will become irrecoverable and irreversible” (pp. 
312-313).  
 This same notion can be applied to the EOC environment. Today, various motives 
may serve as the catalyst to protect the organization's image by covering up performance 
failures. Such cover-ups may take place even in organizations, which culturally, are 
committed to the idea of being viewed as a highly-reliable organization (Stern, 1997). 
Only through the identification of errors can progress can be made. Yet, focus should 
shift from failure and casting blame and be re-directed toward learning from failure. 
“This kind of learning is essential to organizational learning and adaptation, and a 
necessary complement to studies of learning from success” (Baum & Dahlin, 2007, p. 
368). 
 The conceptual framework for this study serves to assist in the formation of the 
research questions (Green, 2014). In order for EOC operations to improve, the issues or 
items that are serving as obstacles to achieving the desired goal of better performance 
must be identified. As such, it is important to uncover whether the issues themselves are 
unique, or if certain deficiencies are correlated. While identifying challenges that inhibit 
effectiveness is important, understanding the causes is critical as well. Far too often, 
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lessons from previous mistakes are not being learned, but repeated (Militello, Patterson, 
Bowman, & Wears, 2007; Donahue & Tuohy, 2006; Drabek, 1997), which could be 
indicative of training shortfalls and may be identified as a cause in the AARs. 
Overview of Review Process  
 While the AARs collected for this study contain a wealth of information that can 
be used to improve multiple areas within not only the discipline of emergency 
management, but public safety as a whole, not all of the information will be relevant to 
this study. As part of the examination of the documents, the following overarching 
process, which will be described in further detail later in this chapter, was implemented. 
Initially, as part of a quality control process, if the portions of the information gathered 
from the AARs were not directly or indirectly related to EOC operations, they were 
disregarded from further use in the analysis. This was determined by examining the 
documentation and identifying those areas where discussions of activities, challenges, 
strengths and recommendations were associated with actual incident scene operations or 
activities conducted outside of the EOC function. 
 Once this initial review was conducted, a preliminary coding procedure was 
created to help create and delineate categories, themes, and sub-themes. After the initial 
coding, another review of the structure was conducted, taking the time to re-examine the 
multiple categories, themes, and sub-themes created to make certain that the data 
collected has been placed in the appropriate category/theme. Once completed, another 
third review of the categories, themes and sub-themes was conducted. If necessary, 
additional themes and/or sub-themes were created  (Lunenburg & Irby, 2007). Once this 
was completed, a final review of all the documents was conducted to ensure that all the 
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relevant information was included into the categories that were used for the analysis. 
 As identified earlier in the coding strategy implemented, each AAR was examined 
for the repetition of similar statements and sentences, since some of the most obvious 
themes arise from topics that occur and reoccur. In conjunction with this step, a constant 
comparison technique was employed to identify similarities and differences in the data 
collected while searching for the meaning of words, sentences, paragraphs, and how they 
are similar or different from previous text (Ryan & Bernard, 2003). The generation of 
word lists and coding sheets were employed to help to identify the concepts, ideas, issues, 
and terms that were most prevalent among the AARs collected. 
Detailed Review Process 
 Content analysis is a process that “attempts to characterize the meanings in a 
given body of discourse in a systematic and quantitative fashion” (Franzosi, 2008, p. xxi). 
As with other quantitative approaches, this methodology begins with design. The 
framework implemented for this study follows the guidelines established by Rose, 
Spinks, & Canhoto, (2015), and depicted in Figure 3.1. The aim is to predict the outcome 
or effect of the document being analyzed (Neuendorf, 2002). 
 Briefly, the design begins with the identification of relevant concepts and 
formulation of hypotheses in response to the research questions developed to guide the 
study (Rose, Spinks, & Canhoto, 2015). After the research questions and hypotheses have 
been created, sampling is conducted. Sampling involves identifying and selecting the 
material to be analyzed. At the same time, the coding units to be utilized are developed, 
which can include words, phrases, sentences, images, paragraphs or whole documents 
(Rose, Spinks, & Canhoto, 2015).  
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 Once the coding units have been identified, a coding scheme is created, which is 
the process of creating developing classification rules to assign to the coding units 
developed (Rose, Spinks, & Canhoto, 2015). For example, assigning the numerical code 
‘1’ to a variable within a category that identifies the main subject as being male. 
Subsequently, using the numerical code of “2” if the main subject is female. These 
coding rules are outlined in a codebook that details how each variable to be analyzed was 
coded (Rose, Spinks, & Canhoto, 2015). The codebook for this study can be found in 
Appendix D. 
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Figure 3.1 Content Analysis Review Process   
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Research Question 
Findings and 
Conclusions 
Reliability testing 
Sampling and Unitizing 
Data Collection 
Coding Scheme 
Development 
Coding 
Conceptualization and 
hypothesis formulation 
Existing Theory 
Figure 3.1: Content Analysis 
Process (Rose, Spinks, & Canhoto, 
2015) 
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 The collection of data, along with the coding of the data and analysis are then 
performed. Finally, the application of reliability testing, the drafting of the findings, and 
the writing of the conclusion complete the process (Rose, Spinks, & Canhoto, 2015). 
Each of these phases of the content analysis process is detailed within this section. 
However, while the process identified for this study is inclusive of the specific steps to be 
completed, they should not be interpreted as to imply that each one must be completed 
prior to the next step being initiated. For this study, the collection of AARs occurred 
simultaneously as the drafting of the codebook.  
Existing Theory 
 Theoretical Construct. A theoretical construct is a logically structured 
representation of the concepts, variables, or relationships involved in a scientific study 
with the purpose of clearly identifying the idea that will be explored, examined, 
measured, or described (Desjardins, 2010). In reviewing the literature associated with this 
study, several recurring deficiencies were noted (independent variables) within responses 
to large-scale emergencies or disasters, including those operations within the EOC (Lutz 
& Lindell, 2008; Militello, Patterson, Bowman, & Wears, 2007; Donahue & Tuohy, 
2006). These independent variables serve to impact the overall efficiency and 
effectiveness of the overarching function of the EOC operation, which for the purpose of 
this study, served as the dependent variable. The study uncovered the most common 
independent variables identified in a majority of the AARs examined, which was similar 
to the study conducted by Savoia et al. (2012). The study also uncovered any 
relationships the independent variables had in regards to co-existence. In essence, this 
portion was inclusive of exploring the circumstances in which two or more variables are 
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present in multiple AARs.  
 The theoretical construct, upon which this study is partially based, and is 
explained later in this section, helps to further the effort within the emergency 
management community to improve EOC operations by creating an evidence-based 
study, which can be used to develop future training programs. These programs are critical 
since EOCs are not activated on a regular basis, and are staffed by those who often are 
tasked with performing unfamiliar roles within a time-constrained environment 
(Militello, Patterson, Bowman, & Wears, 2007; Huang, Wang, & Lin, 2011). While this 
study is only being conducted within mid-sized communities, or cities with populations 
of 300,000 to 499,000, the benefits can be realized in other jurisdictions, regardless of 
size, since community-based EOCs are activated for similar types of incidents. However, 
it is noted there may be differences relative to the size of the community which is not 
addressed in this research, and this is recognized as a limitation within this study. 
 Organizational Theory. This study is guided upon the fluid, and often-times 
debated, organizational theory (Shafritz, Ott, & Yong, 2015) model, which incorporates a 
variety of perspectives from disciplines such as psychology and sociology. 
Organizational theory focuses on the comprehensive examination of organizations, and 
incorporates multiple methods of analysis (Suter, et al., 2013). By taking this approach, 
organizational theory is able to be inclusive of both the detailed examinations of groups 
at the micro level while exploring the concepts and management structures found at the 
macro level (Suter, et al., 2013). 
 Organizational theory is not a collection of assorted facts, but rather a way of 
thinking about how resources and people (also referred to as resources in portions of this 
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study) are organized to accomplish a goal. Studies for exploring how various 
organizations are designed can aid in helping to improve their overall efficiency (Daft, 
2012). The premise of the theory, or theories, deals with how organizations affect their 
environment, and how the environment affects the organizations. However, there is no 
one established theory, but rather a variety of theories that attempt to explain and predict 
how organizations and the people in those organizations will behave within various 
structures, cultures, and situations (Shafritz, Ott, & Yong, 2015).  
 This is an important consideration when viewing the EOC as an organizational 
structure created to make time-sensitive decisions while dealing with unfamiliar yet 
critical information that may determine the success or failure of response and recovery 
efforts to a large-scale emergency or disaster. One of the organizational theories that can 
be associated with this study includes the contingency theory, which considers the 
influence of various components of the environment that could play a role in regards to 
the performance of the organization (Birkinshaw, Nobel, & Ridderstrale, 2002).  
 To understand an organization, one must understand the contingency factors and 
the organizational structures in which they were placed (Suter, et al., 2013). Birkinshaw, 
Nobel, and Ridderstrale (2002) explored the variable of knowledge as a potential 
contingency factor. They argue that with the recognition of knowledge as an 
organizational asset, this variable could be a factor that significantly influences an 
organization’s performance (Birkinshaw, Nobel, & Ridderstrale, 2002). As it relates to 
this study, knowledge is key in helping EOC personnel perform at a level that would be 
perceived by the community, and jurisdictional leadership, as successful. Inasmuch, for 
these staff members to achieve the desired results, they must be trained in a manner that 
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enhances their capabilities to perform in roles in which they do not often have the 
opportunity to exercise.  
 Another sub-set of organizational theory that is applicable to this study looks at 
how technology plays a role within an organization. The Socio-technical theory looks to 
address the issues that are often found when new technologies are introduced into an 
organization, and the problems that may be associated with such an introduction to that 
organization (Trist & Bamforth, 1951). The theory itself has a focus on ensuring that 
people and technology work together to have a positive effect within an organizational 
structure (Trist & Bamforth, 1951). The two main principles of this theory are centered 
on the ideas that the interaction of social and technical subsystems creates the conditions 
for successful (or unsuccessful) organizational performance. As such, work processes and 
procedures involve interaction within the social and the technical subsystems. Secondly, 
“if optimization of only one subsystem occurs, then there is a likelihood of unpredictable 
organizational performance” (Suter, et al., 2013, p. 60). It is interesting to note that while 
this study was conducted in the early 1950’s, it still holds value today.  
 One final organizational theory that is appropriate to consider when examining 
EOC effectiveness is the Stakeholder theory, which argues that when making decisions at 
the organizational level, managers and other staff leaders should consider all of the 
stakeholders of the organization. Specifically, stakeholders are any groups (large or 
small), or individuals who are directly or indirectly impacted by the achievement of the 
organization’s goals and objectives. These will include individuals and units such as 
employees, stockholders, customers, as well as local and national governmental bodies 
(Jawahar & McLaughlin, 2001). The stakeholder theory is a popular method of 
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management because it encourages collective input and shared responsibility (Suter, et 
al., 2013). 
 These organizational theories provide a sound basis and foundation for the 
purpose of this study. While EOC operations are not typically part of the standard day-to-
day function of local government, they are one of the most important components of any 
jurisdiction’s preparations as they relate to response and recovery activities associated 
with any large-scale emergency or disaster. The organization that is put into place within 
the EOC must function at a very high level and be prepared to do so for extended periods 
of time. Disasters are not defined by their geographical size or duration. They have no 
political association or cultural ties. They occur many times with no pre-determined 
boundaries, and the extent of their impact is directly related to the vulnerability and social 
capital of the community.  
 As part of understanding how organizations are designed, this study examines the 
most common errors and the most apparent challenges so that possible corrections to 
current EOC organizational designs can be modified to improve their operational 
effectiveness. Currently, EOCs are not designed based on standard organizational 
structures. Each jurisdiction selects a design that they feel is most appropriate for their 
organization (Shouldis, 2010). While beyond the scope of this study, the findings may be 
used to help communities to implement an organizational design that helps eliminate the 
most common errors faced by EOCs during an activation that will improve their ability to 
perform at a higher level of efficiency and effectiveness. 
    Research Questions 
 According to a paper written by the United States General Accounting Office 
(GAO) (1989), the questions developed for a content analysis should be “based on a clear 
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understanding of project needs and the available data. Precisely worded questions provide 
the focus for data” (p. 8). According to Franzosi (2008), “the best studies will not just 
report percentages one category at a time. They will correlate the results across 
categories” (p. xxxvii), Based upon the literature reviewed, the following research 
questions have been developed to help guide the study towards the desired outcome:    
 1. How often is training, or the lack thereof, recognized as being a source for 
 mistakes, errors, or challenges experienced during EOC operations?  
 2. How often is lack of experience noted as playing a role in performance as 
 identified in after action reports? 
 3. In examining the operations of the EOC, what are the most common 
 deficiencies that are noted in the after action reports? 
 4. In examining the after action reports, which errors are identified as being 
 coexistent? In other words, when one error is identified, what other error or errors 
 will most likely also be identified in other after action reports?  
 5. What are the most common recommendations and strengths identified in after 
 action  reports? 
Hypotheses 
 The formulation of the following hypotheses has been done in conjunction with 
the research questions outlined above. The process of developing the hypotheses has been 
undertaken to establish the rationale behind this study (Rose, Spinks, & Canhoto, 2015). 
These hypotheses have been created to avoid the risk of only doing the content analysis 
to achieve a desired number of outcomes in order to satisfy a “word crunching” exercise 
(Insch, Moore, & Murphy, 1997). As a basis from which the research questions have 
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evolved, the following hypotheses have been formulated:  
 H1: When EOCs are activated for actual real-world or simulated natural, man-
 made, or technological incidents, situational awareness will be identified as a 
 challenge/deficiency in a majority of after action reports. 
 H2: When EOCs are activated for actual real world or simulated natural, man-
 made, or technological incidents, communications will be identified as a 
 challenge/deficiency in a majority of after action reports. 
 H3: The lack of EOC organization will be identified in multiple EOC after action 
 reports as being the source of errors committed during an EOC activation. 
 H4: When EOCs are activated for actual real world or simulated natural, man-
 made, or technological incidents, training will be identified as a 
 challenge/deficiency in a majority of after action reports. 
 H5: When EOCs are activated for real-world or simulated natural, man-made, 
 or technological incidents, resources will be identified as a  challenge/deficiency 
 in a majority of after action reports. 
 H6: When EOCs are activated for actual real world or simulated natural, man-
 made, or technological incidents, several challenges will be identified as being co-
 existent. 
Sampling 
Selection of Jurisdictions for the Study 
 The selection of metropolitan areas to be studied was based upon several factors. 
The main focus was to examine the challenges that faced local level EOCs. Initially, the 
2010 U. S. Census Bureau data was utilized to identify metropolitan areas located within 
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the United States. According to Census Bureau data, there were over 290 metropolitan 
areas with populations over 100,000 (Commerce, 2015). Examining AARs from a sample 
population this large would be beyond the capability of this study due to the limited 
resources available to review such a large number of reports. While the usage of a 
computer to assist with the analyzing and coding of data is employed, this does not 
replace the need for human interface regarding analysis and coding. To create a 
manageable number of reports to review, while at the same time gathering information 
that is reflective of no one specific area of the country, metropolitan areas were broken 
down in three groups small, mid-size and large. This was done in order to break down the 
total number of communities into manageable segments that could be examined within 
the time and resource constraints of the study. The parameters of the groups to be 
considered were set as follows: 
 Metropolitans areas with a population between 100,000 and 299,000 
 Metropolitan Areas with a population between 300,000 and 499,000 
 Metropolitan areas with a population above 500,000 
 The group with a population between 100,000 and 299,000 was not selected 
because it included over 200 communities. Even with a modest AAR submission rate of 
only 15%, reviewing this many AARs was again beyond the resource capability of this 
study. Of those metropolitan areas with a population of 500,000 and above, 
approximately 48% received Urban Areas Security Initiative funding in 2013 
(Department of Homeland Security, 2014). This is in comparison to only approximately 
33% of the group with a population between 300,000 and 499,000, who also received 
similar funding. These funding sources could be used to enhance technology, provide 
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additional training opportunities and possibly support the acquisition of personnel to 
assist with the staffing of positions within the EOC during an activation. Thus, serve as a 
resource that a majority of EOCs across the country do not have the ability to utilize.  
 The third group to be considered served as a type of middle ground between both 
lower and higher population centers. This group also provided a good sample size for use 
in the study. Thus, the determination was made to use metropolitan areas with a 
population between 300,000 and 499,000. This resulted in having 27 metropolitan areas 
to be included as part of the study. Another positive attribute of the population selected 
for this study is the fact that this segment of communities provides a good representation 
of the country in terms of geographical location. Specifically, communities with 
populations between 300,000 and 499,000 include 18 states covering regional areas from 
the Mid-Atlantic, Southeast, Midwest, Central, West, and far West regions of the country. 
While not representative of every state, this sample population does reflect a good diverse 
reflection of the country (Figure 3.2).  
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Figure 3.2  Map of Populations between 300,000 and 499,000   
Unitizing 
 Unitizing is also known as unit coding. Unit coding is a determination of how the 
content of the documents selected for the study will be examined. Context units help to 
set limits on the portion of written material to be examined for categories of words or 
statements (United States GAO, 1989). For example, units may consist of words, phrases, 
sentences, paragraphs or entire documents (Rose, Spinks, & Canhoto, 2015). For this 
study, units were comprised of statements, words, sentences, and paragraphs. For coding 
purposes, sentences and statements were selected. In this way, the context in which 
specific items are used can be identified. In addition, frequencies that illuminate how 
many times a particular sentence or statement was used in one document, as well as 
across all documents included in the study, provided a more comprehensive perspective. 
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This unitizing process took into account the research questions developed for this study 
(Rose, Spinks, & Canhoto, 2015). 
 While using the entire AAR collected from each jurisdiction may seem more 
appropriate, many of the AARs addressed more than just EOC operations, Thus, those 
sentences and statements that were included in areas that were not within the scope of the 
study were discarded. For example, training may have been listed as a factor in the 
performance of personnel on an incident scene as well described personnel who were 
working within an EOC within a later section of the same AAR. While the factor of 
training as it related to those on the incident scene may have some impact, it was not 
relative to the questions asked within the study and thus not included. To identify such 
differences in the use of the word “training” the author needed to examine a smaller 
content unit (United States GAO, 1989). However, individual words were not counted as 
part of the frequency analysis. 
Coding Scheme Development 
 In the development of the coding scheme, steps were taken to ensure that the 
categories were exhaustive and mutually exclusive (Rose, Spinks, & Canhoto, 2015; 
Franzosi, 2008). In conducting content analysis, the ideal process would endeavor to be 
totally exhaustive in the development of categories. Nevertheless, there may be practical 
difficulties of achieving such a level of exhaustiveness. Thus, only empirical 
exhaustiveness may be possible (Franzosi, 2008). However, the author did take steps to 
develop a dictionary that could be used in helping to identify the exclusive nature of the 
units and terms used for the coding process. This dictionary assisted in specifying the 
“range of concepts and the words or phrases that are indicators of those concepts” (Rose, 
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Spinks, & Canhoto, 2015, p. 4)         
 Dictionary. One of the most important components of the content analysis 
conducted was ensuring that each AAR was explored in a structured and systematic 
fashion. In examining the AARs used for this study, it was imperative that the categories 
created, along with the coding implemented, were based upon consistent interpretation of 
the content analyzed. The dictionary used for this study was created to better define the 
parameters of the words utilized to describe specific nouns, verbs, and adjectives used in 
each of the AARs. Multiple sources were utilized for creation of the definitions 
developed due to the nature of the study itself, and the ways in which common terms are 
used in the sense that typical day-to-day communication may be different from the 
manner in which the same word may be understood as it relates to emergency center 
operations functions. 
 For example, the word “exercise” is defined by Merriam-Webster as a physical 
activity that someone will do in order to become stronger and healthier (Merriam-
Webster, 2015). However, as defined by the Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation 
Program (HSEEP), the term “exercise” is defined as an instrument that is utilized to train 
for, assess, practice, and improve performance in prevention, protection, mitigation, 
response, and recovery capabilities in a risk-free environment (Department of Homeland 
Security, 2013). For the purpose of this study, the definition provided by HSEEP is the 
most appropriate. For clarification, the definition itself, along with the source for each 
definition listed is provided in Appendix E 
 Codebook. In addition to the dictionary, a codebook was created, which includes 
information such as a description of the study as well as sampling data, including the 
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population studied, sampling, and response rate. The codebook addresses how the data is 
organized relating to the variables identified and the format utilized, while also ensuring a 
systematic and replicable coding of the data (Rose, Spinks, & Canhoto, 2015). The 
description of the codebook developed for this study is provided below, and the actual 
codebook itself is located in Appendix D. 
 The codebook was developed in association with the study being undertaken to 
identify the most common challenges that are found within EOCs during activations. The 
codebook is constructed to correspond with the issues identified in the research questions 
and hypotheses developed for this study. Each AAR has been coded against multiple 
variables (themes) that have been developed to address the questions and hypotheses. For 
example, under the category of Challenges, if the jurisdiction identified that a lack of 
situational awareness had a negative impact on their EOC operations, it was coded as a 
“1”. If the jurisdiction did not identify that the lack of situational awareness had a 
negative impact on their EOC operation, it was noted as a “2”. An example of the coding 
is provided below (Figure 3.3) 
Challenge 
 
Did the jurisdiction indicate that the 
lack of situational awareness had a 
negative impact on EOC operations? 
 
1=Yes 2=No 
Figure 3.3: Example of Coding for Situational Awareness 
 Once all the jurisdictional AARs were examined and coded, the frequency 
analysis was conducted to indicate if a majority of AARs indicated that the lack of 
situational awareness had a negative impact on their EOC operations. An example of this 
analysis is provided in Table 3.1  
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Table 3.1 Descriptive Statistics Identifying Lack of Situational Awareness Impacting EOC 
Operations (RQ #3/H#1) 
 
Situational Awareness  
            Responses 
         (N=27, n=11) 
Percent of 
Cases 
(n=11) n Percent 
Lack of Situational Awareness had a negative 
impact on the operation of the EOC 
6 100% 54.5% 
 
Additionally, calculations have been done within some main themes to identify 
frequencies of subthemes in order to provide a more in depth analysis of the data. The 
analysis has also identified the most common strengths and recommendations noted in 
the AARs examined. Finally, the codebook helps to identify and compare the data across 
multiple jurisdictions to highlight any possible relationships between challenges.  
 Data Collection. Data to be analyzed for this study was in the form of AARs 
collected from multiple jurisdictions across the country with a population between 
300,000 and 499,000. The reason for using AARs for this study is that they are 
commonly used to capture successes and failures that organizations experience during an 
emergency response (Faith, Jackson, & Willis, 2011). An AAR encourages self-efficacy 
to understand and trust intuitions based on experience, expertise, and demonstrated 
competence. While not a guarantee, candid dialogue in an AAR promotes assessment of 
knowledge, judgment, decisions, and actions among adults as a learning experience 
(Moilanen, 2015). The use of AARs as an appropriate source of information has also 
been established in other research projects (Savoia, Agboola, & Biddinger, 2012)    
 With the advent of the Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program 
(HSEEP), a template for how to construct an AAR after an exercise was created. With 
some editorial modifications, this same template can, and has been used, by some 
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jurisdictions to create AARs for real-world events as well. While there is no set process 
for the construction of AARs for real-world events, the use of the HSEEP exercise AAR 
template has promoted the concept that AARs should be created to help organizations 
better identify operational issues. AARs are now a mainstay for many non-military 
organizations, businesses, public safety, and public health agencies. They are “used as 
tools for gathering and documenting evaluations of key processes during the response to 
both real-incidents and fictional exercises” (Savoia, Agboola, & Biddinger, 2012, p. 
2950).  
 Locales were asked to submit AARs as part of a study to identify the most 
common errors/challenges that their EOC faced during an activation. The initial 
component of this request for data consisted of phone calls to each of the jurisdictions 
selected to be part of the study. If a positive response was obtained from the locale, a 
follow up letter was provided. The main goal of the phone call was to explain the purpose 
of the project and to ask for their assistance by participating in the study. Additionally, 
the benefits to be gained from the data collected were discussed, and the assurance that 
the jurisdiction would remain anonymous in the study. It was also explained that the 
AAR could come from a real world incident or a simulated event. As noted in the 
literature review, AARs generated from exercises, as well as real world incidents, are 
beneficial for examining performance (Sinclair et al., 2012). 
 If the jurisdiction agreed to be part of the study, a follow-up letter (Appendix F) 
was sent to again explain the purpose of the study, request the AAR, and provide contact 
information should the jurisdiction have any questions. Although the level of detail that 
may be contained in AARs will vary according to the jurisdiction and author, AARs do 
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contain a valuable source of information that can be used to enhance an organization’s 
ability to respond and manage large-scale emergencies and disasters (Faith, Jackson, & 
Willis, 2011). 
 The data coded for this study has been derived from eleven (11) AARs that were 
submitted by jurisdictions with a population size between 300,000 and 499,000. The total 
number of jurisdictions within this population range located within the United States is 
twenty-seven. Thus, the number of jurisdictions participating in this study represents 
40.7% of the eligible participants. Each AAR selected for the study was reviewed for 
content to be analyzed according to the research questions developed for the study. 
 Detailed Coding Process. As explained in the earlier section on sampling, both 
computer and human coding were implemented for this study. While coding can be 
performed by multiple researchers, for this study, coding was conducted solely by the 
author. The procedure of open coding was applied to each AAR. Open coding is the 
process of reading the text line-by-line and finding ideas and text to code. As such, broad 
coding categories were divided into broad themes (Siccama & Penna, 2008). For the 
coding process, this study utilized both manual coding along with computer software to 
assist with the collection and analysis of the coded data.  
 The utilization of computers and software programs can assist researchers to 
overcome difficulties related to coding reliability in content analysis (Evans, McIntosh, 
Lin, & Cates, 2007). However, coding rules must be explicit to ensure the reliability and 
comparability of results across multiple texts (Duriau, Reger, & Pfarrer, 2007). In a study 
conducted by Morris (1994), she tested the validity and reliability of both the manual as 
well as the computerized approach to coding. Her findings showed that the results from 
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the computerized coding process, and the coding done by individuals, agreed at an 
acceptable level. Additionally, the computerized coding yielded an acceptable level of 
semantic validity (Morris, 1994).  
 Computers and the usage of software can reduce the time and cost of undertaking 
content analysis projects (Nacos, Shapiro, Fan, & Young, 1991). Additionally, they are 
appropriate for recurrent and repetitive tasks. One of the benefits from using these 
systems can be found in the reduction of coding tasks, coder training, and inter-coder 
reliability checks (Carley, 1997). In addition, the use of computers can potentially 
provide more uniformity to the analysis. Finally, ambiguities and uncertainties can be 
reduced through a standardized approach to content analysis process (Krippendorf, 2004). 
 The coding procedure itself consisted of the transformation of the nominal data 
into numerical equivalents so that a count and comparison of the variety of text identified 
in each of the AARs could be conducted, which was accomplished by initially listing the 
variables in SPSS as “string” variables. A "string" variable is categorical in nature and 
includes items such as names, locations, colors, etc. However, “string” data in itself 
cannot be analyzed statistically. Thus, for this study each piece of the data (letters and/or 
numbers) was treated as text (Hole, n.d.). However, while numerical codes are used, they 
are not treated as numbers in the statistical sense, such as adding or subtracting, but 
instead are labels (Hole, n.d.).  
 As described earlier, a codebook was created to identify how each of the 
jurisdiction’s documented, or did not document, how the various elements identified in 
the research questions and hypotheses developed for this study created for this study 
impacted their EOC operation. Yet the codebook was also developed to outline the 
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specific assignment of terms to the SPSS numerical identification that was used in the 
statistical analysis. The computer software SPSS was implemented to conduct a statistical 
textual analysis in the form of frequency tables of each AAR.  
 Similar to the study conducted by Savoia et al, (2012), the content analysis of the 
AARs was performed in an attempt to identify common themes and subthemes 
experienced by EOCs (Savoia, Agboola, & Biddinger, 2012). Initial coding resulted in 
the creation of over 90 separate categories, main themes, and sub-themes. After 
additional analysis, these were then broken down into the following study areas, which 
are identified as Categories. The specific categories were Challenges, which addressed 
research questions 1 through 4. Then,  Recommendations, and Strengths, which 
addressed question 5.  
 The area of Challenges was the primary focus for this study and within this area, 
40 separate themes and sub-themes were identified. The second area of 
Recommendations revealed 27 themes and sub-themes. Finally, the third area of 
Strengths uncovered an additional 27 items. Once this initial phase was completed, a 
second round of reviews was conducted, which included the process of data cleansing 
and the formal creation of main and sub-themes. 
 Data Cleansing. Once the initial coding was completed, the process of data 
cleaning was performed. Data cleaning, which is sometimes referred to as data cleansing 
or scrubbing, is the procedure implemented to detect and remove errors and 
inconsistencies. Thus, improving the overall quality of the data used for the study (Rahm 
& Do, 2000). For this process, all research documents were re-read to ensure that all of 
the applicable data was included in the first round of coding. In addition, data that would 
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bring no added value to the research was eliminated. Each of the categories were 
examined for any duplication of data, which would ultimately alter the results of the 
statistical study. As a result of this process, final categories were confirmed. These were 
based on the purpose of the study as well as any findings discovered in examining and 
coding the material contained in the AARs that were relevant to the research project.  
     Categories 
Challenges 
 Main themes for the category of Challenges faced during EOC activations, which 
are examined in relation to six hypotheses created for this study are: (a) Communications; 
(b) Organization; (c) Resources; (d) Situational Awareness; (e) Training and (f) 
Experience. Within some of these main themes, sub-themes were created to provide 
additional insight and detail associated with each main theme. 
 Under the main theme of Communications, the sub-themes communications 
equipment and communication procedures were identified. Equipment was inclusive of 
both hardware and software utilized for the communication process. Procedures included 
those processes that were necessary for both internal and external communications 
necessary to communicate effectively. Under the category of Organization, the 
subthemes coordination, equipment, facility, policies, and procedures were identified.  
 Coordination included actions that were related to the interaction between 
individuals, departments, and organizations to conduct mutual activities without conflict. 
The sub-theme of facility included those items where the facility (including equipment 
and supplies) itself served to have an impact on the operation of the EOC. Under the sub-
themes of policies and procedures, a distinct difference was noted, which resulted in the 
107 
 
creation of these two items. Policies included the overarching framework under which the 
EOC operated, whereas as procedures addressed specific tasks that needed to be carried 
out. For example, a policy could state that the EOC will operate under the Incident 
Command System (ICS) structure. The procedures would identify the specific steps that 
need to be taken in order to be in compliance with the policy to operate under the ICS 
structure.  
 Under the main themes of Resources, Situational Awareness, Training and 
Experience, no sub-themes were identified. Under the theme of Resources, both 
equipment as well as non-equipment related items, which included personnel, were 
included for this study. The theme of Experience included participation in past real-world 
or simulated events for the purposes of gathering data for the study. 
 While the primary focus of this study is to identify the most common challenges 
that EOCs face during an activation, secondary areas to examine include strengths that 
AARs identified during these same activations as well as recommendations for the future. 
To maintain consistency, the same process of identifying both main and sub-themes was 
followed. 
Strengths 
 Under the main category of Strengths, the following main themes were identified: 
(a) Communications; (b) Organization; (c) Relationships; (d) Exercises; (e) Situational 
Awareness; (f) Training; (g) and Experience. These were also identified in associations 
with the hypotheses 1 through 5 developed to provide a more comprehensive perspective 
of how both strengths and challenges can be found within similar categories. Under the 
theme of Communications, the sub-themes communication with personnel and 
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communications with the public were created. These sub-themes are inclusive of the 
various aspects that make communications possible, such as equipment, policies, 
procedures, and trained personnel. Under the category of Organization, the sub-themes 
developed included resources, collaboration, coordination, and personnel performance. 
Resources are inclusive of both equipment and non-equipment related items. 
Collaboration is recognizing the behavior associated with cooperation between entities 
and/or individuals. Coordination uses the same criteria as indicated in the 
Communications theme under the Challenges category. The item of personnel 
performance addresses how individuals working within the EOC performed his/her task 
regardless of whether the individual was performing the task as an individual or as part of 
a group.  
 Under Relationships, it has been stated that one of the most important elements of 
emergency management is the relationship between all of the emergency services. 
Having a strong and productive relationship translates into a more efficient emergency 
management performance during a disaster (Emergency Management EDU, 2015, para. 
2). This is the basis from which this category was created. However, these relationships 
are not limited to just public safety entities, but are inclusive of the entire community. No 
sub-themes were created under this main theme. Exercises took into account the 
participation of EOC personnel in previous external and internal exercise opportunities, 
but no sub-themes were identified. Additionally, under Situational Awareness, Training, 
and Experience, no sub-themes were created. 
Recommendations  
 Under the main category of Recommendations, the following main themes were 
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identified: (a) Communication; (b) Conduct Exercises; (c) Resources; (d) Training; (e) 
Organization. Under the theme of Communication, the sub-themes communication with 
staff and communications with the public were created. These recommendations are 
associated with hypotheses 2, 3, 4, and 5. They show what the jurisdictions themselves 
indicated as areas needing to be addressed in relation to what areas were most likely to be 
identified in the hypotheses developed. These included various types of communication 
media, procedures, and personnel resources. Under Conduct Exercises, no sub-themes 
were developed. Under Resources, the following sub-themes were identified: identify 
resources needs (equipment), identify resource needs (non-equipment) and resource 
tracking. Under Training, no sub-themes were developed. Finally, under Organization, 
the following sub-themes were developed: coordination, facility, procedures, and 
policies. 
 The final breakdown of main themes and sub-themes is as follows. In the category 
of Challenges six main themes and nine sub-themes were developed. Under the category 
of Strengths there were eight main themes and eight sub-themes created. Within the 
category of Recommendations, five main themes and another nine sub-themes were 
developed. The number of themes under each category is consistent with the general 
guidelines regarding the number of categories that should be created for a study of this 
nature. According to Gibbs (2013), more than 10 categories is not necessary. Categories 
beyond any meaningful groupings does not bring much added value to the study. This has 
been maintained not only in the creation of categories, but in the number of main themes 
and the number of sub-themes under each main theme as well.  
 Similar sub-themes can be found under each of the categories. Since these sub-
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themes are associated only within the categories in which they are identified, and the 
analysis of the data is not across the three (3) categories of Challenges, Strengths, and 
Recommendations that have been created for this study, each meet the criteria of being 
exclusive, which is necessary for content analysis. For example, the frequency table 
created to statistically analyze the number of issues related to communications, under the 
category of Challenges, did not include data analyzed in the study of communications 
under the category of Strengths. Thus, the exclusive nature of categories that is required 
within a content analysis study was maintained.  
Validity and Reliability 
 One of the most important aspects to the content analysis process is reliability. 
Especially when more than one coder is involved and the need to establish consistency 
between coders exists (Rose, Spinks, & Canhoto, 2015). The underlying theme is that 
unless the coding scheme has been applied to the examination of the documents in a 
consistent manner, then the results of the analysis will be unreliable (Rose, Spinks, & 
Canhoto, 2015; Franzosi, 2008). For this study, the author elected to be the sole coder 
and employ the assistance of a computer analysis because the software has the ability to 
reduce the errors that human coders may make.  
 Additionally, human coders may be inconsistent because they may read 
connotative meanings instead of denotative ones. The computer-assisted program reads 
the text in a straightforward fashion because computers are not sensitive to changes 
regarding cultural contexts. Hence, computers improve research methods because 
computers help to achieve reliability (Camp, 2007). While human interaction is necessary 
in the content analysis process, using computer software to assist helps to reduce the 
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possibility of error. 
 However, the use of computers does have limitations. If the content analysis were 
being done exclusively through computer software, the computer program that performs 
the analysis would require very specific categories. For example, using a computer 
generally confines the analyst to words as recording units. This means that every word 
being coded has to be listed in the computer’s memory. As such, preparing a dictionary 
may turn out to be more difficult than formulating categories (GAO, 1989). In addition, 
because a word can take on different meanings in different contexts, a subtlety that 
computers cannot detect but people can, the results of computer coding may lack some 
validity (GAO, 1989). 
 For this study, the author also conducted additional testing. In order to determine 
further reliability, a Test-Retest process was conducted. Test-retest reliability is one of 
the most common measures of reliability (Williams, 2015; Trochim, 2006). As the name 
indicates, to measure the test-retest reliability, an individual is provided the same test on 
two separate occasions. The scores achieved by the individual on the two separate 
occasions are then correlated. The correlation between the two tests is known as the test-
retest-reliability coefficient, or the coefficient of stability (Williams, 2015). For the 
purpose of this study, the author examined the initial assignment of codes to a specific 
jurisdiction and then recoded that same jurisdiction after a period of time.  
 In the context of test-retest methodology, the closer the codes assigned during the 
second phase match the codes that were initially assigned, the more reliable the measure 
and the higher the coefficient of stability. For this test, a coefficient of one (1) indicates 
that each of the coding processes are perfectly correlated. In other words, the coding 
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conducted in the second phase matched exactly with the coding done initially. On the 
other end of the spectrum, a coefficient of zero (0) would indicate that the coding done in 
the second phase did not match any of the coding done during the first phase. Thus, there 
would be no reliability in the coding process (Williams, 2015). 
 For this study, two separate tests were conducted using a sample AAR. The first 
examined if the same units (sentences and statements) that were identified for coding 
during the initial coding process were again selected during the second phase in a sample 
AAR. For this component, a score of .77 was produced, which is considered an 
acceptable level of reliability (Williams, 2015). For the second part, again using a sample 
AAR, an examination of the codes assigned to the segments selected for coding was 
reviewed (ex: communications, procedures, policies, etc.). For those items that were 
listed in both coding phases, a score of .94 was achieved. This indicates an excellent level 
of reliability (Williams, 2015).  
 To determine validity, several steps were taken to ensure that the research project 
tested what it was designed to test (Rourke & Anderson, 2004). These steps followed an 
outline as described by Rourke and Anderson. First, the purpose for coding the data was 
established. For this study, the codes indicate whether a specific function was performed, 
and whether or not that function was influenced by specifically-defined variables. The 
coding also allowed for the statistical counting of variables to determine frequency to be 
measured against previously-established hypotheses. The second step recognized 
behaviors against the construct. In reviewing the documents, the behaviors either 
occurred or did not occur, and were thus coded accordingly.  
 Next, each category established for this study was done in accordance with the 
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research question and hypotheses developed. In addition, a dictionary was created to 
clarify the specific meanings of terms used so that a consistent interpretation of the data 
could be performed, which ensures both validity and reliability. Notably, however, 
establishing content validity is largely a subjective operation that relies on the judgment 
of experts (Rourke & Anderson, 2004). Continuing with the guidance, as demonstrated in 
the Test-Retest explanation, a preliminary analysis of the coding and categories was 
successfully completed within acceptable research standards.  
 Finally, the codebook that was created provides information regarding the 
description of the study, sample population, how the data is organized, identification of 
variables, and sample collection. It also provides direction on how to interpret the codes 
and can be used in conjunction with the developed dictionary, for replication of the study. 
For external validity, the sample used in this study is representative of 40.7 percent of the 
identified population selected for this study. Using survey response criteria, this 
percentage is an acceptable level for this project (Systems, 2012). 
     Analysis 
 Descriptive statistics were utilized to summarize the findings and implemented to 
validate or invalidate the hypotheses established (Rose, Spinks, & Canhoto, 2015). To 
start, traditional software was used. The specific software used in conjunction with SPSS 
was NVIVO 10, which was selected due to its capabilities to display and develop rich 
data in dynamic documents (Richards, 1999). The utilization of this software allowed for 
the analysis of each document to identify sections of the AARs that were applicable to 
this study. As mentioned earlier, each AAR not only addressed issues within the EOC, 
but also highlighted the areas of concern and strengths with those who were performing 
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their roles on the incident scene. While this was important information to capture for the 
report, it needed to be excluded from this study since the focus for this research was 
limited to EOC operations. 
 In a study using both manual and computer-based analysis techniques together, 
Welsh (2002) said that “in order to achieve the best results it is important that researchers 
do not rely on either electronic or manual methods and instead combine the best features 
of each” (Welsh, 2002, para. 9). Welsh (2002) also acknowledges that if the data set were 
relatively small, such as the data that has been collected for this study, it would be 
possible to use only manual methods. However, the researcher would then be exposed to 
possible human error in searching for simple information on the whole dataset (Welsh, 
2002). Thus, this served as the basis for the chosen approach.   
 The NVIVO 10 software allowed for nodes to be established that were used to 
categorize areas for study, creating themes for analyzing and sub-themes for further 
detailed exploration. This was inclusive of words, statements, and sentences that indicate 
both positive and negative attributes associated within a study area. Gibbs (2002) 
suggests utilizing case nodes to help with the organization of the data collected for study. 
Nodes can be either free nodes, which are independent with no clear connection to other 
nodes, or they may be created as tree nodes, which allow for a hierarchical structure, 
moving from a general category (known as the parent node) to a more specific category 
(known as a child node) (Bazeley & Richards, 2000; QRS International, 2008). This 
hierarcal type of structuring allows for better organization of coding, demonstrates the 
growth of the conceptual framework, and helps to form the structure needed for matrix 
searches (Gibbs, 2002). 
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 Another strength of using NVIVO 10 software is the ability to assign attributes to 
the data. Attributes serve as information about the participants, and can be assigned to 
case nodes. They are then used for asking comparative questions about the coding, 
representing other concepts and categories in the project. They also enable the researcher 
to compare and contrast the concepts and categories in the project. Additionally, they are 
able to compare and contrast the contents of cases based upon the attribute values 
assigned (QRS International, 2008). 
 A variable-focused strategy was utilized to look for themes across the AARs 
(Miles & Huberman, 1984). The coding was refined by using axial coding to explore 
connections between the categories and to analyze the data for specific relationships 
(Siccama & Penna, 2008). Using the software helped to identify areas that may have 
otherwise gone undetected if the study utilized solely a manual content analysis method. 
Understanding the context in which terms are used assists in better defining positive and 
negative attributes, which, in turn, make the quantitative statistical analysis more 
meaningful.  
 The usage of the software also assisted with helping to reduce the amount of time 
necessary to analyze the documents collected. Manual textual coding can take large 
amounts of time when multiple sources are used for analysis (University, 2015). Another 
contributing factor in the selection of this software was the fact that it has been designed 
specifically for this type of research methodology, and can produce various reporting 
formats for ease of interpretation and the presentation of findings. This proved to be 
helpful with expanding upon the results of the quantitative segment, and provide a much 
more comprehensive picture of the findings resulting from the analysis.  
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 Using both software programs, a systematic analysis of the AARs was conducted. 
Each of the three categories was examined based upon the research questions and 
hypotheses developed for the study. Within each of the categories, each of the themes 
along with their sub-themes was examined. Each of the eleven reports was analyzed to 
see if the jurisdiction indicated that a specific theme or sub-theme had a negative or 
positive impact on their EOC operation. Once each jurisdiction had their data coded and 
recorded, an analysis comparing the number of themes and sub-themes identified across 
all eleven jurisdictions was undertaken. 
 The results of the analysis were identified as percentages, which indicated how 
many of the jurisdictions who participated in the study indicated that the specific theme 
or sub-theme being examined had impacted their EOC operation. This process was 
conducted within all three categories. Once the process of analyzing the various themes 
was completed, a case summary of all the responses was created to identify common 
themes among multiple jurisdictions. While numerous percentage parameters could be 
established for this portion, this study focused on those themes in which were found to be 
co-existent in multiple jurisdictions. This is not to belie the importance of lesser 
percentage rates, but was done simply to identify the co-existence of a challenge that 
occurred in all jurisdictions. 
 Another component of the analysis included creating a table indicating the 
breakdown of each jurisdiction’s response to the various themes and sub-themes. The 
table identifies the theme, the jurisdictions that indicated either a challenge or a strength 
with that theme, and the number of sentences or statements that they included within their 
AAR specific to that theme or subtheme. While the main purpose of creating tables for 
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this study was to compare how many jurisdictions indicated either a challenge or strength 
in a particular theme or sub-theme. These additional tables provide more insight by 
showing just how many comments with each theme or sub-theme each jurisdiction 
documented in their AAR. For example, while jurisdiction 1 was noted as having a 
challenge in the area of communications in main table, the second table allows the 
researcher to see that jurisdiction 1 actually had four comments all related to 
communications issues that they experienced in the EOC that impacted their operation. 
This provided more in-depth examination of the quantitative data that may be useful for 
future research considerations. Similar tables were created for the categories of strength 
and recommendations as well, and are located in Appendices A, B, and C respectively. 
Findings and Conclusion 
 In the next chapter, the results of each of the tests conducted are presented as 
frequency tables so that the answers to the research questions can be provided, and 
subsequent test of each hypothesis can be conducted. Each hypothesis has been addressed 
individually and each was found to be either confirmed or not confirmed based upon the 
findings indicated within the frequency analysis table. The conclusion summarizes the 
results of study and includes recommendations for areas of future research. A table listing 
a summary of the results of the hypothesis testing is provided below. 
 
 
 
 
118 
 
Table 3.2 Summary of Hypothesis Testing 
 
Hypothesis 
# 
Hypothesis Status 
H-1 
54.5% of AARs indicated that the lack of 
situational awareness did have a negative 
impact on EOC operation 
 
Confirmed 
H-2 
100% of the jurisdictions reported that they 
had issues with communicating, which had 
a negative impact on their EOC operation 
 
Confirmed 
H-3 
100%  of the jurisdictions reported that the 
lack of organization did have a negative 
impact on EOC operations 
 
Confirmed 
H-4 
63.6% of the jurisdictions reported that the 
lack of training did have a negative impact 
on the EOC operation. 
 
Confirmed 
H-5 
63.6% of the jurisdictions reported that the 
lack of resources did have a negative 
impact on the EOC operation 
 
Confirmed 
H-6 
Multiple similarities were highlighted to 
provide evidence in support the hypothesis.
  
Confirmed 
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CHAPTER IV  
RESULTS 
Categories and Descriptive Statistics 
 The purpose of this study has been to identify the challenges and errors that are 
most often experienced during an EOC activation. The goal is to begin the process of 
establishing a foundation from which future training programs can be developed that are 
built upon empirical evidence and not simply from perceived deficiencies. The study 
utilized a content analysis process to examine AARs from metropolitan areas with a 
population between 300,000 and 499,000. Of the 27 jurisdictions contacted, eleven were 
willing to submit an AAR to be included in the study. This represents a participation 
response rate of 40.74%.  
 As part of the study, three categories, along with their themes and sub-themes 
where appropriate were created for exploration. The N/A designation indicates that no 
sub-theme created (Table 4.1).  
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Table 4.1 Table of Analyzed Themes and Sub-Themes  
 
Theme Challenges Strengths Recommendations 
Communication Equipment 
Procedures 
With personnel 
With the public 
With personnel 
With the public 
 
Experience N/A      N/A N/A 
 
 Organization     Coordination 
    Facility 
    Policies 
    Procedures 
     Resources 
    Collaboration 
    Coordination 
    Personnel       
    Performance 
     Coordination 
     Facility 
     Procedures 
     Policies 
 
 
   Resources Equipment 
Non-equipment 
N/A Identify resource 
needs (Equipment 
and non-equipment) 
Resources  
Tracking 
 
Training N/A N/A N/A 
 
Situational 
Awareness 
 
N/A N/A N/A 
Exercises N/A N/A N/A 
 
Relationship N/A N/A N/A 
 
The first category, Challenges, was the main emphasis of the study and included areas 
such as communications, organization, resources, situational awareness, training, and 
experience. Of the eleven jurisdictions reporting issues under the category of Challenges, 
100% reported issues within communications (Table 4.2), 100% reported issues in the 
area of organization (Table 4.2), 81.8% reported issues in the area related to experience, 
63.6% reported issues within the area of resources (Table 4.2), 63.6% reported issues in 
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the area of training (Table 4.2), and 54.5% reported issues in the area of situational 
awareness (Table 4.2).             
Table 4.2 Descriptive statistics of issues reported under the category of Challenges 
 
Variable Issue N Percentage 
Challenge Communication 11 100% 
Challenge Organization 11 100% 
Challenge Experience 9 81.8% 
Challenge Resources 7 63.6% 
Challenge Training 7 63.6% 
Challenge Situational Awareness 6 54.5% 
 
 Communications is inclusive of processes and procedures as well as equipment 
used to exchange information. Additionally, the category includes the communications 
conducted with internal as well as external partners, stakeholders, and the public. 
Organization incorporates the activities, policies, procedures, and structures implemented 
to manage the EOC. Experience was inclusive of the experience personnel who staffed 
the EOC had gained either through prior incidents and/or through exercises. Resources 
included materials, equipment, supplies and personnel to operate the EOC. Training 
examined the area of EOC training personnel had received. Situational awareness was 
inclusive of the ability of personnel to be aware of the dynamic circumstances of the 
incident and the impact any actions implemented had on the situation.       
 The second category focused on the area of Strengths, which demonstrates those 
areas in which jurisdictions felt they had performed well. Successful performance is 
important when looking towards future training initiatives so that items that fall into this 
category can be explored further to uncover areas where current training practices are 
successful and can be further developed to continue the trend towards improving EOC 
operations. Additionally, this category serves to be a standard from which other areas can 
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be measured, such as commonalities among multiple jurisdictions. While the main focus 
will be on identifying trends in the area of challenges across multiple localities, it is 
important to recognize where EOCs are strong as it relates to operations. Also, if a 
jurisdiction has both a challenge and a strength documented in any particular area, this 
may indicate that the weakness can be eliminated by the application of a process that 
resulted in a strength in the same segment. As part of finding solutions to challenges, a 
locality may only need to understand how to adapt a strength to correct a challenge.  
 The same approach was applied to this category in terms of analyzing the data. 
The category was further delineated into smaller issues, or themes, for the purposes of 
this study, for a more detailed review. Under the category of strengths, 90.9% reported 
strengths in the area of organization (Table 4.3), 72.7% reported strength in the area of 
communications (Table 4.3), 54.5% reported strength in the area of relationships (Table 
4.3), 45.5% reported strengths in the area of situational awareness (Table 4.3), 45.5% 
reported strength in the area of experience (Table 4.3), 36.4% reported strengths in the 
area of exercises (Table 4.3), and 36.4% reported strengths in the area of training (Table 
4.3).  
Table 4.3 Descriptive statistics of issues reported under the category of Strengths 
 
Variable Issue N Percentage 
Strength Organization 10 90.9% 
Strength Communications 8 72.7% 
Strength Relationships 6 54.5% 
Strength Experience 5 45.5% 
Strength Situational Awareness 5 45.5% 
Strength Exercises 4 36.4% 
Strength Training 4 36.4% 
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 Much like the Challenges category, many of the themes in the area of strength 
examined the same areas. The exception in this case was to highlight those areas where 
jurisdictions indicated they saw these themes as strengths within the EOC during the 
activation. Organization examined the activities, policies, procedures, and structures 
implemented to manage the EOC. Communications again was inclusive of the processes 
and procedures, as well as equipment, used to exchange information. As before, this 
theme included the communications conducted with internal as well as external partners, 
stakeholders, and the public.  
 The area of relationships highlighted the previous interaction of personnel that 
was gained prior to the EOC activation being examined in this study that showed to be a 
strength in the activation. Experience was again inclusive of the experience personnel had 
gained through either prior incidents, and/or exercises. Situational awareness was 
inclusive of the ability of personnel to be aware of the dynamic circumstances of the 
incident and the impact of actions taken to address the situation. Training examined the 
area of EOC training personnel had received. Exercises were those activities that 
personnel had been exposed to prior to this incident, which provided them the 
opportunity to simulate the roles they would be expected to perform during an activation. 
 The third and final category created for this study was Recommendations. This 
component was created to serve multiple purposes. First, because part of the study sought 
to discover trends between jurisdictions, such as common challenges that each locale 
faced during an activation, the area of recommendations that were contained in the after 
actions reports were explored to determine if locales shared similar recommendations. 
Additionally, since the goal of this project is to help ensure future training programs are 
124 
 
more beneficial to those who manage and operate within an EOC, the recommendations 
offered within an AAR were reviewed to find similarities of the challenges or strengths 
that the jurisdiction noted during the activation. The table below shows those themes that 
were identified in both Challenges and Recommendations. Additionally, themes that were 
both identified as a Challenges and Recommendation.  
 Table 4.4 shows the comparison between the number of jurisdictions who 
reported challenges in specific themes as compared to the number of jurisdictions who 
offered recommendations in those same themes. Table 4.5 highlights a similar 
comparison, showing the relationship between the number of jurisdictions reporting 
strengths within specific themes against the number of jurisdictions who suggested 
recommendations in these same areas. 
Table 4.4 Comparison of Challenges to Recommendations 
Challenge 
# of Jurisdictions 
indicating 
 a challenge in this 
theme 
# of Jurisdictions 
offering 
recommendation 
within this same 
theme 
Communications 11 11 
Organization 11 11 
Resources 7 11 
Training 7 7 
 
Table 4.5 Comparison of Strengths to Recommendations 
Challenge 
# of Jurisdictions 
indicating 
 a challenge in this 
theme 
# of Jurisdictions 
offering 
recommendation 
within this same 
theme 
Communications 8 11 
Organization 10 11 
Training 4 7 
Exercises 4 3 
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 Much like the previous two categories, many of the same themes were examined. 
However, this category captured those areas that jurisdictions indicated they would like 
to have addressed in order to improve their capability in the EOC. Communications 
included processes and procedures and equipment used to exchange information. 
Similarly, this theme included the communications conducted with internal as well as 
external partners, stakeholders, and the public. Resources, as it pertained to this category, 
again included materials, equipment, supplies and personnel used to operate the EOC. 
The theme of Organization again examined the activities, policies, procedures, and 
structures implemented to manage the EOC. Training indicated those jurisdictions that 
indicated additional training in some area (equipment operation, personnel management, 
resource management, etc.) was necessary to improve their EOC operation. Finally, 
exercises highlight those locales that wished to have more exercises conducted to 
improve their ability in the EOC during an activation. 
 How errors are framed plays a significant role in how they are interpreted (Loh, 
Andrews, Hesketh, & Griffin, 2013). In order for improvements to be made in the area of 
correcting challenges, they must be viewed as constructive for learning to take place 
(Lagadec, 1997). Yet, as was identified and discussed in Chapter Two, many times errors 
that are committed are not documented as actionable because it may be politically 
unfavorable to see errors clearly identified (Donahue & Tuohy, 2006). Viewing 
recommendations in association with the challenges that have been identified within the 
same AAR may give an indication that some influence has been incorporated to minimize 
the findings outlined. Or, no recommendations about a challenge may be presented at all, 
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which could be a further indication of some influence to detract from some level of 
deficiency that may have been identified. While this study does not go into depth with 
regards to the relationships found between challenges identified and recommendations, it 
does conduct a macro-level exploration of how recommendations align with documented 
challenges to provide a more comprehensive review of the quantitative data.  
 The same methodology was applied to this area of interest as was done in both the 
categories of challenges and strengths. The category was delineated into themes for a 
more detailed examination. Under the category of recommendations, 100% offered 
recommendations in the area of communication (Table 4.6), 100% of the localities 
offered recommendations in the area of resources (both equipment and non-equipment) 
(Table 4.6), 100% of the jurisdictions offered recommendations in the area of 
organization (Table 4.6), 63.6% offered recommendation in the area of training (Table 
4.6),  and finally 27.3% offered recommendations in the area of exercises (more 
specifically the recommendations were to conduct more exercises) (Table 4.6),     
Table 4.6 Descriptive statistics of items offered in the area of Recommendations 
 
Variable Issue N Percentage 
Recommendation Communications 11 100% 
Recommendation Resources 11 100% 
Recommendation Organization 11 100% 
Recommendation Training 7 63.6% 
Recommendation Exercises 3 27.3% 
    
 
 As was outlined in the proposal for this study, the jurisdictions were offered a 
choice to provide AARs on real-world events or exercises that resulted in the activation 
of their EOC. Of the reports submitted, two (18.2%) came from exercises conducted and 
the remaining 9 (81.8%) came from real-world events Figure 4.1. The types of events 
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were relatively equally separated between those that were man-made and those which 
were natural (5 and 6 respectively) (Figure 4.2). The creation of the reports themselves 
was conducted either by personnel who worked for the jurisdiction or by a third party. 
Eight (72.7%) of the reports were drafted by jurisdictional personnel and three (27.3%) 
were developed by a third party (Figure 4.3). Many of the reports submitted were 
confidential in nature and thus none of the jurisdictions submitting AARs for this study 
will be identified other than by numerical reference.         
           
  Figure 4.1 Real World Event v. Exercise           Figure 4.2 Natural v. Manmade  
 
 
 
 
     Figure 4.3 AAR created by Jurisdiction v. Third Party 
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    Discussion of Research Questions 
 As discussed in Chapter Two, the study of performance at an individual and 
organizational level helps to identify if any areas need to be corrected to improve 
performance (Paton, Flin, & Violanti, 1999). The study also should highlight those areas 
that are strengths so that good practices can be recognized and continued. Furthermore, 
studies help to set a course of direction for a jurisdiction to move forward in their desire 
to improve performance related to specific operations (Paton, Flin, & Violanti, 1999; 
Savoia, Agboola, & Biddinger, 2012). Thus, the goal of this study was to examine reports 
from multiple jurisdictions to help identify the most common challenges that EOCs face 
during an activation, so that future training programs can be developed that address those 
challenges most often encountered. In this context, more EOCs will benefit from 
improved training programs that are designed to correct common deficiencies as 
determined by a systematic, evidence-based, and purposeful examination of EOC 
operations. 
 Based upon these desired outcomes, the following research questions were 
developed for this study: 
 1. How often is training, or the lack thereof, recognized as being a source   
 of mistake/errors/challenges experienced during EOC operations? 
 2. How often is lack of experience noted as playing a role in performance   
 as identified in after action reports? 
 3. In examining the operations of the EOC, what are the most common   
 deficiencies that are noted in the after action reports? 
 4. In examining the after action reports, which errors are identified as   
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 being coexistent? In other words, when one error is identified, what other   
 error or errors will most likely also be identified in other after action   
 reports?  
 5. What are the most common recommendations and strengths identified   
 in after  action reports? 
 The first question helps to establish the importance of training. The question 
itself, how often is training, or the lack thereof, recognized as being a source of 
mistake/errors/challenges experienced during EOC operations, was designed to explore 
if jurisdictions recognize training as being a key component to the success of their EOC 
operation. Also, it was designed to examine if they are able to identify areas where 
training, or the lack thereof, played a role in the ability of personnel to perform at a level 
that is considered acceptable. Training has been a constant issue, especially at the local 
government level. Very strict personnel rules and regulations, along with a lack of 
training, plague some jurisdictions (Kweit & Kweit, 2006). 
 While there may be constraints to conducting training, this does not belie the 
importance of it being conducted. Within local jurisdictions, emergency management 
training needs to be created to develop or enhance an individual’s capability to respond to 
new, and for the most part atypical, demands that a large-scale emergency or disaster will 
present (Sinclair et al., 2012). The training program needs to include personnel who will 
be working in the EOC as well as key officials who can impact EOC operations. The 
training must focus on the procedures that will take place in the EOC (McEntire & 
Myers, 2004). An effective training program needs to be comprehensive and designed to 
address specific needs. 
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 According to Sinclair et al, (2012), a solid and effective program should be built 
in a specific manner and follow a defined course. Wilson (2000) outlines a basic training 
program that incorporates seven steps, which include: (1) identify the training needs; (2) 
identify those who need training; (3) identify the training method to be used; (4) prepare 
the training materials; (5) deliver the training program; (6) evaluate the effectiveness; and 
(7) audit the process for future modification (Sinclair et al., 2012, p. 509). Building such 
a program based upon findings such as those from this study will improve the capabilities 
of EOC staff. 
 The second question asks how often lack of experience is noted as playing a role 
in  performance as identified in after action reports. Experience does play a role in the 
performance of individuals within an EOC environment (Madsen, 2009; Biddinger, et al., 
1974), thus, this question was designed to examine whether experience was highlighted 
in a majority of the jurisdictions, in only a few locales, or even documented at all. In 
2013, Mann surveyed emergency managers in cities with populations of 50,000 to 
249,999 and asked them to what extent they agreed with the statement, “The 
representatives from other departments have had experience with previous disasters”.  Of 
the 224 respondents who answered the question, 68% agreed or strongly agreed. In 
addition, emergency managers were asked to what extent they agreed with the statement, 
“The representatives from other departments understand their roles and responsibilities 
when the emergency operations center is activated,” to which 64% either agreed or 
strongly agreed (Mann, 2013). Thus, experience as well as training assists in the 
performance of specific functions.  
 Experience can be obtained either through real-world incidents or simulated 
131 
 
events. Regardless of the reason an EOC is activated, the experienced gained by 
performing a function that is not performed very often will be valuable. Sagan (1993) 
states that whether the experience is gained through training, exercises, or actual 
incidents, learning occurs (as cited in Stern, 1997, p. 71). EOCs are not activated on a 
regular basis and thus gaining experience through such real-world incidents is not a 
promising venture. Of course, the real challenge for drawing upon the experience of those 
who report to the EOC is the fact that turnover of personnel has made this difficult. In the 
end, as much as an organization gains through experience, they also lose (Stern, 1997). 
 One of the key aspects that comes from experience is the ability to apply lessons 
learned. Unfortunately, the history in actually applying these lessons learned from real or 
simulated disasters is not strong. Many articles and studies have discussed the failures to 
learn from past mistakes (Faith, Jackson, & Willis, 2011; Donahue & Tuohy, 2006; 
Lennquist, 2004). This study serves to explore if any of the lessons learned from previous 
incidents (either positive or negative) were applied to the current EOC activation, and 
whether any lessons learned in this activation need to be addressed in future operations. 
As already documented, incorporating lessons learned can be a positive experience 
(Madsen, 2009; Birkland, 2009). 
 Another component that arises from experience and lessons learned comes from 
previous training, where individuals first learn how to perform a function. With the lack 
of actual real-world activations, training may be the only activity that actually provides 
them with any experience in performing an EOC function. Thus, the experience they can 
obtain from training activities can help prepare for a crisis or disaster.  
 Although a separate category for lessons learned was not created for this study, 
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the issue of experience was captured. Lessons learned from real-world events, exercises, 
and training all go toward an individual’s broad category of experience. One factor to 
consider is that if the training of personnel does not correct previously-identified 
challenges and allow for obtaining experience, the opportunity to apply that lesson may 
escape, and thus no improvement in EOC operations will occur. 
 The third question looks into the principle area of this study.  It asks, in examining 
the operations of the EOC, what are the most common deficiencies that are noted in the 
after action reports? This question serves to be the basis from which the evidence to be 
used for future training programs can be drawn upon. EOCs are activated for large-scale 
emergencies and disasters. This is a commonalty across the country, thus the question 
was designed to investigate commonalities among activations so that priorities can be 
established and common challenges/errors can be reduced, or preferably, eliminated. Not 
only for those jurisdictions that participated in this study, but for all EOCs. 
 This study follows along the same idea as another research effort that was 
initiated to create a model for the elimination of mistakes in disaster response at a 
strategic level (Caymaza, Akyonb, & Erenelc, 2013). This study looks to accomplish 
similar outcomes at a tactical level. Breaking down EOC operations into areas of focus 
can help to impact EOC operations in a manner that is realistic and doable. Trying to 
improve EOCs only from a strategic level may appear overwhelming to some. However, 
focusing on one area at a time will make the task less daunting. 
 While the main focus of the study is to identify common challenges among EOCs, 
it would also be a good practice to look for challenges that occur together. Thus, the 
fourth question examines the possibility of having challenges that are co-existent. 
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Specifically, the question asks, in examining the after action reports, what errors are 
identified as being co-existent? In other words, when one error is identified, what other 
errors will most likely also be identified within the after action report? By examining the 
data from this perspective, challenges that were catalysts for the occurrence of other 
errors during an EOC activation can be uncovered.  
 For example, if communications with the public did not follow a specific 
procedure, did this frequently result in a delay in the delivery of that information? Thus, 
it would be prudent to underscore that while providing information in a timely manner 
was a challenge, the reason behind it was a lack of a procedure. To prove this co-
existence on a consistent basis would serve to indicate that the main problem was the lack 
of an established procedure to carry out this function. This would assist a jurisdiction 
with focusing resources in the correct manner in lieu of trying to figure out why this 
function just isn’t working as well as it should.  
 This examination also helps to possibly eliminate any myths about the co-
existence of challenges. The jurisdiction may feel that poor decisions are being made 
because of a lack of situational awareness on the part of the decision makers. However, 
looking at a study of this nature may show that decision makers are gathering good 
situational awareness before any decisions are made. Thus, the challenge, or area of 
concern that has been identified may actually be found in another component of the 
decision-making process. Thereby, negating the perception of the problem being with 
situational awareness. This in turn could save the organization from dedicating resources 
on a problem that empirically does not exist.   
 The final question for this study incorporates two parts. The first deals with 
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identifying recommendations while the second analyzes strengths. The question asks, 
what are the most common recommendations and strengths identified in after action 
reports? As stated earlier, recommendations are provided to help improve an operation 
and should be offered in a constructive manner such as suggestions to assist individuals 
as well as organizations to improve what they do (Moynihan, 2009). Furthermore, they 
can be viewed as learning opportunities and not just disguised criticisms that are being 
used to place blame (Lagadec, 1997). This study examines some of the most common 
recommendations suggested across multiple jurisdictions. Again, looking for trends that 
can be identified to help with creating more effective training programs. 
 The other part of the question looks for strengths in the EOC. In other words, 
what did they do well? AARs may be viewed as documents that are only used to correct 
mistakes, yet, they can serve to be much more. They also can show the areas in which 
individuals and organizations performed well. While identifying strengths has been 
partially discussed earlier, other benefits should be highlighted as well. As an example, 
Huang and Wang (2011) share how the member’s desire to participate in the group, and 
the ability of the group’ members to set aside personal desires in favor of the group’s 
desires are both strengths that help the organization perform at a higher level (Huang, 
Wang, & Lin, 2011). Such actions need to be recognized so that others may learn and 
apply these same principles and concepts.  
 Team commitment also has been defined as the relative strength of the 
individual's identification and involvement in a particular team (Bishop, Scott, & 
Burroughs, 2000). This is another element that is important to the overall operation of an 
EOC. While it may be the sole responsibility of one individual to make a decision, it is 
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often done with input from other team members. It has also been shown to facilitate 
overall team effectiveness (Bishop, Scott, & Burroughs, 2000; Bishop, Scott, & Casino, 
1997). Strengths in areas such as these should be identified since they play such an 
important role in the effective operation an EOC. 
Discussion of Variables 
 Descriptive statistics have been applied to address the research questions 
developed for this study. Six hypotheses were identified and tested using the Frequency 
Table analysis methodology. The usage of the frequency table allowed for the 
examination of the occurrence of multiple variables in a statistical fashion to provide a 
comprehensive perspective of the data in the areas of categories, themes, and sub-themes 
against the dependent variable of EOC operations. The impact of the variables on EOC 
operations will serve as the basis for the creation of all frequency tables created to 
perform testing.  
 To document additional information captured from each of the AARs. Details 
regarding the actual number of items listed from each jurisdiction in each of the three 
categories are provided in Appendix A for Challenges, Appendix B for Strengths, and 
Appendix C for Recommendations. Within each appendix, main themes are divided into 
sub-themes and the number of items submitted per jurisdiction is provided.      
 For this study, the first question was addressed using Hypothesis 4. The second 
question was addressed using Hypothesis 6. The third question was addressed through 
Hypotheses 1-5. Question 4 was addressed using Hypothesis 6 and Question 5 was 
addressed through the frequency analysis of the Recommendation section of the study 
(Table 4.7). The main emphasis of this study is to identify the challenges associated with 
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EOC activations, thus, the hypotheses and research questions were primarily designed 
and developed to examine this particular area in detail. 
Table 4.7 Relationship of Research Question to Hypotheses 
 
Research Question (RQ) Hypotheses (H) 
RQ 1 H4 
RQ 2 H6 
RQ 3 H 1-5 
RQ 4 H6 
RQ 5 Recommendations Category 
 
 However, to provide a more comprehensive view, both strengths and 
recommendations have been included as part of this study. Developing future training 
programs should be based upon empirical evidence that should be emphasized, and 
should include data from both real-world and as well as simulated incidents. Effective 
training needs to be purposeful and relevant (Wilson, 2000), and should recognize both 
areas needing improvement as well as strengths. Unfortunately, today’s training programs 
have been found to be organizationally independent, and developed in an ad hoc manner. 
Unfortunately, not taking advantage of relevant literature and ideas currently available 
(Sinclair et al., 2012).  
    Independent Variable Analysis 
Category: Challenges 
 The first category, Challenges, was the main emphasis of the study. It was created 
so that a systematic process could be implemented to empirically explore what the most 
common challenges that EOCs faced during an activation. The goal is to enhance current 
and future EOC training programs based upon research.         
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Communications 
 One of the most basic functions within any EOC is communications. 
Communication in itself can be accomplished through a variety of means and be crafted 
to accomplish a limitless number of goals. Additionally, communications is a multi-
dimensional process. It involves the crafting of a message, the transmittal of the message, 
and the reception of the message (Comfort, 2007). Thus, successful communication is a 
necessity for effective EOC operations. In reviewing the eleven AARs submitted for this 
study, 100% (Table 4.2) reported some issue regarding the communication process. In 
conducting the content analysis of the AARs, the issues identified fell into two primary 
categories. One issue was centered in the area of challenges with communications 
equipment, or the lack of having the communication equipment necessary. Equipment in 
this sub-theme included both hardware and software. 
 The second area within this sub-theme focused on communication procedures. 
For the purpose of this sub-theme, procedures were inclusive of those used to 
communicate with internal personnel as well as communicating with the public. 
Procedures also are inclusive of the steps necessary to monitor third party messages such 
as social media. As demonstrated in research, social media is particularly used and serves 
as a vital link among younger members of the community (Hunt, Smith, Hamerton, & 
Sargisson, 2014).  
 Of the AARs analyzed, over 90% indicated they had issues with communication 
equipment while just under 83% shared that they had difficulties in the area of procedures 
(Table 4.8). The examination of this category addresses question 3.        
 
138 
 
Table 4.8 Descriptive Statistics Identifying Communications Issues Impacting EOC     
Operations (RQ 3/H2) 
 
Communications n 
Responses 
(N=27, n=11) 
Percent of Cases 
(n=11) 
Communications equipment, or lack 
thereof, had a negative impact on 
EOC operations 
10 100% 90.9% 
 
Lack of communications procedures 
had a negative impact on the 
operation of the EOC 
9 100% 82.8% 
 
Some of the comments regarding issues within the communication theme included items 
such as being able to integrate information from one system into another. For example, 
one jurisdiction experienced a compatibility issue between two different systems. They 
could not figure out a way to transmit data from their situational awareness software into 
the GIS system to show the gathered data on a map. Another issue regarding equipment 
highlighted the need to investigate how to get text messages or emergency alerts that can 
be read on mobile devices.  
 In regards to procedural challenges, one of the localities indicated that they 
needed to develop a more systematic process to identify those areas that required support 
personnel to address the needs of vulnerable populations. Additionally, they needed to 
track teams that may be working in various areas after a disaster. Another locale 
indicated that once the jurisdiction had activated its emergency operation center, a 
procedure was needed that indicated that updating the media with information and 
posting relevant information to social media would need to be released through the EOC. 
It is critical that the EOC know what information is being released and to whom specific 
information is being provided. Regardless of whether it was equipment or procedural 
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issues, the communications component impacted each of the jurisdictions that 
participated in this study.  
Organization 
 The organization of the EOC helps to keep the overall operation, and functions 
being conducted, performing in an orderly and deliberate manner. Organization itself is 
composed of several different areas. For this study, the main theme of organization also 
was broken down into multiple sub-themes, much in the same manner that was conducted 
in the communications theme. Another similarity with communications is that all of the 
eleven jurisdiction who participated in the study reported issues related to the 
organization of the EOC. 
 Under the main theme of organization, the following sub-themes were identified: 
coordination, facility, policies, and procedures. Coordination examined how agencies, 
outside organizations, department, and other groups worked together to accomplish tasks. 
Because no one entity can handle all of the aspects that need to be addressed during a 
disaster response, individuals and groups must work together effectively for a successful 
conclusion of the event. 
 The sub-theme of facility is applicable when the actual space that the EOC is 
located can accommodate the needs of personnel who report to site. The facility also 
plays a role when the equipment used to conduct operations is non-functional or not 
present. The equipment noted in this sub-theme is different from the equipment identified 
in the communications sub-theme. This equipment include items such as lighting, 
shredders, office supplies, etc. Another issue deals with the adequate ventilation and 
overall physical environment in which personnel are expected to perform their roles. 
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 Policies are those documents that provide the parameters under which an EOC is 
operated within a jurisdiction. They are not step-by-step procedures used to actually carry 
out functions in the EOC. Policies provide the framework under which procedures are 
developed. They are the strategic concepts while procedures serve as the tactical 
implementation of aforesaid policies. 
 Since EOCs are not activated on a regular basis, procedures are necessary to assist 
activated personnel. Procedures are created to make sure that essential elements of a 
process are completed correctly and in a timely manner. They help to ensure that the 
actions carried out by personnel have a purpose and are useful to the overall operation of 
the EOC itself. Jurisdictions cannot expect personnel who report to the EOC to remember 
exactly what they are responsible for during the disaster response and recovery. 
Procedures that are developed for the EOC help these personnel meet the expectations of 
leadership, as well as the community.    
 In examining the issues identified by jurisdiction as they relate to the organization 
of the EOC, several observations were noted. Of the eleven jurisdictions participating in 
the study, 100% reported that they had issues regarding organization within the EOC that 
impacted operations (Table 4.2). Within the main theme of organizations, issues were 
noted in sub-themes and documented as follows:  
 •  100% (Table 4.9) of the AARs indicated issues in the area of coordination;  
 •  Over 63% (Table 4.9) reported that they experienced challenges in the area of 
  facility capabilities;  
 •  72.7% (Table 4.9) reported difficulties related to the lack of, or poorly- 
 developed policies;  
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 •  81.8% (Table 4.9) of the jurisdictions indicated that procedures was an area of 
    difficulty for them.  
 
Table 4.9 Descriptive Statistics Identifying Organizational Issues Impacting EOC 
Operations (RQ #3/H#3) 
   
EOC Organization (a) 
         Responses 
            (N=27, n=11) 
Percent of  
Cases 
(n=11) n Percent 
Poor coordination had a 
negative impact on the 
operation of the EOC 
 
11 100%    100% 
The facility had a negative 
impact on the operation of 
the EOC 
 
 7 100% 63.6% 
Lack of, or poorly-
developed, policies had a 
negative impact on the 
operation of the EOC 
 
 8  100% 72.7% 
Lack of, or poorly-
developed, procedures had 
a negative impact on the 
operation of the EOC 
 9  100% 81.8% 
a. Dichotomy group tabulated at value 1 
  
 A variety of comments were contained within the after actions reports that 
described some of the issues that jurisdictions had in the area of organization. Regarding 
coordination, challenges were found in differing areas of responsibility. Issues 
documented included a lack of coordination in the area of donation management, 
coordinating activities between the incident scene and the EOC, and working with other 
agencies to get messages out to the public. The issues identifying challenges in the area 
of coordination are not surprising. Past research has shown that coordination is a major 
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challenge among individuals, groups, and agencies during a disaster (Techakesari, 2014; 
Faraj & Xiao, 2006; McEntire, 2002; Carter, 1979; Tierney, 1985; Auf der Heide, 1989).  
 In the sub-theme of facility, issues such as seating arrangements, having agencies 
not centrally located, and a lack of space were some of the items discussed. Within both 
policies and procedures, many of the comments addressed the lack of clear direction 
within the documents themselves. Another issue was simply the lack of any policy or 
procedures, which had a negative impact on the overall organization of the EOC itself. 
Resources 
 Resources are a necessity for any organization to carry out its function. Within an 
EOC, resources come in a variety of forms including, but not limited to equipment, 
personnel, and supplies. For this study, this main theme was inclusive of all types of 
resources and thus no sub-themes were created. A more detailed breakdown of resources 
is identified in the Recommendations section of this study and is inclusive of equipment 
and non-equipment types of resources. The challenge of having the right amount and type 
of resource in the EOC is difficult because each disaster is different. Thus, each requires 
differing resources in order to address the impact from the event.   
 One of the most basic realizations in dealing with disasters is the fact that no one 
jurisdiction has all of the resources they need to meet the demands that arise. While many 
jurisdictions go through a process of conducting vulnerability studies and going step-by-
step to identify resource shortfall, they are not able to have all of the resources necessary 
to meet every demand that a disaster may bring to their community. The challenge facing 
EOCs is determining the necessary essential resources, and where they can be obtained.  
 Under the theme of resources, over 63% (Table 4.10) of the jurisdictions that took 
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part in the study reported issues in the area of resources. Some of the comments within 
the AARs indicated that issues arose with not only the lack their ability to access local 
resources, but a general inability to obtain needed resources from nearby localities or 
through vendors. Others noted that staffing in the EOC was a significant factor in their 
ability to conduct activities. In other cases, while meeting the needs of the community 
was an essential item, meeting the needs of first responders also was a matter that caused 
some difficulty for the EOC. Not in just getting the resources they needed, but making 
sure it was the right resource for the right task.     
Table 4.10 Descriptive Statistics Identifying Resource Shortage Issues Impacting EOC 
Operations (RQ #3/H#5) 
 
 Resources 
Responses 
(N=27, n=11) 
Percent of  
Cases 
 
(n=11) 
 
n 
 
Percent 
Resource shortage issues had a 
negative impact on the operation of 
the EOC 
7 100% 63.6% 
 
Situational Awareness 
 Being able to maintain what is termed situational awareness in the EOC is a key 
component in determining whether an event is brought to a successful conclusion. A 
variety of aspects to situational awareness need to be considered when looking at the 
concept from a holistic perspective. Kowalski and Vaught, (n.d.), stated that different 
situations will demand different forms of cognitive activity. Some will call for an 
increase in an individual’s analytical cognition, while other situations will require 
personnel to rely on intuition. Regardless of the event, situational awareness and the way 
in which individuals react to situations are key when it comes to making decisions 
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(Kowalski & Vaught, n.d). 
 Nowhere was this more evident than with the response to Hurricane Katrina. 
Waugh and Streib (2006) state that “a large part of the problem with the command and 
control system was the lack of situational awareness — that is, poor communication 
among officials in the disaster area and decision makers in Baton Rouge, Jackson, and 
Washington (p. 136). The EOC is a dynamic environment and the ability to keep abreast 
of the ever-changing conditions that disaster entails is a constant challenge, but one that 
must be performed well.  
 In the main theme of situational awareness, just over half, 54.5% (Table 4.11) of 
the jurisdictions reported some type of issue with situational awareness. Of the comments 
documented in the AARs, jurisdictions indicated that maintaining situational awareness 
was hindered by processes such as keeping up-to-date with the communication flow so 
that all individuals in the EOC were up to speed with the current status of the disaster. 
Another jurisdiction reported that they had difficulty due to a lack of equipment that 
would provide them with the information they needed to make timely decisions. Yet, 
others shared that it was hard to maintain constant awareness due to the separation of 
agencies. In fact, some organizations that needed to be kept up to date were not even able 
to be located in the same room where the situational updates were being provided to other 
members of the EOC staff.      
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Table 4.11 Descriptive statistics identifying Situational Awareness Issues Impacting         
EOC  Operations (RQ #3/H#1) 
 
Situational Awareness 
                     Responses 
        (N=27, n=11) 
Percent of  
Cases 
(n=11)         n Percent 
Lack of Situational Awareness had 
a negative impact on the operation 
of the EOC 
6 100% 54.5% 
 
Training 
 Training for personnel that staff the many positions in an EOC is an ongoing 
process for those who are in charge of EOC operations during a disaster. The curriculum 
of training that needs to be created to provide sufficient knowledge to those who will be 
performing diverse roles during an activation is broad in nature. Topics need to include 
how to make good decisions, how to work specialized equipment, how and when to 
create reports and what information is required in each, and understanding where they fit 
in as part of the EOC organization. All of these are necessary due to the fact that turnover 
in the EOC is a constant hurdle that must be overcome (Stern, 1997). 
 Yet, training as a whole for those who operate in the EOC has been somewhat 
disappointing. Multiple articles have been written about how the lack of training has 
impacted the EOC (Kweit & Kweit, 2006; Harrald, 2006b; von Lubitz, Beakley, & 
Patricelli1, 2008; Somers & Svara, 2009). While attempts have been made at the local 
level in terms of providing personnel with the training needed, these programs are mostly 
ad hoc and serve only those jurisdictions that conduct them (Sinclair et al., 2012). EOCs 
are for the most part activated only occasionally in most localities, and the personnel who 
report do not have any relevant experience in EOC operations (Canton, 2007; Militello, 
Patterson, Bowman, & Wears, 2007). Thus, the training developed should help multiple 
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jurisdictions address the most common of issues. 
 Of the eleven jurisdictions who are a part of this study, 63.6% (7) (Table 4.12) 
reported concerns related to training. Much like other concerns that were documented in 
the AARs, training concerns did not necessarily center on any one particular area.  While 
one jurisdiction may have reported difficulties related to the lack of training on 
equipment, another locality identified mistakes occurring due to the lack of training on 
procedural items. However, while not mentioned in all of the AARs where training was 
indicated as an issue, one area that was noted in a couple of reports was that of 
understanding roles and responsibilities. This portion of the study analysis addresses 
question 1.     
Table 4.12 Descriptive statistics identifying Training Issues Impacting EOC Operations 
(RQ #1/H#4) 
 
Training 
Responses 
(N=27, n=11) 
Percent of  
Cases 
(n=11) n Percent 
Lack of Training had a negative impact on 
the operation of the EOC 
        7         100%          63.6% 
 
Experience 
 The lack of experience in emergency management is an attribute that virtually 
every level of government must contend with at some point.  
In 1997, James Lee Witt was widely credited with revitalizing 
FEMA following its less than stellar performance during such 
disasters as Hurricane Andrew in 1992. In the aftermath of 
9/11, FEMA was folded into the DHS. The focus of the vast 
new department was terrorism. In 2005, disaster management 
experts complained that FEMA had lost many experienced 
employees. Some argued the exodus was a result of 
downgrading the importance of preparation for and response to 
natural disasters in the new department. Others believed that 
the cause was the appointment of agency leaders with no 
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background in emergency management. (Kweit and Kweit 
2006, 378-79)  
 
 As organizations change to meet the needs of the community, so do staff. 
Personnel take positions in other departments, some leave to pursue other careers, while 
others are promoted into new roles and responsibilities. Additionally, in EOC operations, 
while personnel who report may be well experienced in their own discipline, they will 
probably have little knowledge or experience regarding the administrative and/or 
command skills necessary during an activation in response to a disaster (Revere, 2000). 
 In reviewing the AARs submitted, 81.8 % (Table 4.13) reported that the lack of 
experience on the part of personnel who reported to the EOC had an impact on the 
performance and impacted the overall operation. Some of the observations documented 
by jurisdictions included issues such as having a lack of personnel who were familiar 
with EOC operations because they had not been involved with many, or any, previous 
activations. Others indicated that some personnel did not understand the importance of 
their role in the overall operation of the EOC due to inexperience with respect to the 
interaction of their role with others in the EOC, and thus did not comprehend its 
importance. Additionally, another jurisdiction noted that some of the plans and 
procedures that had been put in place to address situations were underutilized because 
personnel were not familiar with the plans and/or procedures, and had not used them on a 
regular basis. This portion of the study addresses question 2.      
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Table 4.13 Descriptive statistics identifying Experience as an Issue Impacting  EOC  
Operations (RQ #3/H#1-5) 
 
Experience 
Responses 
(N=27, n=11) 
Percent of  
Cases 
(n=11) n Percent 
Lack of Experience had a negative impact on 
the operation of the EOC 
9 100% 81.8% 
 
 
Strengths 
 Under the category of Strengths, actions that were considered to have a positive 
impact on EOC operations were recorded. While the primary focus of this study was 
directed in the area of identifying the most common challenges, bringing forth the 
strengths that each jurisdiction identified needs to be recognized as well. The 
examination of this category has been done in the same fashion that was implemented for 
the study of challenges. Under this category, several main themes were identified and 
sub-themes were created where necessary to provide more insight into the main theme 
itself. The following main themes were explored in this section of the study: 
communications, organization, relationships, exercises, situational awareness, training, 
and experience. The examination of this category partially addresses question five. 
 
Category: Strengths 
Communications 
 When communications work effectively, they can have a positive impact on the 
overall EOC operation. Within this main theme, two (2) sub-themes, one being 
communications with the public, and the other focusing on communications with staff, 
were created. These sub-themes were inclusive of the various components of the 
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communications process that need to be in place in order for the communication process 
to be successful. Under the main theme of communications, 72.7% of the eleven 
jurisdictions reported observing strengths in this area. Within the sub-theme of 
communications with the public, 62.5% (Table 4.14) of the eleven jurisdictions reported 
this area as a strength in the EOC. Additionally, another 62.5% (Table 4.14) reported that 
they observed good practices in the area of communications with personnel. Additionally, 
some jurisdictions reported strengths in both sub-themes. Some of the comments that 
were included as part of the AAR included: 
 Calls made to the public through their mass notification system went well; 
 Press briefings with the PIO were effective;  
 Working with the local Chamber of Commerce, a web site that provided a 
communication tool for the business community was established and was 
a valuable asset even weeks after the incident had occurred;  
 Communication both to and from the local public information office was 
excellent. 
 
Table 4.14 Descriptive Statistics Identifying Strength in the Area of Communication 
Strength in Communication (a) 
Responses 
(N=27, n=11) 
Percent of  
Cases 
(n=8) n Percent 
Good Communication with the Public 5 100% 62.5% 
 
Good Communication with Staff 
5 100% 62.5% 
a. Dichotomy group tabulated at value of 1    
 
Organization 
 Emergency management many times finds itself in the middle of a paradox. On 
one side of the coin, the activities associated with a disaster response requires that 
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emergency management involves itself with meticulous organization. On the other side of 
the same coin, the EOC needs to be spontaneous to address the ever-changing needs 
brought about by a disaster (Waugh Jr. & Streib, 2006). Organization in an EOC has 
multiple components that need to be considered in order to be effective. Couple this with 
the fact that an EOC, is at best, a temporary organization, and challenges are bound to be 
faced. However, while challenges may be more apparent, strengths established through 
good organizational practices within the EOC must not be overlooked. 
 The main theme of organization has been divided into sub-themes for further 
examination. These sub-themes include: collaboration, coordination, resources, and 
personnel performance. Of the eleven localities taking part in this study, 90.9% found an 
area of strength as it related to the organization in the EOC. Within the sub-themes, 
45.4% (Table 4.15) found strength in the area of collaboration. Another 45.4% (Table 
4.15) found strength in the sub-theme of coordination. Within the segment of good use of 
resources, 72.7% (Table 4.15) found this area to be a strength in their organization of the 
EOC. Finally, 54.5% (Table 4.15) of the jurisdictions identified that their personnel 
performed well during the activation. 
 Much like the sub-themes that make up this main theme, comments from 
jurisdictions covered a wide range of specific activities that they identified as highlights 
in their EOC organizational structure. Below are some of the comments noted in the 
AARs submitted for this study: 
 The EOC staff was proactive in planning for future needs and activities;  
 Personnel knew and understood their roles, which proved to be a strength 
in the  operation;  
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 The collaboration between departments was some of the best seen in a 
number of years; 
 Rotating the same personnel in positions during opposite operational 
periods created consistency and institutional knowledge of the event; 
 EOC staff members were knowledgeable about their duties and 
responsibilities and worked effectively with each other. 
Table 4.15 Descriptive Statistics Identifying Strength in the Area of Organization 
Strength in Organization (a) 
             Responses 
            (N=27, n=11) 
Percent of  
Cases 
(n=11) n Percent 
Good Collaboration in the EOC 5 100% 45.4% 
Good Coordination in the EOC 5 100%  45.4% 
Good use of Resources and good Resource 
Support 
8 100% 72.7% 
Personnel Performed well in the EOC 6 100%  54.5% 
a. Dichotomy group tabulated at value of 1 
 
Relationships 
 Relationships play an important role in the EOC. They are often one of the most 
important ingredients in forming strong groups that need to accomplish, sometimes 
difficult, and time-sensitive tasks. According to Kettl, relationships among the key 
players is often the most useful tool to have when in the heat of a problem. While 
networks matter, personal networks matter most of all (Kettl, 2003). Understanding the 
capabilities and restrictions that organizations bring to the table is one of the benefits of 
having established relationships. 
 Relationship building is often done outside of the EOC. It occurs during training, 
planning, exercises and other associated functions. Yet, the largest benefit comes when 
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the EOC is activated. From an EOC member perspective, building a relationship before 
the disaster occurs is much easier than trying to do so in the middle of one. Within this 
theme, 54.5% (Table 4.16) of the collected AARs identified that established relationships 
served to be a strength during an EOC activation. 
 Within this theme, several disciplines within some of the jurisdictions noted how 
previously-established relationships served to be a strength during the activation. A few 
of the comments submitted as part of the AARs are listed below:     
 It was evident that good working relationships had already been 
established between all departments and outside agencies; 
 Part of the success of the operation is attributed to the establishment of an 
effective public safety partnership early; 
 Long-standing relationships between the jurisdiction and outside entities 
continues to provide a basis for successful operations; 
 Relationships with the community was evident as offers to provide goods 
and services from multiple private organizations came in. 
Table 4.16 Descriptive Statistics Identifying Strength in the Area of Relationships 
Strength in Relationships 
             Responses 
             (N=27, n=11) 
Percent of  
Cases 
(n=11) n    Percent 
Good Relationships 6    100% 54.5% 
 
Exercises 
 Exercises can serve more than one purpose as it relates to EOC operations. While 
it gives those who will report to the EOC an opportunity to go through processes, review 
procedures, and conduct functions that they do not have an opportunity to do very often, 
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it can also highlight areas that need to be addressed. Many times the errors that are found 
during real-world events also can be identified during an exercise (Militello, Patterson, 
Bowman, & Wears, 2007).  
 This theme was created to explore if any exercises that had been conducted in the 
past were mentioned as being a source of improvement in the current EOC operations, or 
if participants felt their performance in the EOC was strengthened by past exercises in 
which they had participated. This is an important area because very often exercises serve 
as a main component of a training program.  
 In reviewing the AARs provided for the study, 36.4% (Table 4.17) of the eleven 
participating localities indicated that past exercises had a positive impact on the operation 
of the EOC. None of the localities reported that past exercises had a negative impact on 
EOC operations. The “no” response indicates that no mention of exercises was included 
in the AAR.    
Table 4.17 Descriptive Statistics Identifying Strength in the Area of Past Exercises 
having a Positive Impact on EOC Operations 
 
Strength in Past Exercises 
Responses 
 (N=27, n=11) 
Percent of  
Cases 
(n=11) n Percent 
Past Exercises had a Positive Impact on EOC 
Operations 
4 100% 36.4% 
    
 
Some of the comments recorded in the AARs pertaining to the positive impact of past 
exercises on the specific EOC operation included:  
 The participation in a full-scale exercise one month prior to this event 
provided for a similar setup and operation for this event; 
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 Local and state personnel from multiple disciplines knew what to do and 
how to coordinate their response due to past exercises; 
 Past workshops and exercises related to interoperable communications 
enhanced the capabilities of personnel. 
Situational Awareness 
 In the previous section noting challenges, situational awareness was included to 
indicate that it is sometimes very hard to maintain. It has also been noted in past research 
as an area of concern (Boin & Hart, 2010). However, some jurisdictions documented that 
their ability to maintain situational awareness in some capacity was noted as being a 
strength. Thus, to provide a balance of perspective for this variable, this study identified 
those jurisdictions who reported this theme as a strength in their EOC. 
 Of the eleven jurisdictions who submitted AARs for this study, 45.4% (Table 
4.18) reported that their ability to maintain situational awareness during their EOC 
activation was a strength. Some of the comments documented in the AARs included: 
 The situational awareness equipment worked well and we need to expand 
its capabilities;  
 Situational reports provided a good summary of what was going on;  
 The equipment utilized provided real-time situational awareness of the 
incident and assisted command staff in decision making; 
 The EOC benefitted from real-time situational awareness information. 
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Table 4.18 Descriptive Statistics Identifying Strength in the Area of Situational Awareness 
Strength in Situational Awareness 
    Responses 
    (N=27, n=11) 
Percent of  
Cases 
(n=11) n Percent 
Good Situational Awareness 5 100% 45.4% 
 
Training 
 As with the sub-theme of situational awareness being identified as being both a 
strength and a challenge, training also has been previously identified as a challenge. 
However, training can have a positive impact on EOC operations. Without some sort of 
training, personnel who perform roles in the EOC would be left with very little guidance 
in terms of identifying their roles, what they are responsible for in performing their roles, 
and how they need to serve as the primary support entity for first responders and the 
community.  
 This section was created to identify those jurisdictions that have indicated in their 
AARs that training was a strength and had a positive impact on their EOC operation. As 
with the exercise theme within this category, the identification of “no” in the table does 
not indicate that training has had a negative impact on the ability of the EOC to operate 
effectively, but rather to indicate that those jurisdictions did not indicate in this specific 
AAR that past training was indicated as a strength in this specific EOC activation.   
 Within this theme, 36.4% (Table 4.19) of the eleven reporting jurisdictions 
indicated that past training had a positive impact on their EOC operations. Some of 
comments noted for this theme included: 
 All jurisdictional employees were provided with training on how ICS was 
utilized in the EOC and this was a strength; 
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 All political and administrative leaders were NIMS-trained, which helped 
to understand their role in the EOC and to act accordingly; 
 A commitment to previous training allowed for good integration of 
emergency services.  
Table 4.19 Descriptive Statistics Identifying Strength in the Area of Training 
Strength in Training 
                 Responses 
                 (N=27, n=11) 
Percent of  
Cases 
(n=11) n Percent 
Past Training had a Positive Impact on 
EOC Operations 
4 100% 36.4% 
 
Experience 
 Experience is a trait that cannot be replaced except over time. While the skills 
needed to perform a task may not change drastically over time, an individual’s ability to 
perform them can improve simply from having done the task numerous times. In terms of 
an organization’s performance, experience is one attribute that can have a significant and 
positive impact (Madsen, 2009). Although it has been noted that the lack of experience 
had played a negative role in the operation of an EOC, experience has served to be a 
positive influence as well. 
 Within the eleven jurisdictional AARs collected, 45.5% (Table 4.20) recognized 
that the experience of the personnel who reported to the EOC was a strength in their 
activation. Of those documenting this particular strength, the following comments were 
highlighted:   
 History of coordinating disciplines was a strength; 
 Using a similar set up that personnel had used before enhance capabilities;   
 Experience helped to identify where shortages in resources may occur; 
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 Experience of EOC staff contributed to the successful operation of the 
EOC.   
Table 4.20 Descriptive Statistics Identifying Strength in the Area of Experience 
Strength in Experience 
                 Responses 
                 (N=27, n=11) 
Percent of  
Cases 
(n=11) n Percent 
Past Experience had a Positive Impact on 
EOC Operations 
5 100% 45.5% 
    
 
Recommendations 
 Under the category of Recommendations, suggestions from jurisdictions on how 
to improve their EOC operations have been identified. While recommendations may be 
thought of as suggestions to only improve operations, some jurisdictions recognized the 
strengths that their EOC had exhibited and made suggestions to continue in the direction. 
The analysis of this specific category followed the same template as was used previously 
in both the Challenges and Strengths categories. Under this category, several main 
themes were identified and sub-themes were created where necessary. The main themes 
identified include: communications, exercises, resources, training, and organization. The 
examination of this category partially addresses research question five. This component 
of the study was done to highlight those areas, as identified by jurisdictions, which 
locales want to see addressed. Developing future training programs will need to be 
cognizant of those areas that jurisdictions identify as needing attention so that the 
programs developed can be viewed as a collaborative endeavor.       
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Category: Recommendations 
Communications 
 Recommendations within this theme have been divided into two (2) sub-themes 
consisting of communications with staff and communications with personnel. Both sub-
themes are inclusive of items such as equipment, procedures, training, and other 
characteristics that can correct or enhance the communications process.  
 Within this sub-theme, 100% (Table 4.21) of the jurisdictions submitted 
recommendations in this main theme, 100% (Table 4.21) provided recommendations in 
the area of improving communications with staff, and 45.5% (Table 4.21) offered 
recommendations in the area of communication with the public. Some of the 
recommendations were as follows:   
 Need to identify a way so that we can ensure that all personnel have the 
same information and are operating off the same page; 
 The EM Director needs to make sure that all personnel are loaded into the 
notification system properly and test the system; 
 Make sure that regular briefings are held at the start of each operational 
period 
Table 4.21 Descriptive Statistics Identifying Recommendations in the area of 
Communications 
 
Recommendations for Communications (a) 
               Responses 
               (N=27, n=11) 
Percent of  
Cases 
(n=11) n Percent 
Improve Communication with Staff 11 100% 100% 
Improve Communication with the Public 5 100% 45.5% 
a. Dichotomy group tabulated at value of 1   
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Exercises 
 The theme of exercises can contain several components such as hold more 
exercises, involve more people in the exercise process, and redesign how exercises are 
currently conducted. Exercises serve to provide an opportunity for individuals to practice 
newly acquired, or previously-acquired skill sets, in an environment that is non-
threatening. They also serve to test newly-created policies and procedures. They are an 
integral component of a well-designed and comprehensive training program. 
 In this theme, 27.3% (Table 4.22) of the eleven jurisdictions offered 
recommendations in this area. Some of the recommendations suggested included:  
 Future drills, exercises and table tops would enhance our current 
operational team work 
 Participants would like to follow up with more exercises to include a 
functional drill on weather-related incidents  
 Conduct exercises on our current checklists and job aids. 
Table 4.22 Descriptive Statistics Identifying Recommendations in the Area of Exercises 
 
Recommendations for Exercises 
            Responses 
            (N=27, n=11) 
Percent of  
Cases 
(n=11) n Percent 
Recommendations to conduct more Exercises 3 100% 27.3% 
    
Resources 
 The area of resources is one that is sometimes hard to define in terms of 
recommendations, simply because of the limitations that may already be in place. For 
example, based upon the event, identifying the resources that may be necessary can be 
difficult. Unfortunately, the type of equipment or personnel being requested may not be 
available or in limited supply. While it may seem reasonable to identify resources that 
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may be needed prior to an incident occurring, it may not be a practical expectation. Thus, 
recommendations in this theme need to be considered with applicability and reality. 
 This theme was broken down into three (3) sub-themes. Identifying equipment-
related resources, identifying non-equipment related resources, and resource tracking. 
Within the eleven contributing jurisdictions, 100% (Table 4.23) offered recommendation 
in the area of needing to identify equipment related resources earlier. In the sub-theme of 
non-equipment-related resources, 54.5% (Table 4.23) of the responding localities had 
recommendations in this area. Finally, 27.3% (Table 4.23) of the jurisdictions had some 
recommendations in the area of, the  need to, or how to better perform, in the area of 
resource tracking.  
 Within the recommendation sub-theme, some of the comments offered by 
jurisdictions were as follows: 
 Additional disaster resource-tracking options should be explored including 
the use of current technology; 
 The EOC should keep a running list of equipment and personnel expenses 
for future reimbursement; 
 While the resources in terms of staffing for this event was sufficient, 
longer events will require the identification of additional personnel to 
maintain a 24-hour operation; 
 Need to conduct a complete inventory of current resources so that we 
know what we have 
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Table 4.23 Descriptive Statistics Identifying Recommendations in the Area of 
Resources 
Recommendations for Resources (a) 
               Responses 
             (N=27, n=11) 
Percent of  
Cases 
(n=11) n Percent 
Recommendation to Identify Needed 
Equipment Resources  
11 100% 100% 
Recommendation to Identify Needed Non-
Equipment Resources 
6 100% 54.5% 
Recommendation to Improve Resource 
Tracking 
3 100% 27.3% 
a. Dichotomy group tabulated at value of 1 
 
 
Training 
 Along with exercises, training is key to helping personnel understand their roles 
and responsibilities when reporting to the EOC. Personnel are already at a disadvantage 
because an activation of the EOC does not occur often enough for them to maintain a 
high level of proficiency when completing tasks in an effective and timely manner. This 
is what makes the training component such an important aspect in the performance of the 
EOC (Sinclair et al., 2012).  
 In the training sub-theme, 63.6% (Table 4.24) of the participating localities had 
recommendations noted in their AARs to hold more training activities. Some of the 
comments included: 
 Multiple disciplines should create a calendar with mutual training 
opportunities that need to be held throughout the year; 
 Need to get more people trained to perform this specific function; 
 Need to conduct cross-training for personnel; 
 Provide further training to EOC staff on the interface process with the 
Incident Command Post. 
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Table 4.24 Descriptive Statistics Identifying Recommendations in the Area of Training 
Recommendations for Training 
             Responses 
               (N=27, n=11) 
Percent of  
Cases 
(n=11) n Percent 
Recommendations to conduct more 
Training 
7 100% 63.6% 
 
 
Organization 
 Organization of the EOC is helps it to function in a seamless and effective 
manner, or be in a constant state of chaos. Unfortunately, there is not currently a standard 
manner in which to establish an organization in the EOC when responding to, or 
recovering from, a disaster. Often, those who are not members of the emergency 
management department do not always understand the premise for how an EOC is 
organized (Perry, 1995). Thus, recommendations concerning the organization of the EOC 
can address many variables. 
 For the purpose of this theme, several sub-themes were developed to capture the 
recommendations in a structured manner. These sub-themes were coordination, facility, 
procedures, and policies. Of the eleven jurisdictions participating in this study, 100% 
(Table 4.25) had recommendations in the area of EOC organization. Of those 
recommendations, 27.3% (Table 4.25) were in the area of coordination. Another 36.4% 
(Table 4.25) had ideas regarding the facility in which the EOC operated. In the area of 
both policies and procedures, 81.8% (Table 4.25) had recommendation to offer. Within 
the various sub-themes, some of the recommendations included: 
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 Continued emphasis on the coordination and partnership of the 
jurisdiction, schools, and volunteer agencies involved in the disaster 
response and recovery; 
 The jurisdiction needs to plan for a backup EOC facility that can be used 
when the primary becomes too full; 
 Procedures for alerting staff when the EOC has been activated need to be 
developed;   
 The jurisdiction needs to review its policies regarding donations during a 
disaster.   
 
Table 4.25 Descriptive Statistics Identifying Recommendations in the Area of 
Organization 
 
Recommendations for Organization (a) 
                Responses 
                (N=27, n=11) 
Percent of  
Cases 
(n=11) n Percent 
Recommendation to Improve Coordination 3 100% 27.3% 
Recommendation to Improve the Facility 4 100% 36.4% 
Recommendation to Create or Improve 
Policies 
9 100% 81.8% 
Recommendation to Create or Improve 
Procedures 
9 100% 81.8% 
a. Dichotomy group tabulated at value of 1 
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Results of Hypothesis Testing 
H1: When EOCs are activated for actual real-world or simulated natural, man-
made, or technological incidents, situational awareness will be identified as a 
challenge/deficiency in a majority of after action reports. 
 The first hypothesis explores the relationship between situational awareness and 
the impact it had on EOC operations. For this hypothesis, the dependent variable is EOC 
operations, which is coded as 0 on a scale of 0-1. 1 is the indication that the EOC was 
activated. Situational awareness is coded as 1 on a scale of 1-2 to indicate that the lack of 
situational awareness was noted in the AAR as being a challenge and thus, had a negative 
impact on EOC operations. The number 2 was assigned to demonstrate that the 
jurisdiction did not note in their AAR that situational awareness had a negative impact on 
their EOC.    
 Based upon the frequency analysis, it was noted that 54.5% (Table 4.26) of AARs 
indicated that the lack of situational awareness did have a negative impact on EOC 
operation while 45.5% (Table 4.26) did not note any impact to the EOC based upon a 
lack of situational awareness. After creating a frequency table, there is evidence to 
support the argument that the lack of situational awareness did have a negative impact on 
EOC operations in a majority of the AARs submitted (Table 4.26). This finding is in 
alignment with the thoughts from Harrald (2006b) regarding situational awareness during 
the response to Katrina. In his article, he shares that “A detailed and credible common 
operating picture may not be achievable for 24 to 48 hours (or longer)” (p. 258). While 
the hypothesis is confirmed and in alignment with other observations, it is noted that this 
represents a small sample of the population and needs to be taken into consideration.  
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Table 4.26 Situational Awareness Frequency Table Indicating Negative Impact on EOC 
Situational Awareness Impact 
               Responses 
                (N=27, n=11) 
Percent of  
Cases 
(n=11) n Percent 
Lack of Situational Awareness had a Negative 
Impact on the Operation of the EOC 
6 100% 54.5% 
 
H2: When EOCs are activated for actual real world or simulated natural, man-
made, or technological incidents, communications will be identified as a 
challenge/deficiency in a majority of after action reports (confirmed) 
 The second hypothesis examines the relationship between EOC operations and the 
function of communications. The independent variable is coded a 1, on a scale of 1-2 to 
show that the after action report did indicate that within the function of communications, 
there were challenges that had a negative impact on the EOC operations. The 2 on the 
scale is used to indicate that the AAR did not state that there were any challenges 
associated with communications that had a negative impact on EOC operations. 
 The issues within communications that were identified by the various jurisdictions 
included items associated with equipment or procedures. Within the area of equipment, 
90.9% indicated they had issues with the improper operations or lack of equipment which 
impacted their ability to communicate (Table 4.8). In the area of procedures, 81.8% 
indicated that there were no procedures or the procedures in place needed to be updated, 
which had a negative impact on EOC operations (Table 4.8). In total, 100% of the 
jurisdictions reported that they had issues with communicating, which had a negative 
impact on their EOC operation (Table 4.27). Based on the data from the Communications 
Frequency Table, this hypothesis is confirmed.  
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 It is worth noting that these results are similar to those found by Savoia et al, 
(2012), who conducted an analysis of AARs from public health agencies and hospitals. In 
their study, they noted that within the area of communications, they identified that “the 
most frequent issue was related to the agencies ability to process any release new 
information (50%), which was often reported to be complex and time consuming” 
(Savoia et al., 2012, p. 2954). Thus, the results of this study are in agreement with the 
results from previous studies in this area.   
Table 4.27 Communication Frequency Table Indicating Negative Impact on EOC 
Communication Impact 
                   Responses 
                   (N=27, n=11) 
Percent of  
Cases 
(n=11) n Percent 
Issues with Communication had a 
Negative Impact on EOC Operations 
11 100% 100% 
 
H3: The lack of EOC organization will be identified in multiple EOC after action 
reports as being the source of errors committed during an EOC activation.  
 The third hypothesis examines the relationship between EOC operations and the 
organization of the EOC itself. For this hypothesis, several areas were included as part of 
the organization. In reviewing the data, the dependent variable of EOC operations 
remains a 1 in a range of 1-2 indicating that the EOC was activated. The independent 
variable of Organization is coded as a 1, on a scale of 1-2 to show that the AAR did 
indicate that the lack of organization did have a negative impact on EOC operations. A 
code of 2 would indicate that the AAR did not indicate that the lack of organization had a 
negative impact on the EOC.   
 Using the frequency analysis table, 100% (Table 4.28) of the jurisdictions 
reported that the lack of organization did have a negative impact on EOC operations. 
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Within the theme of organization, 100% (Table 4.9) indicated they had issues with 
coordination. In a study conducted by Faraj and Xiao (2006), they noted that the recent 
effort to base typologies of coordination from an information processing view, may be 
too formal of a process to allow organizations to “mount an effective response to events 
characterized by urgency, novelty, surprise, and different interpretations” (p. 1167). 
Another 63.6% (Table 4.9) reported that the facility itself impacted the organization of 
the staff, which impacted EOC operations. 72.7% (Table 4.9) documented that the lack of 
policies related to EOC operations had a negative impact while 81.8% (Table 4.9) 
reported that the lack of or outdated procedures were a negative influence. Based upon 
the results of the frequency analysis table, this hypothesis is confirmed. While the sample 
population does present a limitation for this study, the strength in this table is noted 
Table 4.28 Organization Frequency Table Indicating Negative Impact on EOC 
Organization Impact 
                    Responses 
                   (N=27, n=11) 
Percent of  
Cases 
(n=11) n Percent 
Issues with Organization had a 
Negative Impact on EOC Operations 
11 100% 100% 
 
H4: When EOCs are activated for actual real world or simulate natural, man-made 
or technological incident, training will be identified as a challenge/deficiency in a 
majority of after action reports (Confirmed)  
 The fourth hypothesis examines the impact of training on an EOC operation. As 
stated in Chapter 2, while training is an important aspect for any high-risk profession, it is 
especially important to those who come to the EOC due mainly to the fact that EOC 
activations in response to large-scale emergencies or disasters do not occur that often 
(Sinclair et al., 2012). While it is important for those who may perform the technical 
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tasks associated with an EOC operation, learning and understanding how to manage those 
personnel is just as important when it comes to the overall success of the organization 
(Pidot, 2013; Cigler, 2008).  
 Training is an ongoing effort that attempts to address many factors, such as 
providing basic training for those who are new to the EOC; updating current training 
programs to keep up with technological advancements; providing advanced training for 
experienced personnel; and providing training for elected officials. Yet, these are only a 
few of the items that must be addressed in a comprehensive training program. For this 
hypothesis, the independent variable of training was coded as 1 on a scale of 1-2 
indicating that the jurisdiction did identify the lack of training as having a negative 
impact on their EOC operation. 
 Using a frequency analysis, 63.6% (Table 4.29) of the jurisdictions reported that 
the lack of training did have a negative impact on the EOC operation. This figure was 
interesting and should be viewed as a flag of concern when compared to the findings that 
Donahue and Tuohy (2006) found when they examined AARs in identifying lessons 
learned from previous disasters. In their study, they noted that almost every AAR 
discussed the importance that training plays in building capacity. Yet, over half of the 
AARs for this study identified how the lack of training impacted their operations. While 
based upon the frequency analysis data, this hypothesis is confirmed, additional research 
would be prudent to uncover the reason why this figure is still so high. Again, taking into 
account that the results of this study are based on a small population sample. 
 
 
169 
 
Table 4.29 Frequency Table Indicating Lack of Training Having Negative Impact on 
EOC Operations 
 
Training Impact 
                      Responses 
                      (N=27, n=11) 
Percent of  
Cases 
(n=11) n Percent 
Lack of Training had a Negative 
Impact on EOC Operations 
7 100% 63.6% 
 
H5: When EOCs are activated for actual real-world or simulated natural, man-
made, or technological incidents, resources will be identified as a 
challenge/deficiency in a majority of after action reports (Confirmed) 
 The fifth hypothesis takes into account the important of resources to an effective 
EOC operation. Resources in this context are comprised of equipment, supplies, and 
personnel. Anticipating the resources that will be needed for any possible incident that a 
jurisdiction may encounter is a difficult task and requires constant monitoring. In 
reviewing this variable, resources were coded again on a scale of 1-2, with 1 indicating 
that the jurisdiction did document in their AAR that the lack of resources had a negative 
impact on their EOC operation. 
 Using the frequency analysis table, 63.6% (Table 4.30) of the jurisdictions 
reported that the lack of resources did have a negative impact on the EOC operation. In 
comparison to the 75% of AARs on major incidents studied by Donahue and Tuohy 
(2006) where logistics was identified as an issue, this result can be viewed as similar. 
Taking into consideration that the results of this study are founded on a much smaller 
sample of AARs. However, based upon the frequency analysis data, this hypothesis is 
confirmed.   
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Table 4.30 Frequency Table Indicating Lack of Resources had a Negative Impact on 
EOC Operations 
 
Resources Impact 
                       Responses 
                      (N=27, n=11) 
Percent of  
Cases 
(n=11) n Percent 
Lack of Resources had a Negative 
Impact on EOC Operations 
7 100% 63.6% 
    
 
H6: When EOCs are activated for actual real world or simulated natural, man-
made, or technological incidents, several challenges will be identified as being co-
existent. (Confirmed) 
 This hypothesis examines the co-existence of challenges among the jurisdictions 
that submitted AARs for this study. This includes looking at the individual jurisdictions 
for evidence of challenges that they have noted within their own EOC and compare them 
to other jurisdictions who may have the same challenges identified in their AAR. Several 
past studies have shown that issues such as planning, communications, coordination, and 
leadership, among others, have been common in multiple reports spanning from the 
1970’s through the 1990’s (Savoia, Agboola, & Biddinger, 2012; Donahue & Tuohy, 
2006; Henstra, 2010; Col, 2007). For this study, the comparison is inclusive of both the 
main themes and the sub-themes created within them so that a more in-depth examination 
could be undertaken. In examining the data from Table 4.31, the following similarities 
were noted: 
 Of those jurisdictions that indicated that a lack of training had a negative impact 
on their operation, 100% of those same jurisdictions reported that a lack 
experience had a negative impact on their operations. (Table 4.31) 
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 Of those jurisdictions that indicated that a lack of resources had a negative impact 
on their operations, 100% also reported that a lack of, or poorly-written 
procedures also had a negative impact on their operations (Table 4.31). 
 Of those jurisdictions that indicated that a lack of situational awareness had a 
negative impact on their operations, 100% also reported that a lack of, or poorly-
written communications procedures, also had a negative impact on their 
operations (Table 4.31). 
While more similarities were noted between jurisdictions at lower percentages, the 
similarities highlighted above provide evidence to support the hypothesis. Thus, this 
hypothesis is confirmed. Taking into account the small population size, this table 
provides useful information for future studies. This also addresses research question four. 
In examining the data from the case summaries, 100% of the jurisdictions that submitted 
an AAR had issues regarding poor coordination, which had a negative impact on their 
EOC operations (Table 4.31).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
172 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.31 Case summary of all jurisdictions reporting challenges in the EOC 
 
Juris. Communication 
equipment, or 
lack thereof, 
had negative 
impact on EOC 
operations 
Lack of 
communication 
procedures had 
a negative 
impact on the 
EOC operations 
Lack of 
experience 
had a 
negative 
impact on 
the EOC 
operations 
Poor 
coordination 
had a 
negative 
impact on 
EOC 
operations 
The 
facility 
had a 
negative 
impact on 
EOC 
operations 
Lack of, 
or poorly 
written 
policies, 
had a 
negative 
impact on 
EOC 
operations 
Lack of, or 
poorly 
written 
procedures, 
had a 
negative 
impact on 
EOC 
operations 
Lack of 
resources 
had a 
negative 
impact on 
EOC 
operations 
Lack of 
situational 
awareness 
had a 
negative 
impact on 
EOC 
operations 
Lack of 
training 
had a 
negative 
impact on 
EOC 
operations 
           
1 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No 
2 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
3 Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No 
4 Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
5 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
6 Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No No Yes 
7 Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
8 No Yes No Yes Yes No Yes No Yes No 
9 Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
10 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
11 Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes No No No No 
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Summary 
 The results of this study have served to establish the foundation from which future 
training programs focusing on EOC operations can be created and/or be enhanced. This 
study has examined the reports submitted by various jurisdictions from across the 
country, and has highlighted some of the most common challenges when EOCs are 
activated. While the hypotheses established for this study were confirmed, some surprises 
were discovered in conducting the research for the study. These will be identified along 
with recommendations for future research initiatives in the next chapter.     
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION 
 One of the most important functions that a jurisdiction performs during a response 
to a large-scale emergency or a disaster is the activation of its EOC. Yet, this is also one 
of the least-performed functions that a locality undertakes. Thus, when the EOC is 
activated, challenges and mistakes will occur. In an effort to reduce their occurrence and 
impact on the operations of the EOC, localities often look to training to be the solution. 
Yet, to conduct effective training, the jurisdiction needs to identify those areas that need 
to be corrected. This study has attempted to start that process. 
 The purpose of this study has been to investigate some of the most common 
challenges of an EOC activation so that current training programs can be improved, and 
future training programs can be developed. While EOCs have been activated nationally 
for many years, and training programs have been created to enhance their operation in 
some fashion, this study appears to be the first to actually examine the most common 
challenges that EOCs encounter and contributes to the current body of knowledge on this 
topic. This has been done to help identify training needs from an evidence-based 
perspective. From the findings of this study, several points can be made. 
 First, while technical skills are important in performing tasks, jurisdictions seem 
to have the most difficulty in working together. Of the eleven jurisdictions from which 
AARs were collected, 100% (Table 4.29) cited a challenge in the area of coordination. So 
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while training in multiple areas is still needed, attention in the area of how people work 
together to accomplish a task should be the focus. As indicated in Chapter II, individual 
organizations often do not engage with many outside entities on a regular basis to 
conduct their normal day-to-day operations.  Additionally, only 54% (Table 4.12) of the 
jurisdictions reported relationships as being a strength in their operation. Perhaps an 
emphasis is needed to develop training programs that are designed to encourage this type 
of behavior more often in lieu of programs that focus on individual performance in 
specific roles. Focusing more on social skills more so than technical may be an asset and 
should be further researched. 
 Second, one of the most interesting discoveries in this study was the fact that only 
36% (Table 4.17) of the jurisdictions indicated that past training served as a strength in 
the EOC operation. While broad, overarching conclusions cannot be made stating that 
current training programs are not having a positive impact on EOC operations, this 
finding should not be totally dismissed. Perhaps other reasons explain this low 
percentage. However, the fact remains that those who report to the EOC are possibly not 
being adequately trained. It is noted that 63% (Table 4.22) of the jurisdictions indicated 
they would like to have more training in their recommendations. 
 Finally, one interesting finding came in the area of facilities, in which 63% (Table 
4.5) of the respondents indicated that the facility itself had a negative impact on their 
EOC operations. This came in the form of different entities being located in different 
areas, lack of equipment, and not enough space. While this study was initiated to identify 
challenges that could be addressed through better training, this item demonstrated that 
localities need to be more aware of how and where they set up their EOCs. One of the 
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attributes of the EOC is to have a central location in which leaders can come together to 
gather the accurate and real-time information that they need to make good decisions. To 
accomplish this, the facility needs to be adequate and capable of providing this capability. 
 Savoia et al, (2012) utilized AARs to examine lessons learned from responses to 
real-world incidents within the public health domain. One of the areas that they explored 
was public health/hospital EOC operations. In their study, they noted that the most 
common themes identified as challenges were found in the areas of role and 
responsibility confusion of those working in the EOC, lack of ICS knowledge and 
training, and difficulty in the area of situation reports (Savoia, Agboola, & Biddinger, 
2012). While this study indicated that 60% (Table 4.11) of the localities indicated that 
their personnel did perform their roles well, 54% (Table 4.7) did document issues related 
to situational awareness. These findings are similar to the findings of the previous study 
as well. Additionally, all jurisdictions in this study reported challenges related to 
organization (Table 4.1), much like those that the Savoia et al. study highlighted. 
 Although this study was small in terms of numbers of AARs reviewed, eleven in 
total, the information garnered from the reports is valuable. The AARs themselves were a 
good source for capturing the strengths and challenges that EOCs faced during their 
activation. They served as a solid resource upon which improvements to future operations 
can be made and enhancements to training programs can be initiated. By incorporating 
data such as this into the design of future training, progress can be tracked and 
adjustments made that are based on evidence and not just perspectives. 
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     Limitations  
 Very little research has been conducted in the area of the most common 
challenges that are faced by EOCs during an activation. Thus, this study has contributed 
to the broad area of knowledge so that jurisdictions, private contracting companies, and 
individuals can engage in developing training programs that are based on empirical 
findings. In addition, this study has created a platform from which future studies can and 
should be undertaken to advance the goal of improving EOC operations. 
 However, limitations are associated with this study that need to be highlighted. 
First, the number of jurisdictions involved in this study was small. Only eleven AARs 
were reviewed. While the reports did reflect a valid sample of the population identified to 
be included in the project, a larger sample from a larger population group would bring 
added value to this type of research. Additionally, if the response rate from the population 
identified would have been in the 50%-60% range, more data could have been calculated 
into the study for a stronger validation of the results. 
 As shared by Faith et al, (2011), an increasing number of local public safety 
organizations are capturing the successes and failures of their operations in AARs (Faith, 
Jackson, & Willis, 2011). Yet, going through an AAR to gather the reliable information 
that is needed for research purposes does come with its own set of challenges. AARs are 
not necessarily designed or constructed for this type of analysis (Hallbert, et al., 2004). 
AARs from different jurisdictions employ different formats and writing styles. In 
addition, while some programs recommend a standard AAR format for response 
organizations, even a casual review of several reports demonstrates that the level of detail 
in reports prepared by different organizations varies greatly (Faith, Jackson, & Willis, 
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2011).  
 The AARs collected for this study validate this perspective. The reports analyzed 
were not all created in the same manner and had multiple authors. As indicated by Faith 
et al., (2011), at this time, there is no standard manner in which AARs must be created 
following a real-world incident although guidelines are in place for AARs created from 
exercises. Thus, the reports collected for this study were not consistent in how they 
presented their information. While some were very organized and detailed, others were 
not and required extensive review to uncover the information needed for the study. 
Additionally, independent contractors, who were not part of the EOC activation, wrote 
some reports. For their research, they relied on information gathered from interviews and 
other sources. 
 Despite these limitations, AARs do contain a wealth of information that is useful 
for multiple purposes. Furthermore, as a data source that is already generated in many 
jurisdictions, using AARs as a source of data places little extra burden on local response 
organizations. However, as indicated earlier, there is a need to develop and demonstrate a 
standardized approach for encoding the information contained within (Faith, Jackson, & 
Willis, 2011). 
 Finally, using only AARs eliminates the use of other sources of documentation 
that may prove to be beneficial. However, focusing only on AARs keeps the scope of the 
project narrow and manageable. AARs are now widely used by public and private 
organizations, businesses, and public health agencies as tools for gathering documenting, 
and evaluating processes and functions performed in both real-world incidents and 
simulated exercises (Savoia et al., 2012). The use of only AARs for this study allows the 
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researcher to focus on the specific aspects of EOC operations that were identified as 
needing correction.  
     Future Research 
 Future research is needed to expand the database for these types of studies. While 
this study serves its purpose, more data from larger population centers should be gathered 
so that a more robust study can be undertaken to not only identify common challenges, 
but also to conduct comparisons between more communities, seeking to uncover if 
challenges are similar or different across population sizes. This would make a study of 
this type more general and thus more useful to more EOCs. 
 Second, a more in-depth study of the data is warranted. While many challenges 
and strengths were recognized and documented, this study did not undertake the 
examination of how, or if, a correlation between a noted strength and challenge in the 
same general area existed. For example, how can a jurisdiction note a challenge and 
strength in the area of communication during the same activation? While actions are 
taken to correct issues, it would be prudent to understand that there may be solutions 
already identified within the report itself. However, if the focus remains centrally fixated 
on the problem itself without looking at the EOC environment from a holistic 
perspective, the answer to that problem may not be recognized. 
 While the purpose of this study was to identify challenges in areas such as 
communications and organization, the topics themselves require further investigation. 
Although improving training programs will help with correcting errors, it may take more 
than just this one approach. As identified in the study, 100% (Table 4.1) of the localities 
that participated indicated that the organization of EOC was a challenge. Thus, this is an 
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area that may need more than just improvements to a training program. As identified in 
other articles, there are multiple ways in which EOCs are organized in order to meet a 
jurisdiction’s needs (Shouldis, 2010). However, since the primary purpose of an EOC (to 
address the situations and problems created by a disaster) does not change, the utilization 
of a singular organizational structure may be a solution worth considering. Implementing 
such a structure in all EOCs may help them perform their core functions in a manner that 
is consistent, efficient and effective. All the while assisting in the streamlining of training 
curriculums. 
 Several articles have indicated that while the actions of personnel are important, 
the manner in which they are managed carries just as much significance (Pidot, 2013; 
Roberts, 2009; Cigler, 2008). Thus, more attention needs to be applied to understanding 
how management impacts EOC operations. Further study needs to be conducted to better 
understand how organizations that are not brought together often can operate effectively. 
One shibboleth often continued to be held onto is to draw upon public service entities 
such as fire and rescue, law enforcement, and the military to help organize and manage 
EOC operations. 
 While managers from these disciplines may be excellent within their own field, 
the EOC environment is unique. The make-up of the personnel who report to an EOC 
come from diverse backgrounds outside of public safety, and may not normally operate 
within an environment that focuses on high-risk crisis possibilities. Hereinto, they may 
not be familiar with how public safety agencies operate during a crisis and may feel 
somewhat at a loss as to where they fit in. For this, they look to leadership to provide 
them with direction. This may be a role that public safety leaders may not themselves be 
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comfortable in assuming. Directing incident scene personnel is different from managing 
those who report to the EOC  
 Thus, whether jurisdictions are bringing the right type of leadership into the EOC 
may warrant future investigation. There are many potential areas of research open to 
understand and improve EOC operations. Yet, no in-depth studies have been conducted 
up to this point to examine how to best accomplish this goal. While formal steps have 
been taken to improve incident management and personnel performance on incident 
scenes, no such effort has been put forth to improve the performance of the organization 
that is activated to serve as their primary source of support. 
 What has been confirmed through this study is fact that local governments have 
been responding and recovering from disasters for a long period of time. Yet, there are 
areas that still require substantial improvements (Donahue & Tuohy, 2006; Savoia, 
Agboola, & Biddinger, 2012; Wolensky & Wolensky, 1990). This is true not only for 
those operations that occur in the field, but is inclusive of those operations that take place 
within an EOC. In a positive step to address deficiencies in the EOC, training programs 
have been created. However, many of these have been done in an ad hoc manner (Sinclair 
et al., 2012). While this may serve the individual jurisdiction, the benefits stop there. If 
the foundation for why the programs were developed, or modified, is not shared beyond 
the jurisdictional boundaries that created them, very few EOC operations will improve. 
 Developing training programs that are designed to address known shortcomings 
identified through multiple, local level AARs, is one way to approach improving this 
process in a systematic, comprehensive, and prudent manner.  Unlike responses in the 
field, there is no national standard for managing emergency incidents in an EOC. Thus, 
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these types of studies need to be done more often, and in greater detail, so that that 
activities taken in the EOC are based upon sound principles and have training programs 
that enforce this practice. In times of crisis, communities depend upon their local 
governments to take charge. However, when the EOC environment itself faces 
challenges, then response and recovery to those that need help the most may be subject to 
the impact from unfortunate and preventable delays. 
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APPENDIX A 
ANALYSIS OF THE CHALLENGES REPORTED FROM THE AARS 
Jurisdictions Reporting Challenges with Communications 
 
 The total number of jurisdictions reporting challenges/errors within the main 
theme of Communications was 11. This is representative of 100% of the jurisdictions 
included in the study. The main theme of Communications was broken down into the two 
(2) sub-themes of Equipment and Procedures. Of the 11 jurisdictions reporting, 81% 
reported items related to equipment difficulties and another 81% reported issues with 
procedures. As a whole within the Communications main theme, there were a total of 81 
issues identified. Of those, 44% were related to difficulties with equipment, while the 
remaining 56% of issues highlighted were concerned with procedural difficulties.  
Table A.1 Breakdown of Jurisdictions Reporting Challenges with 
Communications 
 
Jurisdiction Equipment Procedures Total 
1 3 2 5 
2 8 12 20 
3 3 0 3 
4 3 2 5 
5 6 1 7 
6 1 3 4 
7 3 0 3 
8 0 2 2 
9 1 4 5 
10 8 16 24 
11 0 3 3 
Total 36 45 81 
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Jurisdictions Reporting Challenges Associated with Organization 
 
 The total number of jurisdictions reporting challenges/errors within the main 
theme of Organizations was 11. This is representative of 100% of the jurisdictions 
included in the study. As indicated in the methodology section of this study, the main 
theme of Organizations was broken down into the four (4) sub-themes of Coordination, 
Facility, Policies, and Procedures. Of the 11 jurisdictions reporting challenges in the area 
of organization, 100% reported some type of issue with coordination; 63% reported items 
related to the facility; another 72% highlighted challenges in the area of policies, and 
81% had concerns in the area of procedures. Within the Organization main theme, there 
were a total of 102 issues identified. Of those, 23% of the issues were related to 
coordination; 26% were in the sub-theme of facility; 18% of the items were in policies 
and the remaining 31% if issues were related to procedures. Of note, in the area of 
facility, jurisdiction #1 accounted for over 51% of the issues reported, while in the sub-
theme of procedures, jurisdiction #10 reported 34% of the total items recorded. 
Table A.2 Breakdown of Jurisdictions Reporting Challenges with 
Organization 
 
  
Jurisdiction Coordination Facility Policies Procedures Total 
1 1 14 1 3 19 
2 1 1 1 1 4 
3 2 1 5 4 12 
4 6 0 4 4 14 
5 2 3 0 3 8 
6 2 0 0 0 2 
7 3 1 1 3 8 
8 1 5 0 1 7 
9 1 0 4 2 7 
10 3 2 2 11 18 
11 2 0 1 0 3 
Total 24 27 19 32 102 
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Jurisdictions Reporting Challenges Associated with Resources 
 
 The total number of jurisdictions reporting challenges/errors within the main 
theme of Resources was seven (7). This represents 63% of the jurisdictions included in 
the study. As indicated in the methodology section of this study, the main theme of 
Resources had no sub-themes created. Within the Resources main theme, there were 26 
issues identified. Of those, 23% of the issues reported identified with jurisdiction #7.  
Table A.3: Breakdown of Jurisdictions Reporting Challenges with Resources 
 
Jurisdiction Resources Total 
1 2 2 
3 3 3 
4 3 3 
5 4 4 
7 6 6 
9 4 4 
10 4 4 
Total 26 26 
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Jurisdictions Reporting Challenges Associated with Situational Awareness 
 
 The total number of jurisdictions reporting challenges/errors within the main 
theme of Situational Awareness was six (6). This represents 54% of the jurisdictions 
included in the study. As indicated in the methodology section of this study, the main 
theme of Situational Awareness had no sub-themes created. Within the Situational 
Awareness main theme, there were only 11 issues identified. These were relatively 
dispersed among the reporting jurisdictions.  
 
Table A.4: Breakdown of Jurisdictions Reporting Challenges with Situational 
Awareness 
 
Jurisdiction Resources Total 
2 1 1 
4 3 3 
5 2 2 
8 2 2 
9 1 1 
10 2 2 
Total 11 11 
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Jurisdictions Reporting Challenges Associated with Training 
 
 The total number of jurisdictions reporting challenges/errors within the main 
theme of Training was seven (7). This represents 63% of the jurisdictions included in the 
study. As indicated in the methodology section of this study, the main theme of Training 
had no sub-themes created. Within the Training main theme, there were only 11 issues 
identified. These were relatively equally dispersed among the reporting jurisdictions.  
 
Table A.5 Breakdown of Jurisdictions Reporting Challenges with Training 
 
Jurisdiction Training Total 
2 1 1 
4 2 2 
5 2 2 
6 1 1 
7 2 2 
9 1 1 
10 2 2 
Total 11 11 
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Jurisdictions Reporting Challenges Associated with Experience 
 
 The total number of jurisdictions reporting challenges/errors within the main 
theme of Experience was nine (9). This represents 81% of the jurisdictions included in 
the study. As indicated in the methodology section of this study, the main theme of 
Experience had no sub-themes created. Within the Experience main theme, there were 18 
issues identified. These were relatively dispersed among the reporting jurisdictions with 
the highest number of 4 issues being reported by jurisdiction #4. This represented 22% of 
the total number of issues recorded  
 
Table A.6 Breakdown of Jurisdictions Reporting Challenges with Experience 
 
Jurisdiction Training Total 
1 3 3 
2 2 2 
4 4 4 
5 3 3 
6 1 1 
7 1 1 
9 1 1 
10 2 2 
11 1 1 
Total 18 18 
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APPENDIX B 
ANALYSIS OF THE STRENGTHS REPORTED IN THE AARS 
Jurisdictions Reporting Strengths within the area of Communications 
 
 The total number of jurisdictions reporting strengths within the main theme of 
Communications was eight (8). This is representative of 72% of the jurisdictions included 
in the study. As indicated in the methodology section of this study, the main theme of 
Communications was broken down into the two (2) sub-themes of communications with 
personnel and communications with the public. Of the eight jurisdictions reporting 
strength in the area of communications, 62% reported strength in the area of 
communications with personnel. In communications with the public, 45% of the 
reporting jurisdictions documented this area as a strength. In total, 26 items were 
documented in this sub-theme, each of the two areas had 13 items (50%).  
Table B.1 Breakdown of Jurisdictions Reporting Strengths within the area of        
Communications 
 
Jurisdiction Comm. with Personnel Comm. With the Public Total 
2 1 0 1 
3 5 0 5 
5 3 0 3 
7 0 2 2 
8 2 5 7 
9 0 1 1 
10 2 2 4 
11 0 3 3 
Total 13 13 26 
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Jurisdictions Reporting Strengths within the area of Organization 
 
 The total number of jurisdictions reporting strengths within the main theme of 
Organization was ten (10). This is representative of 90% of the jurisdictions included in 
the study. As indicated in the methodology section of this study, the main theme of 
Organization was broken down into the four (4) sub-themes of resources, collaboration, 
coordination and performance. Of the ten jurisdictions reporting strength in the area of 
organization, 72% reported strength in the area of resources; 55% reported strength in the 
area of collaboration; 55% reported strength in the area of coordination, and 66% 
indicated a strength in the area of personnel performance. In total, 47 items were 
documented in this sub-theme, the most items were found in the category of resources, 
with 51% of the total number of items. Followed by collaboration with 19%, personnel 
performance with 17% and coordination with 12%. The most items listed were 
documented by jurisdiction 8, who had 11 (23%) of the 47 items recorded.  
Table B.2 Breakdown of Jurisdictions Reporting Strengths within the area of 
Organization 
 
Jurisdiction Resources Collab. Coord. Perf. Total 
2 1 2 2 0 5 
3 3 1 1 0 5 
4 5 0 0 0 5 
5 0 0 1 1 2 
6 1 1 0 1 3 
7 7 0 0 1 8 
8 4 4 0 3 11 
9 1 0 0 0 1 
10 2 1 1 1 5 
11 0 0 1 1 2 
Total 24 9 6 8 47 
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Jurisdictions Reporting Strengths within the area of Relationships 
 
 The total number of jurisdictions reporting strengths within the main theme of 
Relationships was six (6). This is representative of 54% of the jurisdictions included in 
the study. As indicated in the methodology section of this study, the main theme of 
Relationships had no sub-themes created. In total, 17 items were documented in this sub-
theme. Most of the issues noted (10) came from jurisdiction 8. These represented 58% of 
the total items recorded. 
Table B.3 Breakdown of Jurisdictions Reporting Strengths within the area of 
Relationships 
 
Jurisdiction Relationships Total 
3 2 2 
4 2 2 
6 1 1 
7 1 1 
8 10 10 
10 1 1 
Total 17 17 
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Jurisdictions Reporting Strengths within the area of Exercises 
 
 The total number of jurisdictions reporting strengths within the main theme of 
Lessons Learned was four (4). This is representative of 36% of the jurisdictions included 
in the study. As indicated in the methodology section of this study, the main theme of 
Exercises had no sub-themes created. In total, 10 items were documented in this sub-
theme. The largest number of comments recorded was by jurisdiction # 7 with 5, or 50% 
of the total number of comments recorded in this sub-theme.  
 
Table B.4 Breakdown of Jurisdictions Reporting Strengths within the area of Exercises 
 
Jurisdiction Exercises Total 
3 1 1 
4 1 1 
7 5 5 
8 3 3 
Total 10 10 
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Jurisdictions Reporting Strengths within the area of Situational Awareness 
 
 The total number of jurisdictions reporting strengths within the main theme of 
Situational Awareness was five (5). This is representative of 45% of the jurisdictions 
included in the study. As indicated in the methodology section of this study, the main 
theme of Situational Awareness  had no sub-themes created. In total, 15 items were 
documented in this sub-theme. The largest number of comments recorded was by 
jurisdiction # 8 with 6, or 40% of the total number of comments recorded in this sub-
theme.  
 
Table B.5 Breakdown of Jurisdictions Reporting Strengths within the area of 
Situational Awareness 
 
Jurisdiction 
Situational 
Awareness 
Total 
1 1 1 
3 2 2 
4 3 3 
8 6 6 
10 3 3 
Total 15 15 
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Jurisdictions Reporting Strengths within the area of Training 
 
 The total number of jurisdictions reporting strengths within the main theme of 
Training was four (4). This is representative of 36% of the jurisdictions included in the 
study. As indicated in the methodology section of this study, the main theme of Training 
had no sub-themes created. In total, 19 items were documented in this sub-theme. The 
largest number of comments recorded was by jurisdiction # 8 with 11, or 68% of the total 
number of comments recorded in this sub-theme.  
Table B.6 Breakdown of Jurisdictions Reporting Strengths within the area of Training  
 
Jurisdiction Training Total 
4 1 1 
6 2 2 
7 4 4 
8 13 13 
Total 19 19 
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Jurisdictions Reporting Strengths within the area of Experience 
 
 The total number of jurisdictions reporting strengths within the main theme of 
Experience was five (5). This is representative of 45% of the jurisdictions included in the 
study. As indicated in the methodology section of this study, the main theme of 
Experience had no sub-themes created. In total, 17 items were documented in this sub-
theme. The largest number of comments recorded was by jurisdiction # 3 with 10, or 58% 
of the total number of comments recorded in this sub-theme.  
Table B.7 Breakdown of Jurisdictions Reporting Strengths within the area of 
Experience 
 
Jurisdiction Experience Total 
3 10 10 
4 1 1 
7 2 2 
8 3 3 
10 1 1 
Total 17 17 
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APPENDIX C 
ANALYSIS OF THE RECOMMENDATIONS REPORTED IN THE AARS 
Jurisdictions with Recommendations within the area of Communications 
 
 The total number of jurisdictions with recommendations within the main theme of 
Communications was eight (11). This represents of 100% of the jurisdictions included in 
the study. As indicated in the methodology section of this study, the main theme of 
Communications was broken down into the two (2) sub-themes of communications with 
personnel and communications with the public. Of the eleven jurisdictions with 
recommendations, 100% had comments within the sub-theme of communications with 
personnel and 45% had comments related to the sub-theme of communications with the 
public. In total, 35 items were documented in this sub-theme, Communications with 
personnel having 15, and the remaining 20 being assigned to the area of communications 
with the public. Jurisdiction #10 had the highest number of recommendations with 9 (4-
personnel, 5-public) in total, or just over 25% of all of the recommendations provided. 
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Table C.1 Breakdown of Jurisdictions with Recommendations in the area of 
Communications 
 
Jurisdiction 
Comm. 
w/Personnel 
Comm. w/the 
Public 
Total 
1 1 0 1 
2 2 3 5 
3 1 0 1 
4 1 0 1 
5 3 0 3 
6 2 3 5 
7 3 2 5 
8 1 2 3 
9 1 0 1 
10 4 5 9 
11 1 0 1 
Total 20 15 35 
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Jurisdictions with Recommendations within the area of Conduct Exercises 
 
 The total number of jurisdictions with recommendations within the main theme of 
Conduct Exercises was three (3). This is representative of 27% of the jurisdictions 
included in the study. As indicated in the methodology section of this study, the main 
theme of Conduct Exercises had no sub-themes created. In total, six (6) items were 
documented in this sub-theme. The largest number of comments recorded was by 
jurisdiction # 7 with 4, or 66% of the total number of comments recorded in this sub-
theme.  
Table C.2 Breakdown of Jurisdictions with Recommendations in the area of Conduct 
Exercises 
 
Jurisdiction 
Conduct 
Exercises 
Total 
1 1 1 
6 1 1 
7 4 4 
Total 6 6 
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Jurisdictions with Recommendations within the area of Resources 
 
 The total number of jurisdictions with recommendations within the main theme of 
Resources was eleven (11). This is representative of 100% of the jurisdictions included in 
the study. As indicated in the methodology section of this study, the main theme of 
Resources was broken down into the three (3) sub-themes of identify resources needs 
(equipment), identify resource needs (non-equipment), and resource tracking. Of the 
eleven jurisdictions with recommendations, 100% had comments within the sub-theme of 
equipment, 54% had comments in the sub-them of non-equipment, and 27% had 
recommendation the area of resource tracking. In total, 42 items were documented. 54% 
in the area of equipment, 38% in the area of non-equipment and 7% in the area of 
resource tracking. Jurisdiction #3 had the highest number or recommendations, with eight 
(8); 3 in the area of equipment and 5 in the area of non-equipment. In total, submitting 
19% of the total number of recommendations for this category.      
Table C.3 Breakdown of Jurisdictions with Recommendations in the area of Resources 
 
Jurisdiction Equipment Non-Equipment Tracking Total 
1 2 1 0 3 
2 2 3 1 6 
3 3 5 0 8 
4 2 3 0 5 
5 2 2 0 4 
6 1 0 0 1 
7 3 2 1 6 
8 1 0 0 1 
9 1 0 0 1 
10 5 0 0 5 
11 1 0 1 2 
Total 23 16 3 42 
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Jurisdictions with Recommendations within the area of Training 
 
 The total number of jurisdictions with recommendations within the main theme of 
Training was seven (7). This is representative of 63% of the jurisdictions included in the 
study. As indicated in the methodology section of this study, the main theme of Training 
had no sub-themes created. In total, 25 items were documented in this theme. The largest 
number of comments recorded was by jurisdiction # 7 with 9, or 36% of the total number 
of comments recorded in this sub-theme.  
Table C.4 Breakdown of Jurisdictions with Recommendations in the area of Training 
 
Jurisdiction Conduct Training Total 
1 6 6 
2 1 1 
4 2 2 
5 2 2 
6 4 4 
7 9 9 
10 1 1 
Total 25 25 
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Jurisdictions with Recommendations within the area of Exercises 
 
 The total number of jurisdictions with recommendations within the main theme of 
Organization was three (3). This is representative of 27% of the jurisdictions included in 
the study. As indicated in the methodology section of this study, the main theme of 
Exercises had no sub-themes created. In total, 6 items were documented in this theme. 
The largest number of comments recorded was by jurisdiction # 7 with 4, or 66% of the 
total number of comments recorded in this sub-theme.  
Table C.5 Breakdown of Jurisdictions with Recommendations in the area of Exercises 
 
Jurisdiction Conduct Exercises Total 
1 1 1 
6 1 1 
7 4 4 
Total 6 6 
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Jurisdictions with Recommendations within the area of Organization 
 
 The total number of jurisdictions with recommendations within the main theme of 
Organization was eleven (11). This represents 100% of the jurisdictions included in the 
study. As indicated in the methodology section, the main theme of Organization was 
broken down into the four (4) sub-themes of coordination, facility, procedures, and 
policies. Of the eleven jurisdictions 27% had comments within the sub-theme of 
coordination, 36% had comments in the sub-theme of facility, 81% had recommendations 
in the area of procedures and another 81% had recommendations in the area of policies. 
In total, 58 items were documented. 10% in the area of coordination, 8% in the area of 
facility, 53% in the sub-theme of procedures and finally, 27% in the area of policies. The 
jurisdiction with the highest number of recommendations, with nineteen (12), was 
jurisdiction #4. Jurisdiction #7 also submitted a high number of recommendation within 
the theme of organization with eight (8).  
 Table C.6: Breakdown of Jurisdictions with Recommendations in the area of 
Organization 
 
Jurisdiction Coordination Facility Procedures Policies Total 
1 0 2 4 0 6 
2 0 0 3 3 6 
3 0 1 2 1 4 
4 2 0 9 1 12 
5 2 0 1 3 6 
6 2 0 1 1 4 
7 0 0 7 1 8 
8 0 1 0 0 1 
9 0 0 1 4 5 
10 0 1 3 1 5 
11 0 0 0 1 1 
Total 6 5 31 16 58 
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APPENDIX D 
CODEBOOK FOR THE ANALYSIS OF AFTER ACTION REPORTS 
 This codebook has been developed in an association with the study being 
undertaken to identify the most common challenges that are found within Emergency 
Operations Centers during activations. Additionally, the study compares the data across 
multiple jurisdictions to identify any possible relationships between challenges. The data 
used for this study has been derived from the eleven AARs that were submitted by 
jurisdictions with a population size of between 300,000 and 499,000. The total number of 
jurisdictions within this population range located within the United States is twenty-
seven. Thus, the number of jurisdictions participating in this study represents 40.7% of 
the eligible participants.  
 The codebook is constructed to correspond with the issues identified in the 
research questions and hypotheses developed for this study (Princeton University, n/d). 
Each AAR has been coded against the variables (themes and sub-themes) that have been 
created to address the research questions and hypotheses. Additionally, calculations have 
been done within some themes to identify frequencies of subthemes to provide a more in 
depth analysis of the data. Finally, the analysis has identified the most common strengths 
and recommendations noted in the AARs examined. 
 The codebook has been divided into 3 distinct sections. The first outlines the 
questions used to identify those jurisdictions who identified in their AAR that they had 
issues with the themes and/or sub-themes created under the category of Challenges. The 
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usage of a number 1 indicates that the jurisdiction did indicate an issue in that specific 
theme or sub-theme. The coding of the number 2 indicates that they did not document 
any issues within that theme or sub-theme that had a negative impact on their EOC 
operation 
 The second section addresses the area of strengths. In this category, if a 
jurisdiction indicted that they had a strength in a specific theme or sub-theme, it was 
coded as a 1. If there was no indication that the jurisdiction had a strength in the specific 
theme or sub-theme, it was coded as a 2. The coding of a 2 does not imply there were 
weaknesses in the theme or sub-theme. It only indicates if the jurisdiction documented a 
strength in the AAR for that specific theme or sub-theme.  
 The final section indicates if a jurisdiction documented a recommendation in a 
specific theme or sub-theme. The coding of 1 indicates that there was a recommendation 
documented within a specific theme or sub-theme. The coding of a 2 indicates that the 
jurisdiction did not document a recommendation for that specific theme or sub-theme.            
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Codebook for the Category of Challenges 
Category Question Code 
 
 
Challenge 
 
Did the jurisdiction indicate that the communications 
equipment, or lack thereof, have negative impact on 
EOC operations? 
 
 
 
1=Yes  2=No 
 
 
Challenge 
 
Did the jurisdiction indicate that the lack of 
communications procedures had a negative impact on 
the EOC operations? 
 
 
 
 
1=Yes  2=No 
 
 
Challenge 
 
Did the jurisdiction indicate that the lack of experience 
had a negative impact on the EOC operations? 
 
 
 
 
1=Yes  2=No 
 
 
Challenge 
 
Did the jurisdiction indicate that poor coordination had 
a negative impact on EOC operations? 
 
 
 
 
1=Yes  2=No 
 
 
Challenge 
 
Did the jurisdiction indicate that the facility had a 
negative impact on EOC operations? 
 
 
 
 
1=Yes  2=No 
 
 
Challenge 
 
Did the jurisdiction indicate that the lack of, or poorly 
written policies, had a negative impact on EOC 
operations? 
 
 
 
 
1=Yes  2=No 
 
 
Challenge 
 
Did the jurisdiction indicate that the lack of, or poorly 
written procedures, had a negative impact on EOC 
operations? 
 
 
 
 
1=Yes  2=No 
 
 
Challenge 
 
Did the jurisdiction indicate that the lack of resources 
had a negative impact on EOC operations? 
 
 
 
 
 
1=Yes  2=No 
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Challenge 
 
Did the jurisdiction indicate that the lack of situational 
awareness had a negative impact on EOC operations? 
 
 
 
 
1=Yes  2=No 
 
 
Challenge 
 
Did the jurisdiction indicate that the lack of training had 
a negative impact on EOC operations? 
 
 
 
1=Yes  2=No 
 
 
Challenge 
 
Did the jurisdiction indicate that the lack of 
organization have a negative impact on EOC 
operations? 
 
 
 
1=Yes  2=No 
 
 
Challenge 
 
Did the jurisdiction indicate that the lack of 
communications have a negative impact on EOC 
operations? 
 
 
 
1=Yes  2=No 
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Codebook for the Category of Strength 
Category Question Code 
 
 
Strength 
 
Did the jurisdiction indicate a strength in the area of 
communications with the public? 
 
 
 
1=Yes  2=No 
 
 
Strength 
 
Did the jurisdiction indicate a strength in the area of 
communication with staff? 
 
 
 
1=Yes  2=No 
 
 
Strength 
 
Did the jurisdiction indicate that past exercises had a 
positive impact on EOC operations? 
 
 
 
1=Yes  2=No 
 
 
Strength 
 
Did the jurisdiction indicate that experience had a 
positive impact on EOC operations? 
 
 
 
1=Yes  2=No 
 
 
Strength 
 
Did the jurisdiction indicate that collaboration had a 
positive impact on EOC operations? 
 
 
 
1=Yes  2=No 
 
 
Strength 
 
Did the jurisdiction indicate coordination had a 
positive impact on EOC operations? 
 
 
 
1=Yes  2=No 
 
 
Strength 
 
Did the jurisdiction indicate the use of resources had a 
positive impact on EOC operations? 
 
 
 
1=Yes  2=No 
 
Strength 
 
 
Did the jurisdiction indicate that personnel performed 
well in the EOC? 
 
1=Yes  2=No 
 
 
Strength 
 
Did the jurisdiction indicate that previously 
established relationships had a positive impact on EOC 
operations? 
 
 
 
1=Yes  2=No 
 
Strength 
 
Did the jurisdiction indicate that situational awareness 
had a positive impact on EOC operations? 
 
 
1=Yes  2=No 
 
 
Strength 
 
Did the jurisdiction indicate that past training had a 
positive impact on EOC operations? 
 
 
 
 
1=Yes  2=No 
225 
 
 
 
Strength 
 
Did the jurisdiction indicate that communications had 
a positive impact on EOC operations? 
 
 
 
1=Yes  2=No 
 
 
Strength 
 
Did the jurisdiction indicate that organization had a 
positive impact on EOC operations? 
 
 
 
1=Yes  2=No 
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Codebook for the Category of Recommendations 
Category Question Code 
 
 
Recommendation 
 
Did the jurisdiction have 
recommendations in the area of 
improving communications with staff? 
 
 
 
1=Yes  2=No 
 
 
Recommendation 
 
Did the jurisdiction have 
recommendations in the area of 
improving communications with the 
public? 
 
 
 
1=Yes  2=No 
 
 
Recommendation 
 
Did the jurisdiction have 
recommendations to conduct more 
exercises? 
 
 
 
1=Yes  2=No 
 
 
Recommendation 
 
Did the jurisdiction have 
recommendations in the area of 
identifying needed equipment resources 
earlier? 
 
 
 
1=Yes  2=No 
 
 
Recommendation 
 
Did the jurisdiction have 
recommendations in the area of 
identifying needed non-equipment 
resources earlier? 
 
 
 
 
1=Yes  2=No 
 
 
Recommendation 
 
Did the jurisdiction have 
recommendations in the area of 
improving resource tracking? 
 
 
 
1=Yes  2=No 
 
 
Recommendation 
 
Did the jurisdiction have 
recommendations to conduct more 
training? 
 
 
 
1=Yes  2=No 
 
 
Recommendation 
 
Did the jurisdiction have 
recommendations to improve 
coordination? 
 
 
 
1=Yes  2=No 
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Recommendation 
 
 
Did the jurisdiction have 
recommendations to improve the 
facility? 
 
 
 
 
 
1=Yes  2=No 
 
 
Recommendation 
 
 
Did the jurisdiction have 
recommendations in the area of 
resources? 
 
 
 
 
1=Yes  2=No 
 
 
Recommendation 
 
Did the jurisdiction have 
recommendations to create or improve 
policies? 
 
 
 
1=Yes  2=No 
 
 
Recommendation 
 
Did the jurisdiction have 
recommendations to create or improve 
procedures? 
 
 
 
1=Yes  2=No 
 
 
Recommendation 
 
Did the jurisdiction have 
recommendations in the area of 
communications? 
 
 
 
1=Yes  2=No 
 
 
Recommendation 
 
Did the jurisdiction have 
recommendations to improve the area 
of organization? 
 
 
 
1=Yes  2=No 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
228 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX E 
DICTIONARY 
Term 
 
Definition Source 
 
 
 
Communication 
 
The act or process of using words, 
sounds, signs, or behaviors to express 
or exchange information or to express 
your ideas, thoughts, feelings, etc., to 
someone else 
 
 
 
Merriam-Webster 
 
 
Collaborate 
 
To cooperate with an agency or 
instrumentality with which one is not 
immediately connected 
 
 
Merriam-Webster 
 
 
Coordinate 
 
To cause (two or more things) to be the 
same or to go together well : to cause 
(two or more things) to not conflict 
with or contradict each other 
 
 
 
Merriam-Webster 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Drill 
 
 
 
 
 
A drill is a coordinated, supervised activity 
usually employed to validate a specific 
operation or function in a single agency or 
organization. Drills are commonly used to 
provide training on new equipment, 
develop or validate new policies or 
procedures, or practice and maintain 
current skills. 
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Exercise 
An instrument to train for, assess, practice, 
and improve performance in prevention, 
protection, mitigation, response, and 
recovery capabilities in a risk-free 
environment. Exercises can be used for 
testing and validating policies, plans, 
procedures, training, equipment, and 
interagency agreements; clarifying and 
training personnel in roles and 
responsibilities; improving interagency 
coordination and communications; 
improving individual performance; 
identifying gaps in resources; and 
identifying opportunities for improvement. 
Exercise can be conducted in various 
formats such as drills, seminars, workshops, 
games, functional exercise, table-top 
exercise, full-scale exercise 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
HSEEP 
 
 
Experience 
 
skill or knowledge that you get by doing 
something 
 
 
 
Merriam-Webster 
 
 
 
 
Full Scale Exercise 
The most complex and resource-intensive 
type of exercise. They involve multiple 
agencies, organizations, and jurisdictions 
and validate many facets of preparedness. 
FSEs often include many players operating 
under cooperative systems such as the 
Incident Command System or Unified 
Command. 
 
 
 
 
HSEEP 
 
 
 
 
 
Functional Exercise 
Exercises are designed to validate and 
evaluate capabilities, multiple functions 
and/or sub-functions, or interdependent 
groups of functions. FEs are typically focused 
on exercising plans, policies, procedures, and 
staff members involved in management, 
direction, command, and control functions. 
In FEs, events are projected through an 
exercise scenario with event updates that 
drive activity at the management level. An 
FE is conducted in a realistic, real-time 
environment; however, movement of 
personnel and equipment is usually 
simulated. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
HSEEP 
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Game 
 
A simulation of operations that often 
involves two or more teams, usually in a 
competitive environment, using rules, data, 
and procedures designed to depict an actual 
or hypothetic situation. Games explore the 
consequences of player decisions and 
actions and are therefore excellent tools to 
use when validating or reinforcing plans and 
procedures or evaluating resource 
requirements. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
HSEEP 
 
 
Homeland Security 
Exercise and Evaluation 
Program (HSEEP) 
 
 
HSEEP is a program that provides a set of 
guiding principles for exercise programs, as 
well as a common approach to exercise 
program management, design and 
development, conduct, evaluation, and 
improvement planning. 
 
 
 
 
HSEEP 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Incident Command 
System (ICS) 
 
 
 
 
Management system designed to enable 
effective and efficient domestic incident 
management by integrating a combination 
of facilities, equipment, personnel, 
procedures, and communications operating 
within a common organizational structure. 
ICS is normally structured to facilitate 
activities in five major functional areas: 
command, operations, planning, logistics, 
Intelligence & Investigations, finance and 
administration. It is a fundamental form of 
management, with the purpose of enabling 
incident managers to identify the key 
concerns associated with the incident—
often under urgent conditions—without 
sacrificing attention to any component of 
the command system.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DHS 
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National Incident 
Management System 
(NIMS) 
 
The NIMS standard was designed to 
enhance the ability of the United States to 
manage domestic incidents by establishing a 
single, comprehensive system for incident 
management. It is a system mandated by 
Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5 
(HSPD-5) that provides a consistent, 
nationwide approach for Federal, State, 
local, tribal, and territorial governments; the 
private sector; and nongovernmental 
organizations to work effectively and 
efficiently together to prepare for, respond 
to, and recover from domestic incidents, 
regardless of cause, size, or complexity. 
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Organization 
 
an administrative and functional 
structure (as a business or a political 
party); also :  the personnel of such a 
structure 
 
 
 
 
Merriam-Webster 
 
 
Policy 
 
a set of guidelines or rules that determine a 
course of action 
 
 
 
Merriam-Webster 
 
 
Procedure 
 
a series of actions that are done in a certain 
way or order : an established or accepted 
way of doing something 
 
 
Merriam-Webster 
 
 
 
Plan 
 
 
a set of actions that have been thought 
of as a way to do or achieve something 
 
 
 
 
 
Merriam-Webster 
 
 
Relationship 
 
the way in which two or more people, 
groups, countries, etc., talk to, behave 
toward, and deal with each other 
 
 
Merriam-Webster 
 
 
Resource 
 
a source of supply or support: an 
available means —usually used in plural 
 
 
 
Merriam-Webster 
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Seminar 
 
Orient participants to, or provide an 
overview of, authorities, strategies, plans, 
policies, procedures, protocols, resources, 
concepts, and ideas. As a discussion-based 
exercise, seminars can be valuable for 
entities that are developing or making major 
changes to existing plans or procedures. 
Seminars can be similarly helpful when 
attempting to gain awareness of, or assess, 
the capabilities of interagency or inter-
jurisdictional operations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
HSEEP 
 
 
 
Situational Awareness 
 
Gaining an understanding of the situation 
includes gathering, recording, analyzing, and 
displaying information regarding the scale, 
scope, complexity, and potential incident 
impacts 
 
 
 
 
Department of 
Homeland Security 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table Top Exercise 
 
Exercise is typically held in an informal 
setting intended to generate discussion of 
various issues regarding a hypothetical, 
simulated emergency. TTXs can be used to 
enhance general awareness, validate plans 
and procedures, rehearse concepts, and/or 
assess the types of systems needed to guide 
the prevention of, protection from, 
mitigation of, response to, and recovery 
from a defined incident. Generally, TTXs are 
aimed at facilitating conceptual 
understanding, identifying strengths and 
areas for improvement, and/or achieving 
changes in attitudes. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
HSEEP 
 
 
 
 
Training 
 
Training can encompass those activities that 
are designed to improve the knowledge 
and/or skill of an individual to improve 
his/her performance. Training activities can 
include lectures, independent study, hands 
on skill development, classroom instructor, 
one- on- one instruction    
 
 
 
 
 
Merriam-Webster 
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Workshop 
 
Although similar to seminars, workshops 
differ in two important aspects: participant 
interaction is increased, and the focus is 
placed on achieving or building a product. 
Effective workshops entail the broadest 
attendance by relevant stakeholders. 
Products produced from a workshop can 
include new standard operating procedures, 
emergency operations plans, continuity of 
operations plans, and mutual aid 
agreements. To be effective, workshops 
should focus on a specific issue, and the 
desired objective, product, or goal must be 
clearly defined. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
HSEEP 
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APPENDIX F 
SAMPLE LETTER 
******************** 
******************** 
******************** 
******************** 
Attention: ******************** 
 
Dear ****************: 
 
I would first like to thank you for taking my call on ******** to assist me with my 
research. As a follow up to our conversation, I would like to request a copy of an After 
Action Report that is directly related to an activation of your jurisdiction’s Emergency 
Operations Center. As I shared during our conversation, I am a student at Jacksonville 
State University, in the Emergency Management doctoral program, and I am studying 
how to improve EOC operations through the use of AARs to help identify the most 
common challenges that occur during EOC activations. The study will be used to help 
enhance EOC operations and improve our understanding of what errors are most 
prevalent so that future educational and training programs can be structured to address 
them in a holistic and comprehensive manner. This will hopefully provide a foundation 
from which we will be able to help improve EOC operations regardless of their makeup, 
size, and/or location. As I explained, the AAR can be based upon either a real world 
event or an exercise in which your EOC was activated and expected to perform tasks in 
response to a natural, manmade, or technological incident.  
 
For your assurance, neither your jurisdiction, anybody who participated in the EOC 
activation nor anybody associated with the AAR submitted will be identified in my 
dissertation. My contact information is provided below if you should have any questions 
or concerns. Thank you very much for your assistance in helping me to complete my 
research project and fulfill my aspiration to improve EOC operations. 
 
Sincerely, 
 
Michael Ryan 
Email: jsu0049k@jsu.edu 
Phone: 571-447-3231 
 
